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# The idea of stagnation in Korean historiography

FROM FUKUDA TOKUZŌ TO THE NEW RIGHT

## INTRODUCTION

The idea of a stagnant past giving rise to a backward present is by no means unique to the study of Korean history. This idea was almost universal in the approach of colonizing European nations to the subjects of their imperial domination, from at least the late eighteenth century onward. Perry Anderson has given an excellent overview of the genesis and development of the ideas of 'Asiatic' stagnation and despotism as employed by thinkers as diverse as Machiavelli, Bacon, Montesquieu, Hegel, John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. He has also analysed the way in which Marx and Engels absorbed many of these ideas in the mid-nineteenth century in the formation of their views on Asia, giving some parts of Marxist theory a distinctly 'Orientalist' slant.<sup>1</sup> The concept of stagnation itself can be understood as an inversion of the concept of linear progress, invented in the course of the most recent world-historical transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist societies. This dichotomy between past and future was something novel, replacing the prevailing cyclical or messianic conceptions of time. As Shlomo Sand has written recently,

*The rupture caused by modernization detached humanity from its recent past. The mobility created by industrialization and urbanization shattered not only the rigid social ladder but also the traditional, cyclic continuity between past, present and future.*<sup>2</sup>

In the twentieth century the concepts of progress and stagnation became deeply embedded in the consciousness of people everywhere, but perhaps especially so in the minds of those living in the late developing countries like (South) Korea, who are constantly reminded of the need to 'catch up' or to eliminate any vestiges of the 'stagnant' past.

However, in the academic world the concept of stagnation cannot be reduced simply to a matter of Eurocentric ideology or a tool of imperialism, since it often forms a part of serious scholarly attempts to analyse the history of particular countries and reflects, however imperfectly, the real geographical and temporal unevenness of human historical development. When it comes to the politically ambiguous nature of the concept of stagnation, Korea is a case in point. In the historiography of Korea, stagnation was first used as a justification for Japanese colonialism and later adopted by Marxists seeking revolutionary social transformation; the concept is still today causing controversy among Korean historians who line up on either side of the debate over 'internal development' versus 'colonial modernity.'

This article will introduce themes that will be developed further in an upcoming monograph-length study of Marxist historiography in Korea and East Asia. The planned monograph will address the recurring dichotomies of stagnation/progress and particular/universal in the East

<sup>1</sup> Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 462-483. For further discussions of Eurocentrism and the origins of the Eurocentric view of history see Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (London: Zed Books, 1989); Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

<sup>2</sup> Shlomo Sand, *The Invention of the Jewish People* (London: Verso, 2009), pp. 62-3.

Asian historical debates of the twentieth century. As part of that broader project, this article will focus on how the concept of stagnation or backwardness has been applied to Korean history, from the beginning of the twentieth century up until the present day, looking at three scholars who have worked within this paradigm.<sup>3</sup> We will begin with the Japanese economist Fukuda Tokuzō 福田徳三 in the early years of the twentieth century, then look at the mid-century work of Korean Marxist historian Chōn Sōktam 全錫談, before concluding with an overview of some of the ideas of Rhee Younghoon 李榮薰, the contemporary Seoul National University economic historian.

Although previous scholarship has paid attention to stagnation theory, this attention has generally consisted of a rather formulaic denunciation of Japanese colonial historiography. In this scheme, stagnation theory is simply one element of Japanese colonial domination that had to be overcome by the theories of internal development developed by North and South Korean scholars in the post-liberation period. Whatever the intrinsic problems of stagnation theory itself, this article aims to show that such an approach to the concept is far too simplistic. The three scholars examined here have offered quite different conceptions of stagnation in Korean history and differing explanations of its causes. The political and historical contexts in which they have approached the problem of stagnation have varied greatly and their political motivations for applying the concept have occupied opposite ends of the spectrum, stretching from revolutionary socialism to conservative neoliberalism and colonial apologism. Contrary to the general assumption of nationalist historians in Korea that stagnation theory was simply a tool of colonial ideology that had to be ‘overcome’ in the postcolonial era, this article will show that the politics of stagnation

are more complex and can only be transcended with a more fundamental re-evaluation of the progress/stagnation dichotomy.

### FUKUDA TOKUZŌ'S STAGNATION THEORY

The first figure that looms large in the history of stagnation theory in Korea is that of the Japanese economic thinker Fukuda Tokuzō (1874-1930). Fukuda was born in Tokyo in 1874 and after a precocious academic career at Hitotsubashi University (then called Tokyo Higher Commercial School 東京高等商業学校), he went in 1898 to study for a doctorate in Germany under Karl Bücher and Lujo Brentano, both scholars of the German Historical School of Economics.<sup>4</sup>

In Japan, Fukuda is known as an anti-Marxistliberal economic thinker who was keenly interested in social policy and sought to theorize ‘welfare economics.’ In Korea, though, Fukuda is known almost exclusively as the author of the original stagnation theory that would become one of the perennial ideological props of Japanese colonial rule on the peninsula. Shortly after receiving his doctorate in Germany and returning to Japan in 1901, Fukuda Tokuzō visited Korea. It was this visit that inspired



Fukuda Tokuzō

the 1904 essay that has given Fukuda such an infamous role in Korean historiography, entitled “The economic organizations and economic units of Korea” (“Kankoku no keizai soshiki to keizai tani” 韓國の經濟組織と經濟單位).<sup>5</sup> Here he made an explicit contrast between the normal, developmental path of Japan which, in his doctoral thesis of four years earlier, he had described as similar to that of Germany, and the abnormal development of Korea.<sup>6</sup>

For Fukuda one of the main symptoms of Korea’s backwardness that he had observed during his visit was the underdevelopment of private ownership in land. Accord-

3 While I do not argue that these three scholars exhaust the history of stagnation theory in Korea, they are, I believe, representative of the three distinct forms that stagnation theory has taken over the last century.

4 For more on the life and ideas of Fukuda Tokuzō, see Inoue Takutoshi and Yagi Kiichiro, “Two Inquirers on the Divide: Tokuzo Fukuda and Hajime Kawakami,” <http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~yagi/FUkkawiy.html> (accessed 8/7/2010); Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *A History of Japanese Economic Thought* (London: Routledge, 1989).

5 Fukuda Tokuzō, “Kankoku no keizai soshiki to keizai tani.”

6 Yi Ch’ōlsōng, “Shingminji shigi yōksa inshik-kwa yōksa sōsul,” *Han’guksa 23* (Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1994): pp. 150-151.

ing to him even state or royal ownership of land was essentially a fiction, and the *yangban* 兩班 ruling class had social privileges rather than landed estates. Another sign of backwardness could be found in human relationships, where relations of obedience between commoners and *yangban* prevailed and relations between free individuals were lacking. Likewise, in the Korean villages the clan system predominated, meaning that there was no concept of the individual, no independent small family unit and little or no social differentiation.<sup>7</sup> It is interesting to note that these symptoms of backwardness can be found among the main features of Asiatic societies identified by European Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu, Smith and Hegel.<sup>8</sup>

Fukuda had adopted Karl Bücher's theory of developmental stages in economic history and now tried to apply this scheme to Korea's economic history. In fact, Fukuda's essay on Korea is significant due to the fact that it introduced the concept of economic stages to Korean history for the first time, a mode of analysis that would later be taken up by both Japanese and Korean Marxist historians. He claimed that Korea was still stuck at the stage of the small-scale self-sufficient 'closed household economy' (*Geschlossene Hauswirtschaft*) with negligible distribution of goods via the market. This meant that Korea had not yet reached the intermediate economic stage of 'town economy' (*Stadtwirtschaft*), let alone the modern stage of 'national economy' (*Volkswirtschaft*). According to Fukuda this meant that in terms of Japanese history Korea was at a similar stage to the period before the establishment of the Kamakura Bakufu in 1185. In German terms Korea was at the same stage as high medieval states such as the Salian Dynasty of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In other words, Korean development lagged behind Japan and Europe by some seven or eight hundred years.<sup>9</sup>

Fukuda, like his German mentor Bücher, was a devout stagist.<sup>10</sup> He believed that to reach the stage of *Volkswirt-*

*schaft* a society had to go through the stage of *Stadtwirtschaft*, which in Europe and Japan was equated with the feudal political system. This belief then translated into Fukuda's central explanation of Korean historical backwardness: the contention that the country had lacked a feudal stage in its history.<sup>11</sup> It was this stage that had made it possible for countries like Germany and Japan to achieve modernity, even if they lagged behind some other European countries. Lack of a feudal stage, according to Fukuda, doomed a country to perpetual backwardness or the tutelage of a more advanced nation.

In his 1904 article, Fukuda openly used his theory of Korean stagnation to advocate Japanese domination and absorption of Korea in an argument reminiscent of the classic justifications of European imperialism, exemplified in Kipling's "The White Man's Burden":

*We must realise the weight of the task that faces [the Japanese nation], as it is the natural destiny and duty of a powerful and superior culture to assimilate [Korea] by sweeping away the national particularity of this country that has reached the extremes of corruption and decline and whose people have not experienced feudal education and the development of their economic units on the basis of that education.*<sup>12</sup>

Later, during the 1920s, the idea that Korea's backwardness was due to its lack of a feudal stage was taken up by other Japanese historians such as Kokusho Iwao 黑正巖 (1895-1949) and Shikata Hiroshi 四方博 (1900-1973). By the late 1920s and early 1930s, as I will show in the next section, Fukuda's theory of Korean stagnation was being overtaken by the new Marxist historiography that was eagerly adopted by both Japanese and Korean scholars. But, with a few exceptions, this too would focus on finding explanations for Korea's backwardness.

7 Kang Chinch'öl, "Ilche kwanhakcha-ga pon Han'guksa-üi 'ch'öngch'esöng'-gwa kü iron," *Han'guk sahak* 7 (1986): pp. 174-175. Judged by the standards of today's understanding of late Chosön history Fukuda's picture of Korean economy and society is clearly very deficient. One can only guess that the reasons for this were a lack of serious research combined with the prejudices that he brought with him from Japan and Germany. His stagist outlook also leads him to ignore the possibility that what he observed in Korea in 1902 was actually the result of fairly recent developments, such as the impact of imperialism and world capitalism since the 1870s and the decline of the Chosön state.

8 Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, pp. 462.

9 Kang Chinch'öl, "Ilche kwanhakcha-ga pon Han'guksa-üi 'ch'öngch'esöng'-gwa kü iron," p. 170.

10 This is meant in the sense of someone who believes that there are necessary stages through which every society must pass in order to progress, as opposed to thinkers like Alexander Gerschenkron and Leon Trotsky, who believed that societies could leap over certain stages, using the 'advantage of backwardness' to compress development into much shorter periods than their forerunners.


11 This theory is referred to in Korean as *ponggön chedo kyöillyöron* (封建制度缺如論).

12 Fukuda Tokuzō, "Kankoku no keizai soshiki to keizai tani," quoted in Yi Ch'ölsöng. "Shingminji shgi yöksa inshik-kwa yöksa sösul," p. 129.

## CHŎN SŎKTAM AND THE 'KOREAN KŌZA-HA'

The Marxist historiography of Paek Nam-un 白南雲 (1894-1979) is now relatively well known, but the same cannot be said for the other pioneering Korean Marxist historians of the 1930s and 1940s.<sup>13</sup> One reason for this may be that among their leading members were those who advocated a stagnation approach to pre-modern Korea; something that did not sit well with the Stalinist-nationalist historiography that emerged in North Korea in the 1950s and in the South in the 1970s and 1980s. Already during the 1930s prominent Korean Marxists, including Kim Kwang-jin 金光鎮 (1903-86) and Yi Ch'ŏng-won 李清源, had fiercely criticized Paek's "five stages" approach and advocated the application of the Asiatic mode of production to Korean history in what might be called the 'Korean Kōza-ha.'<sup>14</sup> In the post-liberation years of the late 1940s another historian, Chŏn Sŏktam, emerged as the leading 'stagnationist.' Before we consider his particular approach to the issue of stagnation and Korean history, we should first look at one of the main sources for the ideas of the Korean Marxists of the 1930s and 1940s.

In the 1920s and 1930s debates raged among Marxists around the world over the applicability of Marx's schemes of historical development to the non-European world and these debates crystallized around two particular positions. Those that advocated the five-stages theory received the



Chŏn Sŏktam – *Chosŏn kjongjesa*



1987 edition cover

official endorsement of Stalin, but this did not stop those advocating the "two roads" theory (feudalism in Europe and an Asiatic mode of production in the non-European world) from continuing the debate well into the 1930s.<sup>15</sup>

The background to the Korean absorption and adaptation of these Japanese and international Marxist debates on history was, of course, the Japanese colonial annexation of Korea from 1910 to 1945. It is well known that many famous Korean Marxists studied in Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, but much less known that Japanese Marxists came to Korea. One such person was the historian Moriya Katsumi 森谷克己 (1904-1964), who went to work at Keijō Imperial University 京城帝國大學 (the predecessor of today's Seoul National University) in 1927, immediately after graduating from Tokyō Imperial University 東京帝國大學, and was made assistant professor there in 1929. In 1933 Moriya published a volume of articles along with some of his Keijō colleagues, including Shikata Hiroshi, Takeji Ōuchi 大内武次 and Pak Mun-gyu 朴文奎<sup>16</sup>, entitled *Studies on the Socio-economic History of Chosŏn* (*Chosen shakai keizaishi kenkyu* 朝鮮社會經濟史研究).

In his own article "A Study on the Traditional Agricultural Society of Korea ("Kyū rai no Chōsen nōgyō shakai ni tsuite no kenkyū no tame ni" 舊來の朝鮮農業社會についての研究のために),<sup>17</sup> Moriya sets out to explain Korean backwardness, examining the ideas of Hegel, Marx and

<sup>13</sup> For a thorough introduction to the work of Paek Nam-un in English see: Pang Kie-chung. "Paek Namun and Marxist Scholarship during the Colonial Period," in *Landlords, Peasants and Intellectuals in Modern Korea*, edited by Pang Kie-chung and Michael D. Shin. Cornell East Asia Series, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> The Kōza-ha 講座派 or Lectures Faction was one of the two main factions of Japanese communist thinkers in the 1930s. On the Kōza-ha position on Japanese development and capitalism see Andrew Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan*, chapter 3.

<sup>15</sup> See Joshua Fogel, "The Debates over the Asiatic Mode of Production in Soviet Russia, China and Japan," *American Historical Review* 93:1 (February 1988): pp. 56-79.

<sup>16</sup> It is interesting to note that the one Korean contributor to this volume – Pak Mun-gyu – was also an assistant professor at Keijō Imperial University. After liberation in 1945, he eventually fled north like many other Korean Marxists and became a prominent political figure under Kim Il Sung, rising to the post of home affairs minister in 1962.

<sup>17</sup> Moriya Katsumi, "Kyū rai no Chōsen nōgyō shakai ni tsuite no kenkyū no tame ni," in *Keijō teikoku daigaku hobun gakkai: Chōsen shakai keizaishi kenkyu* (Tokyo: Tōkō Shoin, 1933), pp. 297-520.

Wittfogel along the way. Four years later, in 1937, Moriya published a detailed study of the Asiatic mode of production,<sup>18</sup> leaving little doubt that he was an advocate of the “two roads” thesis, as opposed to the then prevailing Stalinist orthodoxy of the “five stages.”<sup>19</sup> Having said this, it seems that he did not deny the existence of feudalism in Korean history as Fukuda had done, but rather saw Chosŏn society as a mixture of “immature” feudalism with a despotic bureaucratic state.<sup>20</sup>

Although Chŏn Sŏktam studied in Japan at Tohoku Imperial University 東北帝國大學 during the late 1930s and only returned to Korea in 1940, it is clear from the writings he published in the late 1940s that Moriya Katsumi was an important influence on his historiography.<sup>21</sup> In fact, it is probably no exaggeration to say that the influence of Moriya and other similar Japanese Marxists helped to form a ‘Korean Kōza-ha’ that became the dominant group of Marxist historians during the short post-liberation period of 1945-50.<sup>22</sup> In a series of books published by Chŏn and his collaborators between 1946 and 1949, these historians emphasized the stagnation of pre-modern Korean history and attempted to find an explanation for it.<sup>23</sup>

In order to give a clearer idea of the specificities of Chŏn’s stagnation theory, I will briefly examine some key ideas from an essay contained in his 1949 book *Economic history of Korea (Chosŏn kyŏngjesa 朝鮮經濟史)* that forms part of a substantial critique of Paek Nam-un’s Stalinist-universalist historiography. In this essay, entitled “The problem of ‘slave society’ as a stage of progression in the development of Korean society,”<sup>24</sup> he takes a rather different approach from Fukuda, proposing that the main reason for Korean backwardness was not the lack of a feudal period, but the lack of a slave society in Korean history. Chŏn argued that although slavery had always been an important form of labour in Korean history, it had never dominated over serf labour:

*It is true that there was much slavery in the Three Kingdoms period as well as during the United Shilla and Koryŏ periods and even through to the Chosŏn dynasty, and slave labour had considerable significance as one form of labour. This slave labour not only took the form of domestic slave labour; slaves played an important role in providing government artisans and were also employed in cultivating the landholdings of aristocrats and government officials. However, even in the case of the Three Kingdoms period, where people have made great efforts at trying to discover a slave-owning social formation, slave labour was not the dominant form of labour.*<sup>25</sup>

Chŏn actually put forward three interlinked reasons for Korea’s historical backwardness: first, the persistence of communal forms of social production such as lineage organizations; second, the underdevelopment of private land ownership and the dominance of state land ownership; third, the lack of a slave stage in Korean history. The significance of the non-development of a slave society was that, unlike in Greece and Rome, the remnants of the communal mode of production were not destroyed by the enslavement of a large part of the population and private property was not stimulated by the use of slave labour on large plantations.

At the beginning of the essay Chŏn refuses to be drawn into a discussion of the applicability of the Asiatic mode of production to Korean history. However, in the ensuing discussion of slave societies, it is clear that Chŏn had absorbed, almost certainly from Moriya Katsumi, many of the elements that theorists of the Asiatic mode of production emphasized, such as the persistence of communal social relations. Chŏn’s views of feudalism in Korean history also bear some resemblance to those of Moriya, since he argues that Korean feudalism had ‘Asian’ characteristics.<sup>26</sup> However, the political significance of Chŏn’s historiography was quite different from that of Moriya, who

<sup>18</sup> Moriya Katsumi, *Ajia teki seisan yoshiki ron*, Tō kyō: Ikuseisha, 1937.

<sup>19</sup> For more on the Asiatic mode-of-production debate in East Asia, see Joshua Fogel, “The Debates over the Asiatic Mode of Production.”

<sup>20</sup> Kang Chinch’ŏl, “Ilche kwanhakcha-ga pon Han’guksa-ŭi ‘chŏngch’esŏng’-gwa kŭ iron,” p. 215.

<sup>21</sup> The details of Chŏn’s life are not entirely clear, but more biographical information can be found in Im Yŏngt’ae. “Puk-ŭro kan Malskŭjuŭi yŏksa hakcha-wa sahoe kyŏngje hakcha tŭl,” *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 8 (1989): pp. 300-337.

<sup>22</sup> For more on these ‘mainstream’ Marxist historians, see Yi Hwanbyŏng. “Haebang chikhu Malskŭjuŭi yŏksa hakcha tŭr-ŭi Han’guksa inshik,” *Han’guk sahaksa hakpo* 5 (March 2002): pp. 41-88.

<sup>23</sup> The main books published by Chŏn during this period were Chŏn Sŏktam et al., *Yijo saehoe kyŏngjesa*, (Seoul: Nonongsa, 1946); *Chosŏnsa kyŏngjŏng* (Seoul: Uryu munhwasa, 1948); and *Chosŏn kyŏngjesa* (Seoul: Pangmun ch’ulp’ansa, 1949).

<sup>24</sup> Chŏn Sŏktam, “Chosŏn sahoe paljŏn-ŭi nujinjŏk tan’gye rosŏ-ŭi ‘noye sahoe’-ŭi munje,” in *Chosŏn kyŏngjesa*, pp. 20-30.

<sup>25</sup> Chŏn Sŏktam, *Chosŏn kyŏngjesa*, p. 22.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

by the early 1940s had become an apologist for Japanese imperialism in East Asia under the guise of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the struggle against Western imperialism.<sup>27</sup> Chŏn Sŏktam on the other hand remained a socialist and his understanding of Korea's historical backwardness did not lead him to pessimistic conclusions about the country's future. Rather, following Lenin and Trotsky's vision of Russia, Chŏn saw Korean backwardness as a call to arms and an opportunity to achieve rapid social change, as the following two quotations demonstrate:

*[B]y fully assessing the stagnancy of the Korean process of social development that is manifested in the underdevelopment of slave relations, we today can feel all the more acutely and urgently the necessity of the social historical revolution that faces us.*<sup>28</sup>

*If we purge all these feudal elements and achieve [...] a bourgeois revolution, we will not need to pass through two or three hundred years of bourgeois society like Britain or France but will be able to move to a newer society immediately afterwards.*<sup>29</sup>

Not long after writing this, sometime around 1950, Chŏn fled to North Korea where he became an important academic, teaching at both Kim Il Sung University 金日成大學 and the Institute of Social Sciences 社會科學院. However, it was not his 'stagnationist' view of Korean history that became the North Korean orthodoxy, but something much more akin to Paek Nam-un's application of the five-stages theory. This emerging North Korean orthodoxy, along with its corollary in a theory of internal development that effectively tried to erase the idea of backwardness from Korean history, would later have a profound influence on South Korean historiography too.

### RHEE YOUNGHOON AND THE NEW RIGHT

From the 1980s, various forms of internal-development theory became dominant in South Korean historical scholarship on pre-modern Korea. While these new theories may have been willing to recognize certain particularities of Korean historical development, they have

rested on two key assertions that are expressly aimed at overturning stagnation theories: the existence of a Korean feudal period and the endogenous development of capitalist relations of production during the latter part of that period, usually referred to as "capitalist sprouts."

Today, however, there are also heirs to the tradition of stagnation theory among the historians associated with South Korea's self-proclaimed New Right. Perhaps the most prominent of them is the Seoul National University economic historian Rhee Younghoon (Yi Yŏnghun), who has taken a leading role in the development of the relatively new field of quantitative economic history. His understanding of Korean history is certainly not the same as that of Fukuda or Chŏn, as it reflects decades of further research, important new empirical findings and, of course, the very different political and historical context of early twenty-first-century South Korea. As we will see, his understanding of the late Chosŏn period is more subtle than that of his predecessors and it is debatable whether it can simply be called a 'stagnation approach.' However, I think Rhee's theories have enough elements in common with those of earlier scholars for him to be seen as part of the same tradition in a broad sense.

In his 1988 book *Socio-economic History of the Late Chosŏn Period (Chosŏn hugi sahoe kyŏngjesa 朝鮮後期社會經濟史)*,<sup>30</sup> which was based on his PhD thesis of three years earlier, Rhee attempted a Marxist analysis of late Chosŏn economy and landholding. This Marxist analysis was rather different from the Stalinist five-stages theory that dominated Marxist historiography in North and South Korea by the 1980s. Instead, it was based on Nakamura Satoru 中村哲 and Miyajima Hiroshi's 宮嶋博史 reinterpretation of Marx. As he outlined in two appendices entitled "An investigation into the historical character of the Chosŏn social formation" and "A critical examination of the Chosŏn feudal system,"<sup>31</sup> Rhee explicitly rejected feudalism as a label for pre-modern Korean society and advocated a form of the two-roads theory. In these appendices he stresses the particularity of European feudalism as the dynamic system that gave rise to capitalism and notes that "this sort of feudal system did not exist in any non-European society, including Chosŏn."<sup>32</sup> In fact, he writes, "there is a gap between any form of Marx's feudal

27 Kang Chinch'ŏl, "Ilche kwanhakcha-ga pon Han'guksa-ŭi 'chŏngch'esŏng'-gwa kŭ iron," p. 217-218.

28 Chŏn Sŏktam, *Chosŏn kyŏngjesa*, p. 30.

29 Chŏn Sŏktam, *Chosŏn sa kyojŏng*, pp. 6-7, cited in Yi Hwanbyŏng, "Haebang chikhu Malsŏjuŭi yŏksa hakcha tŭr-ŭi Han'guksa inshik," p. 48

30 Yi Yŏnghun, *Chosŏn hugi sahoe kyŏngjesa* (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1988).

31 "Chosŏn sahoe kusŏng ŭi yŏksajŏk sŏnggyŏk e kwanhan koch'al" and "Chosŏn ponggŏn chedo ŭi pip'anjŏk kŏmt'o," in Yi Yŏnghun, *Chosŏn hugi sahoe kyŏngjesa*, pp. 599-628.



mode of production and the reality of Chosŏn society.”<sup>32</sup> Instead, he adopts Miyajima’s periodization of Korean history into three phases of the Asiatic mode of production, with Chosŏn corresponding to the third phase.<sup>33</sup> Therefore Rhee’s early understanding of Korean history, although not focusing explicitly on Korea’s backwardness, has some elements in common with earlier theories of stagnation, such as the denial of Korean feudalism and the idea that pre-modern Korea could not have achieved capitalism independently through internal development.

More recently, Rhee has been one of the leading members of the Naksŏngdae Economic Research Institute 落星臺經濟研究所 and the editor of a series of volumes bringing together new quantitative research on the late Chosŏn period. The most well-known of these is *Re-examining the Late Chosŏn Period Through Quantitative Economic History* (*Suryang kyŏngjesa ro tasi pon Chosŏn hugi* 수량경제사로 다시 본 조선후기).<sup>34</sup> In the final chapter of this book Rhee gives an overview and interpretation of the latest research on late Chosŏn economic history. Although his interpretation is based on recent empirical findings, many of which have demonstrated considerable commercialization of the Korean economy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it still shares some of the same basic ideas concerning late Chosŏn that Rhee developed in the 1980s.

Rhee breaks down the results of recent research by himself and his colleagues into three key findings. First, in the late Chosŏn period the non-market economy based on self-sufficiency and redistribution still made up a considerable proportion of the overall Korean economy. Second, from the second half of the seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth century Chosŏn experienced slow growth and general economic stability. Third, from the early nineteenth century both the Chosŏn

population and its market began to stagnate or decline, leading to a full-scale economic crisis in the latter half of the century.<sup>35</sup> Rhee particularly emphasizes the role of the Chosŏn state’s redistributive activities, mainly in the form of the grain-loan system, in stabilizing the economy, and speculates that the decline of this system was one of the triggers for the general economic decline of the nineteenth century. He even argues that the scale of the Chosŏn state’s redistributive system – which he terms a “moral economy” – was quite unusual in world historical terms.<sup>36</sup>

This is, therefore, a much more nuanced view of the economic history of late Chosŏn than earlier stagnation theories would have allowed for, but its conclusion is essentially the same as those of Fukuda and Chŏn: nineteenth-century Korea was backward and could not develop without an outside shock, or more bluntly, without colonization by a more advanced nation. Hence the final point stressed by Rhee in this chapter is that modern economic growth in Korea only began in the twentieth century during the Japanese colonial period. In addition, it was this colonial development of infrastructure, along with labour and credit markets, that “laid

the basis for the development of the Korean market economy and industrial society.”<sup>37</sup> Here, then, we can glimpse the political subtext of Rhee’s historiography, which is made far more explicit by the New Right organisation and the Textbook Forum.

It is not my intention here to provide an analysis of the historiography of the New Right’s recently published *Alternative Textbook for Korean Modern History* (*Tae’an kyogwasŏ: Han’guk kŭn-hyŏndaesa* 대안과서: 한국 근-현대사), but since Rhee was one of the leading lights behind this enterprise, it will be worthwhile to point out some of the connections between his view of Korean history



New Right textbook

32 Yi Yŏnghun, *Chosŏn hugi sahoe kyŏngjesa*, p. 627.

33 Ibid., p. 590.

34 Ibid., pp. 576-578.

35 Yi Yŏnghun (ed.), *Suryang kyŏngjesa ro tasi pon Chosŏn hugi* (Seoul: SNU Press, 2004).

36 Yi Yŏnghun, “Chosŏn hugi kyŏngjesa-ŭi saeroun tonghyang-gwa kwaje”, p. 372.

37 Ibid., p. 378.

38 Ibid., p. 389.

and the aims of the textbook, as outlined on the Textbook Forum website.<sup>39</sup>

The general narrative of this new ‘alternative’ textbook is very much in keeping with Rhee’s emphasis on the lack of development prior to colonialism. One of the pertinent features of the book is its generally negative view of Korean political developments in the period between port opening (1876) and the protectorate treaty with Japan (1905), designating the Tonghak peasant rebellion 東學農民運動 (1894) as a “conservative royalist” movement, and the Taehan Empire 大韓帝國 (1897-1910) as a pre-modern state. This lays the ground for a relatively positive appraisal of Japanese colonialism as a period that saw both colonial exploitation *and* significant economic development. In fact, the textbook goes as far as to argue that colonial rule also helped to develop the “social capacity” that Koreans needed to establish a modern nation state. Finally, the textbook strongly emphasizes the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea and its market economy, which was essentially created by Park Chung-hee’s 朴正熙 “modernizing revolution” on the basis of earlier colonial and postcolonial development.<sup>40</sup>

Despite obvious theoretical differences, the historical scholarship of Rhee Younghoon and the overtly ideological campaign of the New Right can be seen as the heirs of earlier stagnation theories of Korean historical development. What is most important to note, though, is the specific political motivations of the New Right and the contemporary context in which they have set out their historiographical stall. This scholarship has emerged during a period in which left-nationalist historiography arguably retains its dominance in mainstream South Korean academia, but has come under repeated attack from post-modernists, postnationalists and those advocating other new trends in academia since the mid to late 1990s. The academics associated with the New Right, a number of whom are former Marxists themselves, appear keen to remove the influence of Stalinist or left-nationalist history once and for all as part of a more general programme of reviving the ideological strength of the Right in Korea. Overturning the left-nationalists’ internal-development theory and returning to a form of stagnation theory, however nuanced, is one of their primary goals. This in itself, however, is only part of a broader historical programme

that seeks to firmly establish the legitimacy of the South Korean state (as opposed to a wider ‘unification nationalism’); give a positive spin to the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee; and promote the modern market economy as the highest form of human civilization. It is, in effect, a form of neoliberal historiography that seeks to ‘re-evaluate’ imperialism and authoritarianism in order to reinvigorate the fortunes of the South Korean Right.

## CONCLUSION

The concept of stagnation should properly be understood as representing a spectrum of ideas, from the most prejudiced Orientalism of Enlightenment Europe, which emphasized the inability of ‘Asiatic’ peoples to develop, to the much more narrow and ‘scientific’ application of economic theories that attempt to understand the lack of internal development toward capitalism in parts of the world. The thinkers that have been examined in this article fall much closer to the latter end of the spectrum. They were not simply ideologues, and their various historiographies should be understood as serious approaches to the Korean past, however flawed. Above all, these historians were faced with the fact that Korea had not developed in the same manner as European countries, or even in a manner similar to Japan, and had, at the turn of the century, lacked the political or economic power to resist colonialism. In their attempts to explain Korea’s particular path to capitalist modernity, historians of Korea therefore repeatedly returned to some form of stagnation theory. On the one hand, this reflects a perceived need to fit Korean history into some form of linear historical scheme, most often based on one drawn from European history. On the other hand, it also reflects a long-standing tradition of excluding Asian and other non-European countries from any such ‘universal’ scheme, giving them a separate developmental path, or paths. Above all, it reveals a deeper desire to ‘normalize’ Korea and set it on the path of progress, whether through colonial tutelage, socialist progress or neoliberal capitalism.

As stated in the introduction, a more nuanced approach to stagnation theory is required: one that is able to recognize its multiple forms and the variety of motives that drove its advocates. Above all, the varieties of stagnation theory outlined above should be understood in their

<sup>39</sup> Textbook Forum, “Ch’ongsō 4 – Han’guk künhyōndaesa taean kyogwasō.” (published 24/3/2008) See [http://www.textforum.net/bbs/board\\_view.php?bbs\\_code=util\\_bbs6&bbs\\_number=4&page=1](http://www.textforum.net/bbs/board_view.php?bbs_code=util_bbs6&bbs_number=4&page=1) (accessed 30/8/2009).

<sup>40</sup> Textbook Forum, “Ch’ongsō 4 – Han’guk künhyōndaesa taean kyogwasō.”

specific political and social contexts. Thus, for Fukuda Tokuzō Korea's backwardness was a clear justification for the encroachment of Japanese imperialism and ultimately the modernization of Korea under colonial rule. His view that Korea had lacked the necessary preparatory stage for capitalist modernity – feudalism – therefore became a keystone of the colonial government's ideology. Conversely, Chōn Sōktam, as a socialist, saw Korea's backwardness as a spur to revolutionary transformation and not as an obstacle to independent development. For him, it seems that there was no sense of shame or inadequacy in recognizing that Korea's historical development had lagged behind that of Europe or Japan, just a sense of urgency concerning the need to catch up, something that would ultimately be possible only through socialism. Finally, when we turn to Rhee Younghoon we find a third and rather different political motivation for seeing Korea's past as relatively backward. In Rhee's case the inability of Chosōn Korea to develop toward modernity internally reconfirms the origins of Korean modernity in the Japanese colonial period and helps to establish the legitimacy of subsequent South Korean governments that he sees as the inheritors of that colonial modernity. We could also add here that Rhee's disavowal of any form of Marxist approach to history aids his elevation of the market economy to the apex of human civilization by denying the possibility of a postcapitalist horizon.

The concept of stagnation itself is neither exclusively reactionary nor progressive; neither pessimistic nor revolutionary; and neither apologist nor anti-imperialist. Rather, the concept can have all of these different political meanings, depending on the context in which it is deployed. The formula applied by nationalist historians in South Korea – that stagnation theory equals imperial ideology – is too simplistic. The internal-development theory championed by nationalist historians since the 1970s in South Korea (and even earlier in the North) as the answer to stagnation theory has many empirical and theoretical problems of its own.<sup>41</sup> But perhaps more significantly, it can be just as easily implicated in the politics of modernization and appropriated as a prop for the developmentalist states of both Koreas.

The dichotomies of stagnation/progress and internal development/colonial modernity should not be the

only options open to historians studying Korea and East Asia. Each side in this intractable debate has its flaws and the impasse can only be resolved with an approach that departs from both. Such an approach could seek to construct a universalist and non-Eurocentric history of East Asia, and, by necessity, the rest of the world.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> For critiques of the internal-development approach, see James B. Palais, "Progress or Stasis in Korean Society"; Yi Hōnch'ang, "Chosōn hugi chabonjuūi maeng'aron kwa kŭ tae-an."

<sup>42</sup> This is something I explore in a separate article. See Owen Miller, "Marxism and East Asian History: From Eurocentrism and Nationalism to Marxist Universalism," *Marxism* 21, 7-3 (Summer 2010): pp. 202-238.

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# When History is Made:

HISTORY, MEMORY AND THE POLITICS OF REMEMBRANCE IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA<sup>1</sup>

*“June 13 will be a day recorded in history,” the reclusive North Korean president, Kim Jong Il, said to his southern counterpart after they arrived together at his state guesthouse. “Let’s get on,” replied Kim Dae Jung, “and make that history.”<sup>2</sup>*

## LET’S GET ON AND MAKE THAT HISTORY

Expectations were running high on 13 June 2000, when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung (Kim Taejung 金大中) touched down at Sunan Airport, Pyongyang, where he was greeted by North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il (Kim Chŏngil 金正日). The event was historic for the simple reason that it was the first ever visit by the head of state of South Korea to its rival in the north since the establishment of two separate and competing states on the Korean peninsula in 1948. The historical significance of that summit meeting and the June 15 Joint Declaration that was signed on the occasion does not only stem from the unique character of the meeting, but also to a great extent from an anticipation of its future consequences. The summit meeting was supposed to usher in a new era of inter-Korean relations. Rather than the confrontational stance of the past, an era of cooperation, reconciliation and mutual understanding was expected to open the road to Korean unification.

The feeling that one was witnessing a historical moment was a broadly shared sentiment at the time. But what does it really mean when one says that “history is made”? What is being said when such an unmediated reference is made to history? More than anything else, this



Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il at their summit meeting in 2000

<sup>1</sup> Materials supporting the arguments made in this article were partly gathered during a six-month Korea Foundation Fellowship for Field Research in 2010. I benefitted from critical remarks from Ethan Mark, Remco Breuker, Boudewijn Walraven and the anonymous referees who read and commented on earlier versions of this article. All views expressed here remain mine and mine alone.

<sup>2</sup> Howard W. French, “2 Korean leaders speak of ‘making a day in history,’” in *The New York Times*, 14/6/00, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/14/world/2-korean-leaders-speak-of-making-a-day-in-history.html> (consulted 3 September 2009).

utterance is inherently teleological in that it suggests a final outcome to the course of history. ‘History’ and ‘the future’ are mutually interchangeable terms here. Both statesmen could have caught the mood of the moment equally well by saying: “Let’s make the future.”

Another thing they did not feel the need to articulate explicitly was the subject of the history they were referring to. What kind of history were they thinking of? Whose history were they talking about? In so far as the horizon of unification is regarded as the quintessence of the Korean nation, their framework was national history. Highlighting the historical dimension of their actions rhetorically strengthened the case with their respective political constituencies for the appropriateness and legitimacy of that historic meeting. In more general terms, their reference to history is indicative of a more broadly based tendency in Korean society, where social groups – be they lineages, or cultural or religious organizations – tend to vie for a stake in national history by defining their identity historically in reference to the nation’s history.<sup>3</sup> In that respect, it is fair to say that in colloquial use history is always understood to mean national history, with the nation always present as its unspoken subject and ordering principle. While it is proper to distinguish between vernacular use and the way historians problematize history,<sup>4</sup> unearthing the subtext of such vernacular use essentially seems to confirm Prasenjit Duara’s argument regarding the hegemony of national history discourses.<sup>5</sup> Duara questioned the structuring narrative of the nation by historicizing the nation(-state) as a subject of History, a reified history based on “the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving over time [...] derive[d] from the linear teleological model of Enlightenment History.”<sup>6</sup> Historicizing the nation is certainly an efficient strategy to question the hegemony of the nation as the single overarching subject of history, but in bracketing the nation as a historical subject, one should not overlook the social reality of the nation as the organizing principle of a political community. Critical historians are particularly sensi-

tive to the power mechanisms at work in the writing of national history, in terms of both approach and dissemination. In addition, they are attuned to the metaphysics of nationalism. Duara rightly highlighted that in national history, the nation is treated very much as a metaphysical concept, primordial and preordained.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, nation-building as a historical process is more about social physics than metaphysics. The nation state may be built around a metaphysical notion, as promoted by nationalism, but both the social formation of the nation and the political formation of state institutions are very physical, traceable processes. Historians have an important role to play in the demystification of the socio-political process of nation-building. By showing the nuts and bolts of nation formation, historians historically frame the nation as well as reveal the power mechanism underlying its formation.

The metaphysical glow that surrounds much of the nation is reinforced by nationalist ideology. Nationalism is the glue that holds the nation and the state together and is constructed around the metaphysical kernel of the nation. But nationalism comes in different forms and shapes. Critically engaging with the history of nationalism and nationalist movements liberates the nation from supposedly historical inevitability and thereby also opens up space for a debate on the future of the nation as a socio-cultural community and its political emanation in state institutions.

If nationalism is the ideological glue that binds the nation to the state, national history is one of the tools that turn national subjects into loyal state citizens. In that sense, national history is part of a socialization process that contributes to national identity formation. In so far as the construction of national history relates to historical legitimization (*chǒngt’ongsǒng* 正統性), it is very much about the legitimization of *state* power.<sup>8</sup> Dislodging the state from the nation by showing how the state is but one possible emanation of the nation already subverts the power mechanism at work in national history. Indeed, the

3 See Boudewijn Walraven, “The Parliament of Histories: New Religions, Collective Historiography, and the Nation,” *Korean Studies* 25-2 (2001): pp. 157-178.

4 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995).

5 Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 4.

6 Ibid.

7 Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, p. 29. See also Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford & Cambridge, NJ: Blackwell: 1993; Fourth, expanded edition), pp. 67-69.

8 Han Honggu 한홍구 Chǒng T’aehǒn 정태현, Yi Manyŏl 이만열, Sŏ Chungśŏk 서중석, Chǒng Yǒngch’ŏi 정영철, *Taehanmin’guk-ŭi chǒngt’ongsǒng-ŭl mutta: O’in osaek Han’guk hyŏndaesa t’ŭkkang* 대한민국의 정통성을 묻다: 5人5色 한국 현대사 특강 (Seoul: Ch’ŏlsu-wa Yǒnghŭi 철수와 영희, 2009).

nation does not necessarily collapse into an existing state, nor does the nation-state necessarily represent the full amplitude of the nation concept.<sup>9</sup> We should be attentive, following Prasenjit Duara's lead, to the multiple faces the nation takes as it is constantly imagined, constituted and reconstituted.<sup>10</sup> In challenging national history, it is also important to remember that the nation-state is not the sole and single possible subject of history.

National history is just one cog in the wheel of national identity formation. More important than national history as such is the embodiment of such history in national monuments, and its enactment through rituals and pageants. Here we enter the domain of the politics of memory with its goal of constructing and managing public memory (*konggong kiök* 공공기억) in support of social cohesion and national allegiance. A national historical narrative is crucial for the establishment of the legitimacy of a state, but allegiance to the state is only attained when such a narrative is absorbed into public memory through the skilful interpretation and reiteration of references to this narrative in state symbols and rituals and its display in the memorial landscape of the country.<sup>11</sup>

That in Korea the nation is a strong trope and the ultimate point of reference in the definition of any kind of public identity should not blind us to the fact that the nation is, at the same time, an open-ended, dynamic signifier, constantly reformulated and invented and less intrinsically threatening or totalizing than retrospectively seems the case. After decades of authoritarian rule and the heavily distorted state-society relations this entailed, the hegemonic nature of the nation as a historical referent endures in a democratized South Korea.<sup>12</sup> The eagerness of multiple social groups to inscribe their social memories in the story of the nation is ample proof of this enduring hegemony. However, such discursive hegemony should not blind us to the fact that as a historical and social reality, the nation is always both contentious and

contingent. Although there is a clear power bias in favour of state structures, such power is never uncontested, nor immovable. Working and writing from within a specific socio-historical context, historians are always already interacting with an existing national historical discourse. Many historians, particularly in Korea, are also actively involved social actors who participate in as well as critically engage with and contribute to the articulation of the nation. They may be involved in the writing and rewriting of national history, or they might be on the barricades protesting against the dominant narratives. In either case they act not just as detached historians, but also as involved citizens; their historical analysis is based upon an often unarticulated conviction of the course and historical nature of the nation. Regardless of where, as a historian, one positions oneself in the spectrum of social engagement, it is important to be aware of one's historical situatedness when unravelling the social process of nation-building and challenging the hegemonic character of the nation concept.

#### HISTORICAL IMPERATIVES AND POST-NATIONALISM IN KOREAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Just as historians are always already socially situated, shaping and being shaped by the historical reality they confront, so too is history articulated against the backdrop of an always already present social and cultural memory. That such social and cultural memory is in turn framed by the going historical narratives goes to show how complex, entangled and forever-evolving history as a social practice is.<sup>13</sup> History and public memory are closely intertwined. Socially – if not politically – embedded, history is hardly a self-contained rationality-driven scientific endeavour; rather, it is always open towards society in both its interests and functions. In that sense, history expands on, responds to and influences public memory.<sup>14</sup> When, in June 2000, both Korean leaders referred to uni-

9 See a.o. Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London: Routledge, 1998).

10 See also Gi-Wook Shin, "Nation, History, and Politics: South Korea," in *Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity*, edited by Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherlini (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1998), pp. 148-165.

11 See Chông Hogi 정호기, *Han'guk-üi yöksa kinyöm shisöl* 한국의 역사기념시설 (Seoul: Minjuhwa undong kinyöm saöphoe 민주화운동기념사업회, 2007), pp. 20-21.

12 As Kim Yugyöng 김유경 puts it, there is no inherent problem with the aim of upholding national identity (*minjok chöngch'esöng* 민족 정체성). What is an issue is the state power's monopoly on the formulation of what constitutes Koreaness. Kim Yugyöng, "Kungmin kukka-üi chipdan kiök-kwa yöksa kyoyuk – yöksa kyogwasö" 국민국가의 집단기억과 역사교육 - 역사교과서, *Ch'angjak-kwa pip'yöng* 창작과 비평 115 (March 2002): pp. 396-411.

13 Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller and Karoline Tschuggnall, "*Opa war kein Nazi*": *Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002).

14 Jörn Rüsen, *Geschichte im Kulturprozeß* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2002), pp. 130-138. See also his introduction to Jörn Rüsen (ed.), *Meaning & Representation in History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2006), pp. 1-5.

fication as a historical imperative they did so against a backdrop of an understanding of Korean history and its crucial contribution to identity formation. The belief in the indivisibility of the Korean nation has been a pillar of Korean national identity on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone since the imposition of the division in 1945.<sup>15</sup> Be that as it may, such a belief is rather an act of faith and escapes historical scrutiny. Kang Man'gil 강만길 is one historian who has made the division of the peninsula into a defining category of contemporary history. The division is the prism through which he examines Korean history in order to make a projection into the future. In an enlightening essay on unification summarizing his views, he described the historical imperative of unification as the completion of Korea's modernization process – in itself already a problematic and contested term.<sup>16</sup> He posited unification as an inevitable future phase in Korea's historical development as a nation.<sup>17</sup> Borrowing the universal discourse of linear progress so typical of national historiography, Kang Man'gil repeated that the established discourse of modernization (*kūndaehwa* 近代化), defined politically as national sovereignty (*kung-min chukwōn chuūi* 國民主權主義) and economically by a capitalist system, was the apex of historical development. He countered, however, that modernization would not be complete until the unification of the nation was achieved. Making the claim that failure to reach unification barred Korea from joining the ranks of civilized nations, Kang Man'gil mobilized the officially much-heralded spectre of civilization (*munmyōng* 文明, another important concept in the South Korean state's modernization discourse), oddly reminiscent of the “Hegelian narrative of Enlightenment History” and its “preoccupation with the utopia of modernity” that Duara had found in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Chinese historiography.<sup>18</sup> Making his argument in this way, Kang tapped into,

and inverted, the state discourse as it had been developed since the Park Chung Hee (Pak Chōnghŭi 朴正熙) years. Whereas the Park regime had mobilized nationalism in support of the state,<sup>19</sup> Kang Man'gil dislodged the Korean nation (*minjok* 民族) from the South Korean state (*kukka* 國家) by shifting the focus away from the developmental state, to the reunified nation as the apex of national history.

In an attempt to regain control over the interpretation of national history, some New Right historians have taken Duara's critique on the metaphysical nature of the nation to heart. Challenging the hegemony of nationalist narratives by historicizing the nation, Yi Yōnghun 이영훈, a self-declared neo-liberal, finds the individual human being, characterized by freedom, ethical self-interest (*todōkchōk igishim* 도덕적 이기심) and a capability for cooperation, to be a more fundamental historical category. By taking the individual as his starting point, he writes a history of civilization that develops the state as a historical instrument for the protection of the liberties of individuals. Through Yi Yōnghun's reframing of the dislodged – and discredited – state, South Korea regains legitimacy as a state, which it had lost as a nation.<sup>20</sup> Rewriting national history from the perspective of the state also shifts the parameters away from liberation from Japanese rule and the division of the peninsula to the foundation of the Republic of Korea as a self-contained entity. At the time of the celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of the foundation of the Republic, the New Right became particularly vociferous in a campaign to rename 15 August, currently known as Restoration Day (*kwangbokchōl* 光復節), (State) Foundation Day (*kōn'gukchōl* 建國節).<sup>21</sup> The purpose of such a move was to instil national pride in the economic and democratic successes of South Korea, rather than shame for the failure to uphold national unity. Instead of facing backwards, unable to let go of the past,

15 A commitment to the unification of Korea is inscribed in the constitutions of both the Republic (Art. 4) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Preamble).

16 Simon Gunn, *History and Cultural Theory* (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd., 2006), pp. 185-186.

17 Kang Man'gil 강만길, *Kang Man'gil sōnsaeng-gwa hamkke saenggakhanūn t'ongil* 강만길 선생과 함께 생각하는 통일 (Seoul: Chiyōngsa 지영사, 2000), p. 16.

18 Kang Man'gil, *Kang Man'gil sōnsaeng-gwa hamkke saenggakhanūn t'ongil*, pp. 15, 20-21. Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, pp. 48-50. One prominent Korean exponent of nineteenth-century civilization discourses is Yu Kilchun 兪吉潯. See Koen De Ceuster, “The World in a Book: Yu Kilchun's *Sōyu kyōnmun*,” in *Korea in the Middle: Korean Studies and Area Studies*, edited by Remco E. Breuker (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2007), pp. 67-96.

19 Chang Yōngmin 장영민, “Kuksa kyoyuk-ūi kwanghwa-wa kukkajuūi 국사교육의 강화와 국가주의,” in *Kukka-wa Ilsang. Pak Chōnghŭi shidae* 국가와 일상: 박정희 시대, edited by Kong Cheuk 공제욱 (Seoul: Han'ul 한글, 2008), pp. 399-469.

20 Yi Yōnghun 이영훈, *Taehanmin'guk iyagi: 'Haebang chōnhusa-ūi chae inshik' kangūi* 대한민국 이야기: '해방전후사의 재인식' 강의 (Seoul: Kip'arang 기과랑, 2007), pp. 20-21. See also Kim Yōngho 김영호, “Kōn'guk sagwan-gwa Pundan sagwan” 건국사관과 분단사관, in *Taehanmin'guk kōn'guk 60nyōn-ūi chae inshik* 대한민국 건국 60년의 재인식, edited by Kim Yōngho (Seoul: Kip'arang 기과랑, 2008), pp. 76-100.

21 Kim Yōngho (ed.), *Taehanmin'guk kōn'guk 60nyōn-ūi chae inshik*, pp. 7-9; Kim Kihyōp 김기협, *Nyurait'ū pip'an: Kim Kihyōp-ūi yōksa-esōi* 뉴라이트 비판: 김기협의 역사에서이 (Seoul: Tolbegae 돌베개, 2008), pp. 27-35.



this approach purports to be resolutely future-oriented. History, in the eyes of the New Right, should not paralyse but liberate. As Yi Yŏnghun wrote, “developed Koreans are free individuals liberated from the shackles of history.”<sup>22</sup> Interestingly, by breaking out of the stranglehold of the nation, Yi Yŏnghun restores the state as the hegemonic subject of national history: not as some kind of metaphysical entity, but as a historical reality based on a supposedly rational weighing of options by free individuals. What he effectively ends up with is the defence of a state-centred national history that should instil patriotism (*aegukshim* 愛國心) as an important civic virtue.<sup>23</sup> Yi Yŏnghun’s restoration of the state as subject of national history thereby falls prey to the same idolatry of which he accuses nationalist historians. Both statist and nationalist approaches are about constructing allegiance to an overarching collective concept, whether mystical/metaphysical in the case of the nation, or rational/institutional in the case of the state. In both cases, however, the historical analysis starts from hegemonic concepts that are posited as a given that retrospectively orders and shapes national history. Whether it is the nation or the individual that becomes the primary subject of national history is in the end the outcome of an ideological interpretation of what holds society together. Given that a community (*kongdongch’e* 共同體), whether defined as a nation, a nation-state, a state, or simply as a pragmatic interest group, is always a social construct supported by an equally constructed history, such a choice is not a case of one history being more correct than the other.<sup>24</sup> What is problematic is that such ordering principles are pos-

ited as preordained, as forever receding and thus beyond scrutiny. In the case of Yi Yŏnghun, his call for instilling patriotism basically lifts the state to an absolute outcome of historical development that should be proudly cherished rather than critically questioned. Considering, however, that any society is based upon some sort of social contract that is constantly negotiated and evolving, it logically follows that such negotiation and evolution is a legitimate subject of historical examination and, thus, that such ordering principles should also be the subject of critical scrutiny.

*Minjung* 民衆 historiography has proven that hegemonic concepts can be challenged, subverted and inverted. This challenge eventually resulted in an era of post-nationalist historiography.<sup>25</sup> Critical historians are sensitive to the balance of power at work in the social construction of the nation and the ways in which the ruling power mechanism affects the creation of its history. Im Chihyŏn 임지현 is a vociferous advocate of a post-nationalist historiography, though with an agenda very different from that of Yi Yŏnghun.<sup>26</sup> Adroit at deconstructing the nationalist paradigm, he stops short of venturing into the definition of an alternative, as if the idea of a national (as opposed to nationalist) history is in itself problematic.<sup>27</sup> Where Im Chihyŏn and Yi Yŏnghun concur, is in their support for a democratization (*minjuhwa* 民主化) of historiography. What they mean by this idea is that historiography should break free from the paradigm of the monolithic nation and become more representative and encompassing.<sup>28</sup> They want to see a diverse alternative history, infused from below by repressed memories.<sup>29</sup> Despite his inter-

22 Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehanmin’guk iyagi*, p. 315.

23 Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehanmin’guk iyagi*, pp. 32-33. Critical comments on Yi Yŏnghun’s approach can be found in Yi Yŏnggho 이영호, “Han’guk-esŏ ‘kuksa’ hyŏngsŏng-ŭi kwajŏng-gwa kŭ tae’an” 한국에서 ‘국사’형성의 과정과 그 대안, in *Kuksa-ŭi shinhwa-rŭl nŏmŏsŏ* 국사의 신화를 넘어서, edited by Im Chihyŏn 임지현 and Yi Sŏngshi 이성시 (Seoul: Hyumŏnisŭt’ŭ 휴머니스트, 2004), p. 460.

24 This statement of course assumes that the historians writing such history abide by the methodological tricks of the trade in terms of treatment of historical source materials. I do not want this to be read as a relativistic statement about the veracity of historical utterances. Rather, I want to highlight that a conviction about such very fundamental concepts, which are often not problematized, shapes the way the historical sources are approached. At the same time, where concepts are problematized, a constant dialogue is going on between the historian and the sources, the latter affecting and shaping in no small measure the historical understanding of the former. See also John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

25 *Minjung* historiography did challenge the historical narrative produced by the state, but eventually fell short of challenging, let alone overcoming, the nationalist paradigm itself. Koen De Ceuster, “When History Matters: Reconstructing South Korea’s National Memory in the Age of Democracy” in *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, edited by Steffi Richter (Frankfurt, New York: Campus Verlag, 2008), p. 77.

26 Im Chihyŏn is author of the bestselling essay *Minjokchuŭi-nŭn panyŏk-ida* 민족주의는 반역이다 [Nationalism is treachery] (Seoul: Sonamu 소나무, 1999). Kang Man’gil might be described as a modernist historian, for whom history refers to the establishment of an actual unity in the sequence of time, connecting past, present and future through one single connecting principle (progress/development). Im Chihyŏn, in contrast, is a post-modernist historian who is weary of an imposed rational historical order, preferring instead a more lively description where the contemporary diversity of experience and interpretation is shown in all its disarray. Jörn Rüsen, *Geschichte im Kulturprozeß*, pp. 125-155.

27 Im Chihyŏn 임지현, “‘Kuksa’-ŭi an-gwa pakk - Hegemoni-wa ‘kuksa’-ŭi taeyŏnswŏe” ‘국사’의 안과 밖 - 헤게머니와 ‘국사’의 대연쇄, in *Kuksa-ŭi shinhwa-rŭl nŏmŏsŏ*, edited by Im Chihyŏn and Yi Sŏngshi, pp. 15-33.

28 Im Chihyŏn, “‘Kuksa’-ŭi an-gwa pakk”; Yi Yŏnghun, “Minjoksa-esŏ munmyŏngsa-roŭi chŏnhwan-ŭl wihayŏ”, in *Kuksa-ŭi shinhwa-rŭl nŏmŏsŏ*, edited by Im Chihyŏn and Yi Sŏngshi, pp. 37-99.

est in an alternative history, Yi Yŏnghun in particular is critical of the ongoing reappraisal of the nation's history. He rejects the efforts made by the successive democratic governments to come to terms with the legacies of the past (*kwagŏ ch'ŏngsan* 과거청산), deeming them a failure to let go of the past.<sup>30</sup> Although it is clear that there is an aspect of political reckoning involved in this process, what Yi Yŏnghun fails to acknowledge is the social need at a time of democratic transition to come to terms with the legacies of South Korea's authoritarian past. Historians have an obvious responsibility to attend to this process, although it falls within the authority of the state to dispense transitional justice, pay compensation and deal with issues of honour restoration. These discretionary powers go to show that the hegemony of the state, though politically transformed, remains unaffected in the process of democratic transition; in fact, the transition rather confirms and highlights such hegemony. Critical historians have a duty to attend to and engage with the process of dealing with the past, yet they are fully aware that the ultimate outcome of the process is the continuation of state ascendancy in the social contract. Admittedly, not only has the democratized state become more representative and more susceptible to demands from civil society, but also the intention of the state's incumbents has genuinely been to assuage past suffering. Still, the ramifications and eventual outcome of this entire process of settling the past seem to point towards an affirmation of state dominance and a renewal of allegiance to the nation-state. Critical historians should engage with this process in the acknowledgement of the continued "ideological and ideational hegemony of the nation-state and the epistemological and hermeneutic conventions that support it."<sup>31</sup>

## TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN SOUTH KOREA

South Korea's mangled post-liberation history is littered with unsavoury memories of state violence. The authoritarian state largely succeeded in suppressing these memories, but whenever state power weakened, these memories resurfaced and the state was called to account. Aside from the unfinished business of coming to terms with the legacy of pro-Japanese collaboration, one of the most painful episodes in Korea's post-liberation history must be the wave of violence that swept through the peninsula in the years prior to and during the Korean War. Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman 李承晩)'s hold on power was based on a reign of 'white terror' that left hundreds of thousands of victims.<sup>32</sup> Following Rhee's demise from power in 1960, in the wake of the April 19 Student Uprising, citizens' movements raised the issue of civilian massacres perpetrated by the South Korean army, police and/or paramilitary groups prior to and during the Korean War. Commemorations were held for victims of state violence, monuments erected and questions asked in the National Assembly.<sup>33</sup> This effort at coming clean was cut short in the spring of 1961, when the May 16 coup d'état brought Park Chung Hee to power. The citizens' movements were labelled "anti-state organizations," their leaders arrested, monuments destroyed and graveyards desecrated.<sup>34</sup> Not until the democracy movement of the 1980s brought the authoritarian state to its knees did the issue of settling the past return to the political agenda.

The struggle against the authoritarian state has also been very much a struggle about history and legitimacy. In an attempt to explain the origins and endurance of this violently repressive authoritarian state, activist historians turned to the failure to make a clean break with the colonial past in the aftermath of liberation. The culture of violence and total control had risen from the ashes of

29 Im Chihyŏn, "'Kuksa'-ŭi an-gwa pakk," pp. 32-33. Though I have not seen it used in this way, a Korean term that might well describe such a more representative and encompassing (national!) history might be *yŏllin kuksa* 열린 국사.

30 Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehanmin'guk iyagi*, p. 315. There is a striking parallel with the neoconservative charge of 'national self-flagellation' against the New Left interest in *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in Germany. Jeffrey K. Olick, "What Does It Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics since 1989," in *States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts and Transformations in National Retrospection*, edited by Jeffrey K. Olick (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 260.

31 This phrase is taken from the introduction to the *Flying University of Transnational Humanities*, a project run by the Research Institute of Comparative History and Culture (RICH); see <http://www.rich.ac/eng/fly/introduction.php?pageNum=5&subNum=1> (consulted on 21 May 2010).

32 Han Honggu speaks in this respect of a coup d'état by former collaborators, linking in particular the assault on and arrest of minority parliamentarians in the spring of 1949 (known as the *p'ŭrakch'i sakŏn* 프락치사건), the assault on the offices of the Collaboration Investigation Committee (*panmin t'ŭkwi* 反民特委) in June 1949, and the 26 June 1949 assassination of Kim Koo (Kim Ku 김구). Han Honggu, "Nyurait'ŭ-ŭi yŏksa ūshik, muŏs-i munjein'ga? 뉴라이트의 역사 의식, 무엇이 문제인가?" in Han Honggu et al., *Taehanmin'guk-ŭi chŏngt'ongsŏng-ŭl mutta*, pp. 41-45.

33 Sŏ Chungŏk 서중석, *Han'guk hyŏndaesa 60nyŏn* 한국현대사 60년 (Seoul: Yŏksa pip'yŏngsa 역사비평사, 2007), pp. 81-82. Han Honggu, *Taehan min'guk sa 01 Tan'gun-esŏ Kim Tuhan-kkaji* 대한민국사 01 단군에서 김두한까지 (Seoul: Han'gyŏre ch'ulp'an 한겨레출판, 2003), pp. 126-140.

34 Han Honggu, *Taehan min'guk sa 01*, pp. 137-138.

the Japanese defeat,<sup>35</sup> and the regimentation and total mobilization of society became a hallmark of Park Chung Hee's economic development plan. The failure to make a clean break with the colonial period and uproot all remnants of pro-Japanese collaboration was seen as 'the original sin' and the root cause for the corruption at the heart of the South Korean nation. Immediately following liberation, the US military government stalled all attempts at uprooting pro-Japanese collabo-

rators from public life. Following the establishment of a separate South Korean government in 1948, a belated attempt was made at weeding out the remnants of the colonial elite, but Syngman Rhee effectively boycotted the activities of the investigation committee set up by the National Assembly to prosecute former collaborators. Settling the past became an important issue again in Korean society with the restoration of democracy. By the late 1980s the list of issues to be settled had expanded well beyond the legacies of the colonial period. Politically, there was an urgency to first and foremost settle accounts with the Fifth Republic and to alleviate the pain of the suppression of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising (*Kwangju hangjaeng* 광주항쟁). In an opposition-dominated National Assembly, parliamentary hearings into the 12 December 1979 military revolt and the quelling of the Kwangju Uprising were



Photo 1: K'öch'ang: Two desecrated mass graves, with their cenotaphs torn down. This site was reassembled in April 2007. The original site had been destroyed on orders of the Park Chung Hee government in May 1961, its cenotaphs buried and the remains of the victims scattered. (May 2010)

organized in November 1988. Aside from publicly shaming former President Chun Doo Hwan (Chŏn Tuhwan 전두환), these nationally televised hearings failed to settle the issue, as they were a strictly political process without any judicial consequences. Nevertheless, these hearings were the start of an unrelenting drive to come clean on the secrets of the past.

South Korea's democratization was a gradual process in which the authoritarian political power elite was unseated step by step. Accordingly, the scope of the movement to settle the past expanded as the entrenched elite became ever more alienated from executive power.<sup>36</sup> That over the years the issue has remained on the political agenda is, however, also very much a consequence of the sustained campaigning by a wide variety of grassroots movements, which in November 2004 joined forces in the National

<sup>35</sup> One striking example is the resurgence of the colonial system of thought control through the organization in June 1949 of the National Guidance League (*kungmin podo yŏnmaeng* 국민보도연맹), an organization under the control of the judicial authorities which, in the words of Syngman Rhee, "gave the chance to leftists who had it in them to mend their ways, to abandon their beliefs" (개선의 여지가 있는 좌익세력에게 전향의 기회를 주겠다). With the outbreak of the Korean War, a systematic elimination of its membership, thought to have numbered close to 300,000, was perpetrated by both the armed forces and so-called youth movements, another legacy of the colonial period. Following the fall of the Syngman Rhee regime in 1960, a parliamentary investigation commission into "the massacres of innocent civilians" (*yangmin haksal* 양민학살) was set up, but following Park Chung Hee's coup d'état, its activities were suspended and all the documents it had already compiled, destroyed. Han Honggu, *Taehan min'guk sa 01*, pp. 131-135; Kang Chunman 강준만 and Kim Hwan'yo 김환표, *Hŭisaengyang-gwa chŏe ūshik: Taehan min'guk pan'gong-ŭi yŏksa* 희생양과 죄의식: 대한민국 반공의 역사 (Seoul: kaema kowŏn 개마고원, 2004), pp. 49-52. On the efforts at establishing the truth and its suppression in 1960, see Kim Kijin 김기진, *Kkŭnnaji anhŭn chŏnjaeng, kungmin podo yŏnmaeng. Pusan-Kyŏngnam chiyŏk* 끝나지 않은 전쟁, 국민보도연맹: 부산-경남지역 (Seoul: yŏksa pip'yŏngsa 역사비평사, 2002), pp. 281-312.

<sup>36</sup> Koen De Ceuster, "When History Matters." See also Gi-Wook Shin, Soon-Won Park, and Daqing Yang (eds), *Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia. The Korean Experience* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

Coalition for a Proper Settling of the Past (*olbarin kwagō ch'ōngsan-ūl wihan pōmgungmin wiwōnhoe* 올바른 과거 청산을 위한 범 국민위원회). Another equally fundamental reason why the issue has not disappeared, is the fact that all official initiatives have always been political compromises that in the end fell short of public expectations. All investigations were strictly circumscribed, both in terms of what could be investigated and how, and in terms of the time, funding and manpower allotted. Thus, the state did not attempt to establish criminal responsibility for the atrocities, nor did it seek to bring the perpetrators to justice. Furthermore, there has been no reflection on the institutional role and responsibility of the state, nor has there been any attempt at drawing lessons from the past by adopting new legislation to strengthen democracy, justice and respect for civil and human rights. Overall, the authorities limited themselves to establishing an account of “what really happened” (*chinsang kyumyōng* 진상규명) and alleviating the pain and suffering of individuals affected directly or indirectly by the past acts of state violence. Their efforts to alleviate this suffering involved paying compensation, restoring the honour of victims and erecting memorial sites as a contribution to the restoration of social harmony.<sup>37</sup>

The efforts to come to terms with the legacies of the past culminated under the presidency of Roh Moo Hyun (No Muhyōn 노무현) in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK, *chinshil-hwahae-rūl wihan kwagōsa chōngni wiwōnhoe* 진실-화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회), the most comprehensive attempt to date by the state at dealing exhaustively with the festering past. No other president had

been as convinced of the need to come to terms with the legacies of the past in order to strengthen the roots of democracy in South Korea as Roh Moo Hyun. Kim Dae Jung, his predecessor, had also actively addressed the need to redress the wrongs of the past, but his perspective focused on alleviating the pain of the individual victims in a grand gesture of making peace with the past (*kwagō-waii hwahae* 과거와의 화해) and securing a future-oriented national reconciliation and harmony.<sup>38</sup> Roh Moo Hyun, for his part, took a much more principled position based upon a reflection on the root causes of what he saw as an enduring culture of corruption. Firmly focused on strengthening the roots of social justice and democracy and committed to rebuild trust in the state, he addressed the issue of settling the past during a presidential address on Liberation Day in 2005, calling for a proper and thorough investigation into the wrongs of the past, including the suspension of the statute of limitations so as to bring those responsible for such wrongs before civil or criminal courts. Nothing was more important in securing the future of a transparent open democracy than the rigorous application of the rule of law.<sup>39</sup> The National Assembly did not follow him completely in this endeavour. The establishment of responsibility for civilian massacres was not part of the task assigned to TRCK. A sense of failure to thus secure the foundation of Korean democracy must have contributed to Roh Moo Hyun's highly negative self-assessment of his presidency, which may have contributed to his decision to end his life.<sup>40</sup> As president he did, however, assume state responsibility for the genocidal suppression of the April 3 Cheju Revolt (commonly known as *sa-sam* 4.3) and as such, on 31 October

37 Kim Yōnsu 김연수, *Kwagōsa ch'ōngsan, 'minjuhwa'rūl nōmō 'sahoehwa'ro* 과거청산, '민주화'를 넘어 '사회화'로 (Seoul: meidei 메이데이, 2008), pp. 55-59. See also the website of the National Coalition for a Proper Settling of the Past: [www.ktruth.org](http://www.ktruth.org). The issue of justice and fundamental respect for civil and human rights is directly related to the question of the abolishment of the National Security Law (*kukka poanpōp* 國家保安法), a legal tool that continues to allow the state to repress at will any form of political dissent.

38 Kim Dae Jung, of all people, talked about building a memorial hall for Park Chung Hee, whose secret service was behind a plot to assassinate him in 1973. The plan for the memorial hall was shelved due to public opposition to the idea. See Chōng Hogi, *Han'guk-ūi yōksa kinyōm shisōl*, pp. 31-32.

39 Kwōn Oguk 권오국, “Kwagō ch'ōngsan-e taehan 'wōnch'ikchōk' ūiji-wa 'hyōnshiljōk' panbal” 과거청산에 대한 ‘원칙적’ 의지와 ‘현실적’ 반발, *T'ongil Han'guk* 통일한국, September 2005: pp. 40-42.

40 In the light of his suicide on 23 May 2009, his unfinished memoirs make uncomfortable reading as one is confronted with a clearly depressed individual who looks back on what he saw as a failed presidency. No Muhyōn 노무현, *Sōnggong-gwa chwajōl. No Muhyōn taet'ongnyōng mot ta sūn hoegorok* 성공과 좌절: 노무현 대통령 못 다 쓴 회고록 (Seoul: Hakkojae 학교재, 2009).

41 Cheju 4.3 sakōn chinshil kyumyōng mit hūisaengja myōngye hoebok wiwōnhoe 제주4.3사건진실규명 및 희생자 명예회복위원회, ed. *Hwahae-wa sangsaeng: Cheju 4.3 wiwōnhoe paeksō* 화해와 상생: 제주4.3위원회 백서 (Seoul: Cheju 4.3 sakōn chinshil kyumyōng mit hūisaengja myōngye hoebok wiwōnhoe 제주4.3사건진실규명 및 희생자 명예회복위원회, 2008) pp. 117-121; Yi Yōnggwōn 이영권, *Cheju 4.3-ūl mussūmnida* 제주 4.3을 묻습니다 (Seoul, Shinsōwōn 신서원, 2007), p. 148. The Cheju Rebellion, which began with a violently suppressed 1 March demonstration in 1947 and spiralled out of control when police forces opened fire on 3 April to quell further unrest, led to a sustained police offensive against the people of Cheju which eventually left nearly 10% of the island population dead. One of Roh Moo Hyun's final acts as president of the Republic of Korea was to express remorse and extend a formal apology for the unlawful behaviour of the national army and police forces in the Ulsan National Guidance League Incident (*Ulsan kungmin podo yōnmaeng sagōn* 울산 국민보도연맹사건). This incident refers to the mass killing of 407 people in the vicinity of Ulsan over a period of ten days in August 1950. The president made this pre-recorded formal state apology upon the recommendation of the TRCK. Anon., “Noh taet'ongnyōng 'Ulsan podo yōnmaeng sagōn' kongshik sagwa” 盧대통령 ‘울산 보도연맹사건’ 공식사과 in *Tonga Ilbo*, 24/1/08 (consulted online at <http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?n=200801240342>).

2003, he offered a formal apology for the grief the state had inflicted on the people of Cheju Island.<sup>41</sup>

In retrospect, it becomes apparent that two major concerns have been motivating the desire to settle the past. One relates to the nature of Korean democracy and the lessons that should be drawn from the past with regard to the role and functioning of the state. Finding its origin in the anti-authoritarian struggle of the 1980s, this campaign focuses on the colonial period and the failure of the South Korean state to properly deal with the legacies of that past. This phase of the process of settling the past can be described as negative in so far as it seeks to weed out the last vestiges of pro-Japanese collaboration from Korean society in an attempt to strengthen the representative democratic system as an expression of popular sovereignty. Uprooting the remnants of colonial state culture consisted of a twofold pursuit: naming and shaming former collaborators (by the Presidential Committee for the Investigation of Pro-Japanese Collaboration, PCIPC (*Ch'inil panminjok haengwi chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe* 친일반민족행위진상규명위원회), established on 31 May 2005,<sup>42</sup> and an attempt at repossessing property wrongfully held by the families of collaborators (by the Investigative Commission on Pro-Japanese Collaborators' Property, ICPCP [*ch'inil panminjokcha chaesan chosa wiwŏnhoe* 친일반민족자 재산조사위원회], established on 13 July 2006).<sup>43</sup> This campaign was built on the conviction that the failure to root out such remnants of collaboration following liberation had created the conditions for the authoritarian state to thrive. The enduring legacy of collaboration had prolonged a culture of injustice that undermined trust in public authorities and the rule of law. Interestingly, this campaign to uproot the vestiges of collaboration yields to the hegemony of national history in so far as it formulates the problem of, and explains the solution to, the legacy of collaboration strictly from within a reading of Korea's national history. Though this was a discourse developed during the waning years of the Chun Doo Hwan government, the issue finally came to a head during the presidency of Roh Moo Hyun when legislation was enacted to shed light on "anti-national activities during the colonial period." Although previous administrations had been dedicated to uproot-

ing the physical remnants of the colonial state (Chun Doo Hwan's *ilche chanjae ch'ŏngsan* 일제 잔재청산), or at getting the (nation's) historical record straight (Kim Young Sam's [Kim Yŏngsam 김영삼] *yŏksa paro seugi* 역사 바로 세우기), only during Roh Moo Hyun's presidency did the authorities take up the challenge of completing the unfinished job of establishing the extent of pro-Japanese collaboration at the time of liberation. Here, as in many other cases, it is relevant to point to the sustained efforts by NGOs to keep this issue alive. In particular the campaign for the compilation and publication of a biographical dictionary of collaborators deserves mention here. Paid for by contributions from citizens, a three-volume biographical dictionary was published in November 2009.<sup>44</sup> Interestingly, compared with the 1,005 names the Presidential Committee had listed, the dictionary logged a total of 4,776 persons.

While dealing with the legacies of the colonial period is largely a negative process, when it comes to dealing with civilian massacres and cases of state violence in the post-liberation period, the authorities took a positive approach in so far as the focus was on compensation and restoration of honour rather than on hunting down the guilty. Although the TRCK sees its task as working towards contrition on the part of the perpetrators and wishes to mediate in the reconciliation between perpetrators and victims, it does not seek to promote legal justice. The commission has three subcommittees, which investigate forgotten activities in support of (South) Korean sovereignty and cases of anti-ROK terror; look into civilian massacres prior to and during the Korean War; and deal with suspicious deaths and human rights violations during the authoritarian state system. As the name of the commission indicates, it serves a double purpose: to establish the truth and to contribute to social reconciliation. However, the truth we are talking about here is the kind of evidential truth that stands up in court but has little to do with the kind of truth(s) historians deal with. Looking at the composition of the committees that make up the TRCK, it is interesting to see that although there are historians on the committees, they are outnumbered by members with a legal background. The reports produced by the TRCK do indeed read rather like court case reports, where the

<sup>42</sup> The Presidential Committee concluded its statutory activities on 31 November 2009, after publishing its final report listing a total of 1,005 persons whom it deemed collaborators; see [www.pcic.go.kr](http://www.pcic.go.kr).

<sup>43</sup> This investigative commission has a statutory mandate of four years with a possible extension of two years; see [www.icjcp.go.kr](http://www.icjcp.go.kr).

<sup>44</sup> *Ch'inil inmyŏng sajŏn p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe* 친일인명사전편찬위원회 (ed.), *Ch'inil inmyŏng sajŏn* 친일인명사전 (Seoul: Minjok munje yŏn'guso 민족문제연구소, 2009).

established facts are laid out in order to reach a conclusion dealing with an individual case and individual grief. However, there is a looming void when it comes to giving such grief and suffering a historical context. The commission is not concerned with understanding the events on that level. In that sense, the commission undertakes something more akin to a criminal investigation – trying to assess the factual course of events – than to a historical investigation. Such an investigation would lift individual suffering to a level of historical contextualization that surpasses the individual and allows conclusions to be drawn on the systemic nature of state violence. In a way, one might discern a double process at work here, where the social recognition of individual suffering goes hand in hand with historical amnesia. This is far removed from the national soul-searching historians were talking about in the 1980s. But then the purpose of the TRCK is not to establish historical truth, in so far as historical truth is what transpires from a historical narrative that lifts the single facts to a level of analysis that is the result of an interpretative ordering of accumulated historical facts. In fact, if anything, the TRCK contributes to a muffling of any fundamental reinterpretation of the nation's history. The assessment of individual cases and incidents without any fundamental questioning of the historical causes of such violence basically keeps the existing historical narrative intact, a narrative of the nation's ever onward and upward thrust. The momentum that had been created by President Roh Moo Hyun's official apology for the suppression of the Cheju Uprising has been lost. Under the current president, Lee Myoung Bak (이명박) the funding and activities of the TRCK have been drastically scaled back. As the term of the TRCK was not extended, its formal activities terminated on 30 June 2010. The commission now has another six months to wrap up its activities and come up with a final report. With a new TRCK president who fatalistically accepts the absence of public interest in the work of the TRCK, it is unlikely the TRCK will produce any meaningful conclusions.<sup>45</sup> The current political majority is no longer intent on assuming any state responsibility for past violence, but rather accepts all cases of state violence as a form of collateral

damage in the nation's history.

Despite the fact that an important aspect of the TRCK's social reconciliation process is the public commemoration of the suffering of victims of state violence, the following analysis of the changing mnemonic landscape in South Korea suggests that the hegemonic nationalist master narrative endures. What appears at first sight to be a fractured mnemonic landscape littered with apparent internal contradictions, on closer scrutiny shows itself to be a collage of vignettes of the nation's history refracted through the prism of very specific events or individuals and their commemoration. These vignettes all refer back to an implied understanding of the nation as the ultimate motive power for historical development. It is in this respect that the master narrative can be said to frame the way these various incidents are recounted. One important player in the maintenance of this master narrative is the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs (MPVA, *kukka pohunch'ŏ* 國家報勳處), the authority in charge of the official memorial sites and sponsor of numerous patriotic organizations.

#### MEMORIAL SITES AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC MEMORY


In the process of Korea's transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, grassroots movements resurfaced calling for the recognition of state atrocities against civilians. This campaign has been successful in so far as the reformed state has taken on board the remembrance of victims of state violence. Such remembrance answers the need at a time of democratic transition for hitherto excluded groups to be inscribed in an inevitably rewritten national historical narrative.<sup>46</sup> As the state reconstitutes and reinvents itself as a democratic state, it develops a discourse that tries to integrate the country's tangled past and heal the scars of past social injustices. While this development shows a willingness and commitment to make the nation more inclusive and indicates an attempt to adapt and broaden the historical narrative of the nation-state, it would be a mistake to ignore the nation-state's enduring hegemony. There is an undeniable need for the nation-state to suggest national continuity and to restore

<sup>45</sup> Rather than speaking up for the importance of the work of his commission, the new president, Lee Young-jo (이영조), in a recent interview with *Voice of America*, merely mouthed popular sentiment by saying people felt the work of the commission was nothing but a waste of money. Kurt Achin, "Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission Winds Up Painful Look at the Past (23/6/10; <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Koreas-Truth-and-Reconciliation-Commission-Winds-Up-Painful-Look-at-Past-96979584.html>).

<sup>46</sup> Alexandra Barahona De Brito, Carmen González-Enríquez, and Paloma Aguilar (eds), *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

national cohesion. This desire leads to awkward tensions in the public discourses deployed by South Korean state institutions as the nationalist master narrative gradually adjusts to the new political reality of a pluralistic democracy. Previously excluded social memories are appropriated and incorporated into public memory, but inevitably sanitized in the process so as to serve and support the nation-state and its interests. This in turn creates new tensions as new debates ensue between different interest groups, whether within the political elite, or between national authorities and civil movements, over the proper representation of the nation's history and destiny

Although the democratized state is not the only player in the memory game, it is certainly the most powerful, plying the mnemonic landscape with memorials that mobilize a master narrative that moulds the public perception of the nation's history, and that serve as repositories and testimonials of public memory. One institution that plays a central role in the management of the mnemonic landscape is the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs mentioned above.<sup>47</sup> This ministry is assigned the task of preserving and honouring the memory of those who gave their lives for the country and of promoting the spirit of dedication and self-sacrifice those people showed. More than anything else, it is a ministry of patriotic affairs and as such it fosters allegiance to the nation-state through research and remembrance. The MPVA researches and preserves documents related to the Korean independence struggle, the Korean War and, more recently, the struggle for democracy. The ministry manages the various national cemeteries, the Kim Koo Museum & Library (*Paekbŏm kinyŏmgwan* 백범기념관) and the Independence Hall (*Tongnip kinyŏmgwan* 독립기념관). It also supports, financially and otherwise, the development of numerous memorial sites dedicated to meritorious patriots. Paramount in its educational activities is the propagation of patriotism (*nara sarang* 나라사랑) and the inculcation of national consciousness (*kukka ūishik* 국가의식) so as to strengthen national identity (*kukka chŏngch'esŏng* 국가정체성).<sup>48</sup> As the state was democratized, the historical discourse produced by the



A banner with the lyrics of the protest song (임을 위한 행진곡) that was dropped from the 2010 MPVA commemoration of the May 18 Uprising. In protest family organizations disturbed the official ceremony and hosted an alternative commemoration at the old Mangwŏldong cemetery, where this banner featured prominently. This incident is indicative of the tensions that arise in the process of the nationalization and institutionalization of the memory of Kwangju. (May 2010)

ministry adapted to this new situation. Without batting an eye, the ministry proposed, as one of its main objectives for 2010, a campaign to “remember with the people the proud history of establishing *simultaneously* national sovereignty, democracy and economic development, something unique in the world”<sup>49</sup> (italics added). This essentialist presentation of the history of South Korea brushes aside any contradiction that exists between the goals of the independence movement and the fratricidal Korean War, and ignores the struggle of democracy activists against the very state that this ministry unquestioningly legitimates. The ministry gets away with this sloganistic presentation because what it is presenting is precisely that: a slogan. The ministry is not in the business of writing history. In fact, as the following preliminary and cursory look at a number of memorial sites will show, there exists a fair amount of contradiction between the different sites managed by the ministry. It combines the various sites into a memorial landscape that is scattered around a core – a master narrative that frames the way the history of the nation is remembered – but allows quite some leeway in the way that core is represented and

<sup>47</sup> Established in August 1961 as the *kunsa wŏnhoch'ŏng* 군사원호청, it was elevated to ministerial level and renamed *wŏnhoch'ŏ* 援護處 in 1962. Another name change, to the current *kukka pohunch'ŏ* followed in 1985. See the website of the ministry: [www.mpva.go.kr](http://www.mpva.go.kr).

<sup>48</sup> As the Korean terms already indicate, national consciousness and identity are very much focused on the state (*kukka*), and thus on the Republic of Korea, rather than the nation (*minjok*). In the ministry's organizational chart (국가보훈처소개, 조직안내, [www.mpva.go.kr](http://www.mpva.go.kr)), click on the link Patriots' Promotion Bureau (*pohun sŏnyangguk* 보훈선양국) and its different divisions.

<sup>49</sup> “세계에서 유일하게 [국권회복 민주주의 경제발전] 동시에 이룬 자랑스러운 역사를 국민과 함께 기억하고.” Consult [www.mpva.go.kr](http://www.mpva.go.kr); click on 국가보훈처소개, 주요 업무. The ‘uniqueness’ of this feat is something the ministry wants to promote internationally as part of the Korea Brand (*kukka pŏraendŭ* 국가 브랜 드) campaign to further Korea's national interests.



The National Cemetery in Tongjak-dong, Seoul. In the distance the cenotaph, a monument erected during the presidency of Park Chung Hee. (April 2010)



National Cemetery, Seoul. Tombstone of a soldier killed during the suppression of the Kwangju Uprising in May 1980, stating he was “killed in action” (戰死). (April 2010)

developed. What results is a collage of impressions that fluctuate, expand and retract around a core that is so general that it is forever elusive. The past refracted through the prism of the master narrative scatters into a colourful array of representations that always relate to the same concept of sacrifice for the nation, but differ in the way such sacrifice is expressed.<sup>50</sup> At the heart of the MPVA project is the state as the legitimate representative of the nation that ties this bundle of histories together. But there are many dark spots masked in the myriad pasts refracted simultaneously through the prism of the nation’s history. Historical remembrance clearly goes hand in hand with historical amnesia.

One of the eldest memorial sites in the Republic of Korea is the National Cemetery in Tongjak-dong. When it was established in 1954 in the aftermath of the Korean War, it was intended as a military cemetery (*kukkun myoji* 國軍墓地) where soldiers fallen in the struggle against communism would find their final resting place.<sup>51</sup> In

1965, Park Chung Hee expanded the cemetery and turned it into a site of worship and remembrance of those who had dedicated their lives to the protection and development of the state and the nation. He officially renamed it the National Cemetery (*kungnip myoji* 國立墓地), a site where national martyrs (*sun’guk yōlsa* 殉國烈士) and meritorious patriots (*kukka yugongja* 國家有功者) could also be laid to rest. In 2006, the memorial aspect of the cemetery was accentuated when its Korean name changed to National Memorial Park (*kungnip Sōul hyōnch’ungwōn* 國立서울顯忠院).<sup>52</sup> Pride of place is given to the tombs of Park Chung Hee and Yuk Yōngsu 陸英修, his second wife, who was killed in a political assassination attack in 1974. Just as Park Chung Hee’s tomb overlooks the cemetery, his spirit lingers on the premises.<sup>53</sup> Following his death in exile in 1965, the first president, Syngman Rhee, was repatriated to be buried there and, one may wryly add, to be forgotten. Finally, Kim Dae Jung was also given a modest grave there, following his death on 18 August

50 On the concept of sacrifice (*hūisaeng* 희생), see Yi Kich’an 이기찬, “hūisaeng-ūl kinyōmhagi – aedo-wa kinyōm-ūi pulli, chukūm-i sogōtoen hūisaeng-e taehayō 희생을 기념하기 – 에도와 기념의 불리, 죽음이 소거된 희생에 대하여,” paper presented during the 5.18 Uprising 30<sup>th</sup> Commemoration International Conference, 26-28 May, 2010, Kwangju, The May 18<sup>th</sup> Memorial Foundation.


51 For the ROK Army, defending the country has always had the added connotation of fighting communism. Anti-communism became the bedrock of the independent South Korean state that Syngman Rhee founded in 1948. From its inception the military cemetery, at the time managed by the Ministry of Defence (*kukbangbu* 國防部), held not only the tombs of soldiers killed during the Korean War, but also those of soldiers killed in action during the suppression of the October 1948 Yōsu 여수 and Sunch’ōn 순천 rebellion. The National Cemetery has also always been one of the centres of anti-communist education in South Korea. Even today, this ideology permeates the cemetery and its exhibition halls. For more information on the history of the National Cemetery, see the National Cemetery’s website [www.snmb.mil.kr](http://www.snmb.mil.kr); click on 현충원 소개. Also Han Honggu, *Han Honggu-wa hamkke kōtta: P’yōnghwa-ūi nun’gil-lo torabon Han’guk hyōndaesa* 한홍구와 함께 걷다: 평화의 눈길로 돌아본 한국현대사 (Seoul: kōmdungso 검동소, 2009), pp. 33-51.

52 Though commonly translated as “memorial” the term *hyōnch’ung* 顯忠 has a much richer meaning. What is honoured is the “unswerving loyalty” of individuals who gave their lives to the great national cause.



2009. These three presidents may represent three very different faces and phases of South Korean history, but all antagonism between these three historical figures is brushed aside in the Meritorious Citizens' Hall (*kukka yugongja shil* 국가유공자실), where their meritorious service to the state is lauded. In line with the aforementioned 2010 MPVA slogan of “simultaneous recovery of national sovereignty, economic development and democratization,” they are remembered as Syngman Rhee, the first president of the republic;<sup>54</sup> President Park Chung Hee who laid the foundation for the development of a self-reliant economy;<sup>55</sup> and President Kim Dae Jung who devoted his entire life to democratization and human rights, and to peace on the Korean peninsula.<sup>56</sup> The placard detailing Park Chung Hee's contributions praises him for lifting the people out of poverty, strengthening the foundation of a self-sufficient economy and building up South Korea's self-defence (*chaju kukpang* 자유국방); it glosses over the human rights abuses that Kim Dae Jung fought so hard against. The fractured history of post-liberation South Korea is summarized in the political lives of these three presidents, but the message deployed at the National Cemetery ignores the tensions and overlooks the conflicts between them by reframing their presidencies as successive stages in the unstoppable process of the nation's progress.

The National Cemetery, as a site originally dedicated to the ultimate sacrifice of Korean soldiers, has more surprises in store. Wandering the grounds of the cemetery,



Placard at the entrance of the “Self-Defence Hall” at the National Cemetery, Seoul, implying that the suppression of leftist riots was part of legitimate behaviour for safeguarding the country. (April 2010)

one may come across tombstones of soldiers “killed in battle” (*chönsa* 戰死) in Kwangju in May 1980. This may have appeared to be a proper term at the time, when Chun Doo Hwan described events in Kwangju as a rebellion (*ponggi* 蜂起, *p'oktong* 暴動), but in 2010, when the same MPVA is responsible for the management of the National Cemetery for the May 18 Democratic Uprising (*kungnip o'lp'al minju myoji* 국립 5.18 민주묘지), this term cannot but be qualified as inappropriate.<sup>57</sup> The choice of the term is particularly injudicious given the fact that tombstones throughout the cemetery show a considerable amount of imagination in describing the causes of death. This goes to show how shattered the memorial landscape is. The National Cemetery does not reflect on the fact that the ROK Army was mobilized in a domestic power struggle against the people it was meant to protect. Admittedly, political neutrality is not something that shines prominently in the history of the ROK army. An equally ideological take, unbecoming of a democratic state, is to be found on the placard at the entrance of the Self-Defence

<sup>53</sup> From his prominent position in the National Cemetery, Park Chung Hee also has a commanding view of the Han River and the city beyond (Photo 3bis). His imprint on the layout of the National Cemetery remains unaffected today. One example of this is the hearse (*yöngguch'a* 영구차) that carried his remains to the cemetery is still enshrined there as a relic. At the same time, signs of popular veneration of Park can be seen at his graveside, where a steady stream of visitors come to pay their respects.

<sup>54</sup> Yi Süngman ch'odae taet'ongnyöng 이승만 초대 대통령


<sup>55</sup> Charip kyöngje palchön-ül kich'o-rül tajin Pak Chönghui taet'ongnyöng 자립경제발전을 기초를 다진 박정희 대통령.

<sup>56</sup> P'yöngsaeng-ül minjuhwa-wa in'gwön, Hanbando p'yönghwa-rül wihae hönshinhan Kim Taejung taet'ongnyöng 평생을 민주화와 인권, 한반도 평화를 위해 헌신한 김대중 대통령.

<sup>57</sup> Victims of the suppression of what is today officially described as the May 18 Democratization Movement were initially buried in a corner of the Kwangju municipal cemetery at Mangwöldong 망월동. In an attempt to contribute to national reconciliation, Kim Young Sam initiated the relocation and proper commemoration of the victims of the Kwangju Uprising. Work on the new cemetery was started in 1993 and completed in 1997. It became a national cemetery (*kungnip o'lp'al myoji* 국립 5.18 묘지) under the management of the MPVA in 2002, and in 2006 was renamed National Cemetery of the May 18 Democracy Movement (국립 5.18 민주묘지); see [www.518.mpva.go.kr](http://www.518.mpva.go.kr), click on 민주묘지 소개, 연혁. Considering the military and statist nature of most national cemeteries, one may wonder whether the name change into “cemeteries of the democratization movement” (*minju myoji* 민주묘지) was an attempt by the Roh Moo Hyun government at stressing their civil nature. There are two other cemeteries that are related to the democracy struggle and carry the name *minju myoji*: the National Cemetery for the April 19 Revolution (*kungnip sa.ilgu minju myoji* 국립 4.19 민주묘지) and the National Cemetery for the March 15 Revolution (*kungnip sam-iro minju myoji* 국립 3.15 민주묘지), commemorating the 15 March 1960 democracy movement in Masan, precursor to the April 19 Student Uprising.

Hall (*chaju kukpangshil* 자유국방실), where the national army and police are credited with “playing a crucial role in overcoming national crises, from the inception of the armed forces onwards, *by suppressing leftist riots* and by performing their destiny as true bulwark for the security of the country by gallantly giving their lives to the fatherland, whenever the country faced national crises, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War or all kinds of armed provocations by North Korea” (author’s translation, italics added). Given the activities of the TRCK in unearthing civilian massacres prior to and during the Korean War, it is surprising to see how the political misuse of the armed forces is still being rationalized in the spirit of the National Security Law, which admittedly is still in force and remains a blemish on Korean democracy.<sup>58</sup>

The contradictions and tensions that appear within the National Cemetery are repeated throughout the memorial landscape managed by the MPVA. Take for example Syngman Rhee, founding father of the Republic of Korea and its first president. Since he is buried at the National Cemetery, a display is dedicated to him in the Meritorious Citizens’ Hall. The placard mentions his involvement in the Independence Club and the Provisional Government. It credits him with “leading the movement for the foundation of the state” (*kōn’guk undong-ŭl chudohaekko* 건국운동을 주도했고) and hails him for “having established a free democratic system” (*chayu minju ch’ejje-rŭl hwang-niphaetta* 자유민주체제를 확립했다) as the first president of South Korea. Contrast this with the April 19 Cemetery where the Student Revolt was said to be a first step towards the restoration of the free democratic system. Syngman



Placard at the entrance of the Meritorious Citizen's Hall" at the National Cemetery, Seoul (April 2010)

Rhee and the excesses of his regime are largely absent from the displays, which focus on the immediate cause of the revolt, namely the election rigging of 1960, without directly making the president himself responsible. The website of the April 19 Cemetery, however, is much more outspoken about Syngman Rhee’s autocratic regime (*tok-chae chōnggwōn* 독재정권), although it does not specify what autocracy meant in this context.<sup>59</sup>

The picture gets even more complicated when one considers that Syngman Rhee’s main political rival in the contest for power in post-liberation Korea, Paekpōm Kim Koo, has an MPVA memorial hall dedicated to his life and exploits, whereas Syngman Rhee’s own residence, *ihwajang* 이화장, is crumbling from neglect under the care of a private foundation. The Kim Koo Museum & Library opened to the public in October 2002, just months after the historic Pyongyang Summit that brought the North and South Korean leaders together for the first time since the establishment of two independent states. It cannot be a coincidence that the Memorial Hall does not just concentrate on Kim Koo’s anti-Japanese (armed) activism, but also firmly situates him as a precursor to Kim Dae

58 In a similar vein, it is remarkable to see how a display in the War Memorial (*chōnjaeng kinyōmgwan* 전쟁기념관), another site for the glorification of military culture, hails the “spontaneous” organization of “civilian organizations” who performed rear guard security operations during the Korean War, a euphemism for the civilian massacres that were carried out following the retreat of the KPA from the South in the wake of the Inch’ōn Landing, a sad page in the history of Korea that is currently being unearthed by the TRCK.

59 A brief glance at the history of the April 19 Cemetery makes it clear that a study of the memorial landscape should not just be conducted synchronically, but also diachronically. Following the ousting of Syngman Rhee, Chang Myōn 장면 decided in April 1960 that the sacrifices made by the students had to be properly commemorated. It was Park Chung Hee who eventually oversaw the construction of the memorial at what was then an outlying district of the city of Seoul. His intention in doing so was to present himself as heir to the ideals of the Student Uprising and to confirm his break with the excesses of the Syngman Rhee period. What Chang Myōn had still described as a student “revolution” (*hyōngmyōng* 革命) became, under Park Chung Hee, a “heroic uprising” (*ūigō* 義舉), as Park had reserved the term “revolution” for describing his 16 June 1961 coup d’état. See Han Honggu, *Han Honggu-wa hamkke kōtta*, pp. 169-189; Chōng Hogi, *Han’guk-ūi yōksa kinyōm shisōl*, pp. 129-145. It was Kim Young Sam who renamed the Student Revolt a revolution. Under his presidency, the cemetery in 1995 became a national cemetery. A memorial hall opened in 1997 and was fully refurbished on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolt. See [www.419.mpva.go.kr](http://www.419.mpva.go.kr); click on 민주화운동, 역사적의의.

Jung's Sunshine Policy by portraying him as a post-liberation statesman who energetically opposed Syngman Rhee's scheme to establish a separate state in the southern half of the peninsula, convinced that the unity of the nation was more important than any political differences.<sup>60</sup> A symbolically interesting development in this regard is the fact that the once (July 2005) blank wall behind the imposing statue of a seated Kim Koo in the entrance hall of the museum, is now (March 2010) covered with South Korea's national flag, the *t'aegŭkki* 태극기.<sup>61</sup>

What transpires from this initial cursory overview of just a handful of MPVA memorial sites is a first indication of how dynamic, multi-layered and highly complex the memorial landscape governed by the ministry is. What is remarkable is that none of the sites teach proper history, but rather, they simply make reference to it. Surely, at some locations the visitor must be overwhelmed by factual detail, but the larger historical context is only suggestively touched upon. Displays expect some kind of existing historical knowledge on the part of visitors. In fact, what these sites really tap into is public memory, some kind of encyclopaedic repository of



Statue of the much revered Kim Koo in the entrance hall of the Kim Koo Museum & Library, reminding the viewer of D.C. French's statue of Abraham Lincoln at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington DC. The message is intentional: Kim Koo is Korea's Abraham Lincoln, the visionary who was capable of saving "the union." Seen in this light, the current display of the T'aegŭkki behind Kim Koo's statue is inappropriate, though its intention is clear: to lift Kim Koo into the pantheon of South Korean visionary leaders. (July 2005)

historical moments that is commonly shared, but hardly ever the subject of true reflection.<sup>62</sup> The memorial sites relate to this repository by elaborating on specific individuals or incidents and surrounding these with a nationalized glow. The diverse memorial landscape does not converge into a single comprehensive overview of Korean history, but rather resembles a historical patchwork stitched together by a nationalist master narrative of selfless sacrifice for the greater good of national advancement. Both the History Education Hall (*yŏksa kyoyukkwan* 역사교육관) in the Kŏch'ang Memorial Park (*Kŏch'ang sagŏn ch'umo kongwŏn* 거창사건 추모공원)<sup>63</sup> and the Memorial Hall (5.18 *ch'umogwan* 5.18 추모관)<sup>64</sup> at the Kwangju National Cemetery are interesting examples of this glut of detail. In the case of the Kŏch'ang History Education Hall, the profuse detail on display contrasts markedly with the cursory references to the historical context. This incident, in which over a two-day period in February 1951 the ROK Army went on a killing spree in three villages, killing more than 700 civilians, including women and children, is presented as the act of misguided officers, acting on inaccurate intelligence, who subsequently tried

60 At the same time, Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy is given historical legitimacy by linking his Pyongyang visit to Kim Koo's Pyongyang visit in February 1948. It was Kim Koo's adamant and continued opposition to the establishment of the ROK that eventually led to his assassination by An Tuhŭi 안두희 in June 1949. Though Syngman Rhee could not be directly linked to the murder of Kim Koo, a 1995 parliamentary commission did find that Syngman Rhee had a moral responsibility in the murder of his political rival. Kang Shinok 강신옥. *Paekpŏm Kim Ku sŏnsaeng amsal chinsang chosa pogosŏ* 백범김구선생암살진상보고서 (Seoul: Taehan Min'guk kukhoe pŏpche pŏpsa wiwŏnhoe 大韓民國國會 法制法司委員會, 1995). On An Tuhŭi and his military career during the Park Chung Hee years, see Han Honggu, "Nyurait'ŭ-ŭi yŏksa ūshik, muŏs-i munjein'ga?" pp. 41-45.

61 [www.kimkoomuseum.org](http://www.kimkoomuseum.org), click on 전시, 상설전시. The identification of Kim Koo with the *t'aegŭkki* warrants some reservation. At first glance, identifying Kim Koo with the *t'aegŭkki* seems appropriate as this was the national flag of the provisional Korean government. However, the display in the entrance hall to the Museum is of a different nature. Here, Kim Koo is mobilized in support of the Republic of Korea, a much more contentious move given the misgivings Kim Koo had about the establishment of a separate state in the south. It is not by chance that on 26 May 2010 the Democratic Party mayoral candidate for Seoul, former Prime Minister Han Myŏngsuk 한명숙, joined civil society movements in the Kim Koo Museum & Library to denounce President Lee Myoung Bak's handling of the Ch'ŏnan 천안 shipwreck case and to counter the president's belligerent speech from the equally symbolic Memorial Hall (*hoguk ch'unghonshil* 護國忠魂室) at the War Memorial of Korea, where he criticized 10 years of engagement policy with North Korea as misguided. Pak Sanghŭi 박상희, "Han Myŏngsuk Chŏnjaeng hanŭn nara-e t'ujahal oegugin-ŭn ōbta" 한명숙 전쟁하는 나라에 투자할 외국인은 없다, in *minjung-ŭi sori* 민중의 소리, <http://www.vop.co.kr/A00000298275.html>

62 This situation is not helped by the fact that none of these memorials host a proper bookshop (the Kim Koo Museum & Library features a book corner, selling mainly its own publications) where the visitor can purchase additional background publications. Most of the time, one has to make do with the pamphlets available on site.

63 An overview of the layout of this hall (Photo 8) can be consulted online at [www.case.geochang.go.kr](http://www.case.geochang.go.kr); click on 추모공원안내, 역사교육관. See also Chŏng Hogi, *Han'guk-ŭi yŏksa kinyŏm shisŏl*, pp. 96-105.

64 The various displays in this Memorial Hall are introduced online at [www.518.mpva.go.kr](http://www.518.mpva.go.kr), click on 민주묘지소개, 주요시설물, 추모관.

to cover up their misdeeds. The incident is framed in the context of the Korean War, and treated as a sorry aberration, the political context of universal and systemic violence perpetrated in the course of the establishment of the Republic of Korea being ignored. Visiting the Kōch'ang Massacre Memorial Park (*Kōch'ang sagŏn ch'umowŏn*, completed in 2004) one may forget the numerous other massacres that occurred during this time. As for the May 18 Memorial Hall, only completed in 2007, the story is even more complex. An interesting tension appears between the displays in the Memorial Hall, prepared by the Kwangju-based May 18 Memorial Foundation (*5.18 kinyŏm chaedan*), and the commemorations staged at the May 18 Cemetery, managed solely by the MPVA. The Memorial Hall overwhelms with its factual detail, depicting the daily, almost hourly sequence of events on those fateful days in May 1980. In doing so, it seeks to factually counter decades of disinformation about the uprising. Particularly important in that respect is the attention paid to the organized conduct of public life during the period of “liberated Kwangju 해방광주,” when, between 22 and 27 May, the city was sealed off from the rest of the country. Rather than the mob violence and disorder the national authorities reported at the time, the city came together in a remarkable sense of communal responsibility. Another focal point is how the initial defeat in Kwangju turned into the victory of June 1987. The democratization of Korea in this sense redeemed the suffering of the victims of Kwangju. Finally, due attention is also given to the prosecution of the perpetrators. Although the Kwangju Uprising is presented in a conceptual context of democracy and human rights, how these concepts relate to the uprising and how they ought to be understood remains unexplained. Interestingly enough, these subjects are not properly addressed in the Children's-Learning-Through-Experience Hall (*ŏrini ch'ehŏm haksŏpgwan* 어린이체험학습관), a space exclusively run by the MPVA, either. Although the layout



Entrance to the “children’s learning through experience hall” (어린이체험교육관) at the May 18 Cemetery. In the top left corner the logo of the MPVA which runs this hall. (May 2010)

and purpose of this children’s space is to “teach through various games and experiences the valuable spirit of the May 18 Democratization Movement,” on further scrutiny, it turns out to be first and foremost about teaching patriotism, *nara sarang*.<sup>65</sup> Rather than the spirit of resistance, echoed in the description of the uprising as the People’s Resistance (*minjung hangjaeng* 민중항쟁), used locally by both the Kwangju City authorities and the May 18 Memorial Foundation, nationally, the Kwangju Uprising has been remembered and described, since the Kim Young Sam years, as the May 18 Democratization Movement (*5.18 minjuhwa undong* 5.18 민주화운동). The tension that exists between local and national memory came to the fore during the 2010 commemoration when the song that had come to be identified with the Kwangju Uprising and its commemoration ever since, *im-ŭl wihan haengjin’gok* 임을 위한 행진곡, was dropped from the official MPVA-

<sup>65</sup> The quotation is from a folder, *5.18 Minjuhwa undong*, distributed at the Memorial Hall but prepared by the city of Kwangju (*Kwangju kwangyŏkshi* 광주광역시, no date). The MPVA displays the “grand tree of patriotism” (*nara sarang-ŭi k’ŭn namu* 나라사랑의 큰나무) on its own pamphlet of the May 18 Cemetery (*kungnip 5.18 minju myoji*) (*kukka pohunch’ŏ*, no date). The tree symbolizes the Republic of Korea, the *t’aegŭk* motif at the top of the tree stands for sacrifice (*hŭisaeng* 희생) and service (*konghun* 공훈) to the nation(-state) (*kukka*) (by meritorious citizens), the fruits stand for abundance (*p’unggyoroum* 풍요로움) and prosperity (*pŏnyŏng* 번영) and the bluebird and the twig stand for freedom (*chayu* 자유) and the hope for tomorrow (*naeil-ŭi hŭimang* 내일의 희망). See also [www.koreatree.or.kr](http://www.koreatree.or.kr) (Photo 10).

<sup>66</sup> In protest, an alternative commemoration was held at the old Mangwŏldong Cemetery, where the lyrics of the banned song were prominently displayed. Anon., “Pi sok-esŏ ullyŏp’ŏjin ‘im-ŭl wihan haengjin’gok,’” 비 속에서 울려 퍼진 ‘임을 위한 행진곡,’ in *Han’gyŏre*, [http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society\\_general/421292.html](http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/421292.html).

managed programme.<sup>66</sup> Such tension is an inevitable consequence of the nationalization (*kukkahwa* 國家化) and the concomitant institutionalization (*chedohwa* 制度化) of the memory of Kwangju.<sup>67</sup>

It is at memorial sites such as those discussed above that the politics of memory operate in streamlining public memory and that state institutions try to muffle resilient memory through the mobilization of nationalizing historical discourses. This has resulted in a discursive landscape that is marked by apparent ambiguity and enduring amnesia. The dynamism that can be seen in the memorial landscape as it is managed by the MPVA is partly a consequence of the democratic transition process and the inevitable reinterpretation of the nation's history this transition also demands on the part of the entrenched state institutions. At the same time, this dynamism seems to be an intrinsic part of the construction of public memory which has to be open-ended in order to absorb the inevitable tensions that appear in the process of integrating diverse social memories into the story of the nation.

**LET'S GET ON AND MAKE THAT MEMORY:  
A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION**

This article started out with a simple statement uttered at the first inter-Korean summit in June 2000. When Kim Dae Jung pronounced the words "Let's get on and make that history," he was speaking with the weight of history hovering over the summit meeting. This was not just a statement about the past, but also very much a statement about the future. More than anything else, this article has been an excursion into the sociology of history, situating history in relation to the politics of memory and remem-



A banner floating over the entrance to the old Mangwoldong cemetery in Kwangju, where an alternative commemoration took place on 18 May 2010. The banner displays the slogan "Resist" 저항 and has as subtitle the slogan the Kwangju city authorities used for the 30th anniversary of the Kwangju Uprising: "Do you hear, the people's slogans; do you see, the people's torches!!" 들리는가! 민중의 함성; 보이는가! 민중의 횃불!! This forceful slogan differs sharply from the demure slogan used by the MPVA for the 30th anniversary celebrations at the May 18 Cemetery: "May, the beam that lights the future" 오월은 미래를 비추는 빛. Both in colour and tone, these contrasting slogans demonstrate the tensions that exist between residual local memories and the sanitized national memory. (May 2010)

brance, and showing historians as socially embedded. If history is a social practice, then surely historians are social agents who not only interact with and are influenced by their sources, but who are also fundamentally defined and shaped by their ontological situatedness. This also means that historians do not own history, but practise their trade in an always already existent and ever developing memorial landscape, both material and immaterial. Historians may be privileged practitioners, but in the larger context of memory politics, they may also be quite marginal.

In this article I have outlined the contours and issues of a research project on history, memory and remembrance in contemporary South Korea. In earlier research, I have looked at developments within the field of Korean historiography in the course of democratization.<sup>68</sup> With

67 Chŏng Hogi, "'5.18'-ŭi kiŏk-kwa kyesŭng, kŭrigo chedohwa 5.18" 의 기억과 계승, 그리고 제도화, in *5.18 Minjung hangjaeng-e taehan saeroun sŏngch'alchŏk shisŏn* 5.18민중항쟁에 대한 새로운 성찰적 시선, edited by Cho Hŭiyŏn 조희연 and Chŏng Hogi (Seoul: Han'ul, 2009), pp. 453-481. As the memory of Kwangju is nationalized, new tensions also appear within the local community, where the monopolization of the memory of Kwangju by the victims' families is contested. See Ch'ei Chŏnggi 최정기, "'5.18 kinyŏm konggan-gwa sahoejŏk kaltŭng 5.18기념 공간과 사회적 갈등," *Minjujuŭi-wa in'gwŏn* 민주주의와 인권 (2008) 8-1: pp. 51-78. See also his paper "'5wŏl undong-ŭi chedohwa-wa hyŏn chuso 5월운동의 제도화와 현 주소," presented during the *5.18 Uprising 30th Commemoration International Conference*, 26-28 May, 2010, Kwangju, The May 18th Memorial Foundation.

68 Koen De Ceuster, "The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in South Korea," *Korean Studies* (2001) 25-2: pp. 207-242; De Ceuster, "When History Matters: Reconstructing South Korea's National Memory in the Age of Democracy".

this project, I want to go a step further and situate history within a much larger and fuzzier context of memory and remembrance. This is particularly relevant at a time when a democratized South Korea is coming to terms with its tangled and violent past. The historical urgency to come to terms with the legacies of the past was not only motivated by a concern for social and historical justice, but also by a deeply felt desire to learn lessons from the past and make the nation more inclusive. This process has culminated in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea. As the process is driven by politics, counterarguments have thrived and the process is far from accomplished, both in terms of providing comprehensive justice and in putting the country on a new footing.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless, as part of the process of providing historical justice, formerly suppressed and excluded memories are now incorporated in the rewritten story of the nation. The Korean state and society had to find ways to allocate these lost memories a proper place in the history of the nation and its mnemonic landscape. This process of incorporation is managed for the state by the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, which decisively intervenes in the memorial landscape and promotes a cult of national remembrance. This makes the ministry an important institutional agent in the management of public memory. As has been shown, the MPVA is the beholder of the nationalist master narrative which frames public memory. It now seems as if this master narrative is what holds an otherwise fractured and dynamic mnemonic landscape together.

Public memory is about selective functional interpretations of the past based on socially-endowed mnemonic strategies. The functionality of a past stems from its relevance and usefulness to the present.<sup>70</sup> The mnemonic strategies relate to this in so far as both individual and group recollections are ordered and remembered through socially defined conceptual structures (Maurice Halbwachs' social frameworks). In Patrick H. Hut-

ton's words, "[individual memories] are in fact composite images in which personal reminiscences are woven into an understanding of the past that is socially acquired."<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, public memory is not some immutable repository, but rather a process in constant flux, shaped by specific discursive codes dominant in the present of its production. But public memory is more than just a product of cognitive processes. Paul Connerton has alerted us to the importance of (often ritualistic) performances for conveying and sustaining memory, something that is readily apparent in historical pageants and commemorative re-enactments. Commemorative ceremonies in part remind communities of their communal identity as represented and told by the master narrative.<sup>72</sup> Although "institutionalized forms of memory are important but not all-controlling and [...] leaders exercise only imperfect control over institutional memory,"<sup>73</sup> Barry Schwartz has shown in the case of the memory of Abraham Lincoln that despite the fact that at any given time various, often contradictory, images of Lincoln coexisted, these did not fundamentally threaten the master narrative.<sup>74</sup> Something similar seems to be happening in South Korea, where apparent contradictions between and within memorial sites apparently do not affect the strength and hegemony of the master narrative. On a different level, this same perspective can also be applied to the various social groups who may vie for incorporation into public memory, but do so without apparently challenging the nationalist narrative that frames this public memory as it is articulated in the mnemonic landscape. What remains to be done is a more comprehensive mapping of the mnemonic landscape of South Korea so as to chart the dialogue and dynamics within and between the different memorials, both those supported and/or run by the MPVA and those in contention with public memory. Ideally, this mapping should then lead to further insights into the process of social and cultural memorialization in the age of pluralist democracy in South Korea.

<sup>69</sup> For an interesting historical parallel in post-liberation France, see Megan Koreman, *The Expectation of Justice: France 1944-46* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).

<sup>70</sup> As Paul Connerton phrases it, "[c]oncerning social memory in particular, we may note that images of the past commonly legitimate a present social order. It is an implicit rule that participants in any social order must presuppose a shared memory." Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 3.

<sup>71</sup> Patrick H. Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1993), pp. 6-7. For a more elaborate treatment, see Aleida Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik* (Muenchen: C.H. Beck, 2006), pp. 21-61.

<sup>72</sup> On commemorative ceremonies, see Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*, pp. 41-71.

<sup>73</sup> Lebow, Richard Ned, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fugo (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 15. "Institutional memory describes efforts by political elites, their supporters, and their opponents to construct meanings of the past and propagate them more widely or impose them on other members of society." Ibid. p.13.

<sup>74</sup> Barry Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

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# Keep Your Enemies Closer:




PROTECTING KOREA'S POP CULTURE IN CHINA<sup>1</sup>

Cultural histories usually revolve around people and the group or institution they are associated with. After all, any study of the development or adoption of cultural ideas or concepts would be meaningless without some idea of what drives those involved. But whereas cultural exchanges have long involved various degrees of human interaction, it is unlikely that they were ever as instant and 'anonymous' as they often are in popular culture today. Ideas and concepts are disseminated through the Internet to large numbers of people from different cultures without any direct involvement from the creators, and while the aspect of anonymity may not necessarily be new, to cultural studies, and in particular to studies of mainstream popular culture, this implies that the concept of agency and ownership has become even more contentious. South Korean popular culture is no

exception. What is more, while many of its aspects remain inextricably linked to South Korea's (hereafter Korea's) culture and society, it is part of a realm of activity that stretches across East Asia and is marked by increasing mimicry. Perhaps because of the notion that national association may jeopardize commercial profit, many pop

acts and stars are emerging in this region that defy a single national association, and often intentionally mask it.

Across the Asian region, sales of Korean popular entertainment are likely to have been underpinned by some degree of cultural proximity and notions of a shared history. In its efforts to compete with other industries



Korean pop acts are popular in China

<sup>1</sup> I am very much indebted to Dr Stephen Epstein, to my colleague Dr Geng Song, and to Ms Ai Chen for their invaluable comments during the writing of this article.

in the region, the Korean industry has not had to make significant adjustments to its products. One reason is that because strict censorship had for long been institutionalized and firmly embedded in Korean culture until 1998, Korea's mainstream pop was virtually void of gory violence, profanity or nudity. Another is that most of the elements one might associate with Korean products today, such as the frequent use of meaningless English rap in R&B songs, the often – from the author's perspective – effeminate styling of male stars, and the category-defiant genre-crossing of screenplays, already existed. These elements have certainly proven successful abroad and have thus been encouraged and emphasized, but they have their roots in Korean society and the domestic entertainment industry and were not introduced to add to the respective products' overseas marketability. Perhaps the only necessary adjustment was that as screenplays and lyrics began to involve Korea's neighbours, strong criticism of these neighbours' treatment of Korea or its people in the past was avoided.<sup>2</sup>

From a legal point of view, however, the marketing of Korean popular entertainment abroad has necessitated a number of important changes in the way the industry operates. Although the Korean government had for long showed little concern over the loss of revenue incurred by foreign companies as a result of domestic piracy or the production of counterfeits, over the last decade it has had to take proactive measures to ensure the Korean industry would not suffer great losses due to similar copyright-related issues abroad. Although the issue of piracy is also very much a domestic one, and certainly not limited to one overseas market only, in this article I analyse the major factors involved in the piracy of Korean media in China, one of Korea's most important markets for Korean pop entertainment. I argue that while cultural proximity and national association are important factors behind the popularity of popular entertainment among the Chinese, they do not affect piracy per se, as it is driven mostly by practical and economic factors.

Since the late 1990s, when Korean pop stars began to regularly perform to large sold-out stadiums in China, Korean media executives have often engaged in difficult negotiations with Chinese media executives and government administrators. Although at first these negotiations were primarily concerned with artists' fees and permission to perform, as the popularity of teenage pop acts such as H.O.T., S.E.S., Clon, and Baby VOX grew, the widespread breach of the Copyright Act in China urged the Korean government to increase its appeals to its neighbour for more effective countermeasures. In China foreign products are subject to stringent censorship and high import tariffs, but in the case of music, for example, pirated CDs are still believed to account for as much as 85 per cent of all products sold.<sup>3</sup> Since estimates suggest China's digital music market will grow to 12.7 billion yuan (US\$ 1.6 billion) in 2010,<sup>4</sup> this implies, of course, an increase too in the generally licit – i.e. socially accepted – but illegal exchange of media files. The situation causes concern among production companies, who can easily find illegal copies of their products being sold even before the official ones have been launched. Korean companies have been frustrated by the volume and speed with which counterfeit copies of their products flood the Chinese markets and, on one occasion in 2005, Korean national TV stations KBS and MBC ended up cancelling contracts with Chinese counterparts after large numbers of illegal copies were intercepted before they could launch legitimate ones. Because, moreover, many of these counterfeit copies of Korean entertainment media look official to the non-Chinese, one can find a large number of them being sold at seemingly legitimate outlets abroad.

In the middle of 2010, the popularity of Korean pop culture in China shows no signs of abating. Surfing the so-called 'Korean Wave', the Korean industry has been exploring China's market potential, and charting its performing talent, film locations and cultural history. Besides pop acts such as Bada, TVXQ, Rain, BoA and Lee Hyori, Korean directors have also been flying

2 Despite being painfully formulaic in its depiction of good and evil, the 1999 blockbuster *Swiri* (Shiri), which is often considered South Korea's most blatant attempt at emulating the American blockbuster-style movie, nevertheless depicted North Koreans as human beings. See Michael Robinson, "Contemporary Cultural Production in South Korea: Vanishing Meta-Narratives of Nation," in *New Korean Cinema*, edited by Chi-Yun Shin and Julian Stringer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 27-28.

3 Contrary to the situation in the US, in Korea it is only in recent years that significant losses have been incurred in the field of audio-visual entertainment products. Member associations of the International Intellectual Property Alliance have estimated that the losses incurred by US copyright-based industries due to Chinese piracy in 2005 amounted to \$1.28 billion for business software, \$589 million for entertainment software, \$244 million for motion pictures and \$204 million for records and music. See James F. Paradise, "China's Intellectual Property Rights Honeymoon," *AsiaMedia*, 14/11/06 (online article, [www.asiamedia.ucla.edu](http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu)).

4 See Hong'e Mo (ed.), "Digital Music Market to Expand to 12.7 Bln Yuan by 2010," *China View*, 29/5/06 (online article, [www.xinhuanet.com](http://www.xinhuanet.com)).

to China regularly to work on productions there. Early examples of Korean movies shot in China are *Pich'ŏnmu* (*Heaven-flying Dance*, 2000) and *Musa* (*The Warrior*, 2001). While the former used the talent of Hong Kong-based action director Ma Yuk-Sing, the latter starred the celebrated actress Zhang Ziyi and Korea's heart-throb Jung Woo-sung. In 2008, the Barunson Production Company released director Kim Ji-woon's *The Good, the Bad, the Weird*, a movie that was shot partly in Mongolia and Manchuria, and stars three of Korea's most popular male actors. Examples of TV dramas that have been very popular in China include MBC's *Taejanggŭm* (*The Jewel in the Palace*, 2003), KBS's *Pulmyŏr-ŭi Yi Sun-shin* (*The Immortal Yi Sun-shin*, 2005)<sup>5</sup>, about Korea's legendary general, SBS's *Yŏn Kaesomun* (2006), about the life of military dictator Yŏn Kaesomun in the later Koguryŏ period, and KBS's *Taejojŏng* (2006), which tells the story of how the founder of Parhae united refugees after Koguryŏ's fall. More recent successes include MBC's *Chumong* (2007) and *Taewang sashin'gi* (*Four Guardian Gods of the King*, 2007). While the former relates events at the time of the Koguryŏ kingdom's foundation, the latter chronicles the history of the kingdom up until its final days.

The Korean popular entertainment industry's successes in China do not, however, depend only on sales of entertainment media. The Korean film industry – the fifth largest in the world in terms of ticket sales with a total turnover amounting to approximately US\$ 1.1 billion in 2006 – seems keen to increase its involvement in the Chinese cinema market, whether through ticket sales, DVDs or digital TV subscriptions.<sup>6</sup> Korea's CGV, Megabox and MK Pictures, for example, are building Multiplex cinemas in China, while Korea's largest film distributor CJ Entertainment is increasing its direct investment in Chinese movie production. In August 2007, the Korean talent-management company and pro-



Back of an illegal DVD copy of *Kung Fu Hustle*, sold at two Asian DVD stores in central Sydney in 2009. The dark brown section at the bottom of the back cover was copied from a *The Mask of Zorro* DVD

duction house iHQ set up its first foreign subsidiary in Beijing with the intent of promoting the many Korean stars in its portfolio, and developing Chinese-Korean co-productions.<sup>7</sup> One month later, iHQ's parent company SK Telecom entered into an agreement with the state-controlled China Film Group Corporation to cooperate on film projects and nurture Chinese talent.<sup>8</sup> On 5 March 2008 it was announced that SK Telecom had acquired a 42.2 per cent stake in the major Chinese record label Beijing Taihe Rye Music (TR Music).<sup>9</sup>

5 This series became very popular, in part, because of its portrayal of the general forging an alliance with the Ming in order to defeat the Japanese navy during the late sixteenth-century Hideyoshi invasions. See anon., "Immortal Admiral Yi Sun-shin' Gains Popularity in China," KBS, 19/4/05 (online report, english.kbs.co.kr/entertainment/news).

6 In January 2006 Korea and China began cooperating on mobile TV. See Si-young Hwang, "Korea, China to Cooperate in Mobile TV," *Korea Herald*, 24/1/06 (online article, www.koreaherald.co.kr). Hoon-tack Jung, CEO and president of iHQ, expects that Chinese films will comprise half of the company's sales in the future. See Mark Russell and Jonathan Landreth, "Pusan Fest Unites Korean, Chinese Film Sectors," *The Hollywood Reporter*, 28/9/07 (online article, www.hollywoodreporter.com).

7 Darcy Paquet, "Korea's SidusHQ Hits Beijing," 20/8/2007 (online article, www.variety.com).

8 In 2009 the China Film Group agreed to release SK Telecom's movie *Haeundae* across China. See Maggie Lee, "Haeundae: Film Review," *THRReviews*, 27/7/09 (online article, www.hollywoodreporter.com).

9 Mark Russell, "Korea's SK Telecom Buys Stake in China's TR Music," *Billboard.biz*, 5/3/08 (online article, www.billboard.biz).

What do Chinese consumers find so appealing about Korean products? Although I was unable to do a cross-generational study for this article, my Chinese friends and students between the ages of 20 and 40 often tell me that Korean movies and dramas are addictive and that many singers and actors are ‘hot’. I am not sure, however, whether they think that Korean pop entertainment is cool and worth exploring by definition, or whether they think it is simply better than most of what is available to them and that its origin from a small Asian country makes it more appealing. Cultural proximity is, however, likely to play an important role in either case. If one looks at Korean dramas that have done particularly well in China, the focus on historical themes that relate events of mutual concern and shared influences is evident. An article in the *Rénmín Ribào* (People’s daily), in fact, named cultural similarity as a major factor behind the success of Korean productions in China, and argued that the growing popularity of Chinese productions in Korea partly derived from the use of Chinese characters, which many Koreans associated with their cultural heritage.<sup>10</sup> Ingyu Oh and Chang Suhyŏn posit alternative main factors underpinning the success of the Korean Wave in China. While Oh argues that it is the fact that the Korean products have created an image of Korea being “much more advanced and developed than China,” Chang believes it is simply the fact that they are cheaper than Western or Japanese products.<sup>11</sup> The latter argument is weak, because pirated copies of Western movies are widely available across China and rarely cost more than copies of Korean movies.

Although the term ‘Korean Wave’ is common among Chinese consumers, their selection of Korean products may in part stem from the strong connection of these products with Chinese culture itself. If cultural similarity is a major factor, then, it may not be so important that the products derive from Korea. Surely many of China’s Korean-speaking residents, both South Korean residents and those from the autonomous region of Yanbian, will remain loyal to Korean products because of the culture

and language they are based on and because of pride over South Korea’s powerful and technologically advanced economy. But will Chinese consumers continue to favour Korean entertainment when they find that domestic products are just as good and show a similar degree of economic and technological success? One issue Joseph Nye brings to the fore in his book on soft power is the fact that the consumption or enjoyment of specific cultural goods does not necessarily imply its consumers embrace the culture as a whole. He points out that those fond of American junk food may not, for example, like the United States at all, whereas those protesting against US foreign policy often do so in blue jeans and t-shirts.<sup>12</sup> While I do not wish to revisit the debate on the history of blue jeans, and very much doubt that jeans are still strongly associated with the US (at least in East Asia), I wish to emphasize more generally the importance of analysing how representative of a culture specific cultural items are. After all, the political implications of cultural choices often seem marginal at most, and national or cultural associations, feeble.<sup>13</sup> Because ideas and concepts are exchanged so rapidly in the realm of popular culture, for example, the homogenization that occurs makes it increasingly hard to claim a cultural specificity for any given item. Moreover, the factor of popularity itself plays a crucial role as few people spend much time searching for what product might suit their tastes best, opting instead for what is readily available, either at their cinema of choice or favourite download websites. Although, unfortunately, Nye does not discuss this issue in detail, an understanding of the association of certain products with their perceived culture of origin could prove useful, among other things, in the marketing of products and in trying to avoid ostracizing target consumers.<sup>14</sup>

As I stated earlier, the commercial success of Korean popular entertainment media companies in China has been marred by widespread copyright infringement. Apart from the significant number of Chinese cover versions of Korean songs recorded since the late 1990s,

<sup>10</sup> Anon., “Měi měi yǔ gòng, hé ér bù tóng” [We share beauty, but there is difference within the harmony], *Rénmín Ribào* [People’s daily] 19/1/08, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> Ingyu Oh, “Hallyu: The Rise of Transnational Cultural Consumers in China and Japan,” *Korea Observer* 40:3 (2009): p. 442; Suhyŏn Chang, “Chungguk hal-lyu-ŭi kwagŏ-wa mirae” [The past and future of the Korean Wave in China], *Chindia Journal* 3 (2007): p. 37.

<sup>12</sup> Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 12, 52. For other examples, see Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power: Japanese Popular Culture in East and Southeast Asia,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8:1 (2008): p. 76.

<sup>13</sup> See also Gerry Groot, “Soft Power in the Asia-Pacific post 9-11: The Cases of Japan, China and India,” in *Asia-Pacific and a New International Order: Responses and Options*, edited by P. Jain, F. Patrikeeff and G. Groot, p. 56.

<sup>14</sup> It is, for example, unlikely that when it contracted Lee Hyori to model its jeans across Asia in 2007, Calvin Klein considered the possibility that its product could carry a negative association with the United States. It will have expected consumers to focus on the Korean star’s beauty, rather than on where the product itself originated.

Korean entertainment media files are exchanged and sold illegally on a vast scale.<sup>15</sup> But it is, of course, not just Korean products that are sold illegally in China. According to the IFPI's 2006 piracy report, China had the largest market for counterfeit copies of entertainment media, and in 2008 the Havocscope global black market indexes ranked China second and fourth in the world in terms of music piracy (US\$ 451.2 million) and movie piracy (US\$ 565 million) respectively.<sup>16</sup> In 2005 Henry Blodget reported that because the price of a real DVD was approximately ten times higher than that of a pirated copy, many factories producing legitimate copies in the daytime would produce illegal ones at night.<sup>17</sup> In February 2008 Google announced plans to add links to MP3 files to its services in an attempt to compete with China's very similar-looking leading search engine Baidu, which in November 2006 won a favourable ruling in a lawsuit filed by seven major local record companies over its linking to illegal MP3 files.<sup>18</sup> Because of the website's ease of use and the large number of links to MP3 files it provides, in China even music industry insiders use the service to download their music rather than pay for it.<sup>19</sup>

The main factors that explain the widespread sale and exchange of illegally copied media are cost and profitability, availability<sup>20</sup> and ineffective jurisdiction, all three of which are to a significant degree affected by an understanding of the implications of copyright infringement to the product's owner, and by social acceptance. Targeting the latter will take time and much public information



A small shop at an underground shopping street in central Shanghai selling Korean Wave-style weddings (June 2008)

planning. Some believe that this is partly because Chinese culture has a longstanding tradition of accepted reproductions. Jianqiang Nie argues, for example, that apart from the absence of any legal framework, the concept of intellectual property is alien to many Chinese people:

*Traditional Chinese people conceived knowledge as public in nature. Inventing a product or authoring a work of art might be an accomplishment of the family and the community, and expected to be shared. [...] Nobody claimed they created knowledge and therefore privately owned it. Even Confucius said that he transmitted but did not create knowledge.<sup>6</sup>*

<sup>15</sup> In her very insightful book on copyright issues in Asia, Laikwan Pang argues that some pirate companies have become brand names themselves. See Laikwan Pang, *Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia: Copyright, Piracy, and Cinema* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 102-103.

<sup>16</sup> IFPI, *The Recording Industry 2005 Piracy Report* (www.ifpi.org), p. 11; www.havocscope.com.

<sup>17</sup> Henry Blodget, "Visiting the Pirate's Lair: Where to Buy Fake DVDs in Shanghai? Try a Fake Restaurant," *Slate*, 1/5/08 (online article, www.slate.com).

<sup>18</sup> See Duncan Riley, "Google To Challenge Baidu In China With Free Music," *TechCrunch*, 6/2/08 (online article, www.techcrunch.com). Several other search engines also offer easy access to media files, including www.sogou.com and www.tudou.com.

<sup>19</sup> Ru Wang, "Dancing to Digital's Tune," *China Daily* (North American ed.), 12/6/07, p. 20.

<sup>20</sup> Laikwan Pang argues that flaws in China's distribution network fuel piracy, yet I doubt that, given the choice, many Chinese would pay more to see a movie in a cinema than to buy a pirated DVD, and surmise that cost is almost always the decisive factor. See Laikwan Pang, *Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia*, pp. 101-102.

<sup>21</sup> Jianqiang Nie, *The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China* (London: Cameron May Ltd., 2007), p. 178.

In an article on copyright infringement, Ilhyung Lee also points to the impact of Confucianism on intellectual and artistic creations in China and Korea. He explains that in Korea this meant that creations were seen as public goods, “to be shared rather than exploited privately by the author.” He adds that in the past the copying of a Confucian scholar’s work was considered “an honour” and that it “reflected a passion for learning.”<sup>22</sup> The situation may have been similar in China, and Nie points out that even under Mao and after his death, when several laws were enacted recognizing copyright, the actual protection of a holder’s sole rights to the application of his creation and ensuing income for long remained ignored. The laws stipulated that all inventions belonged to the state and that copyright was recognized for the purpose of encouraging the creation and dissemination of works to support the “development and flourishing of socialist culture and sciences.”<sup>23</sup>

It would appear, however, that the concept of copying that is considered here and further in the past relates to the creative use and application of an individual’s ideas and creations rather than to the attempted replication of items for passive consumption, which is the primary concern of this article.<sup>24</sup> But even if the phenomenon of piracy were to be considered, the idea that the work of artists is necessarily original is contentious. As Joost Smiers puts it,

*The philosophical basis of the present copyright system is founded on a misunderstanding, notably that of the sheer originality of the artist. One always builds on the labours of predecessors and contemporaries. Subsequent artists add something to the existing corpus of work, nothing more and nothing less.*<sup>25</sup>

What is more, the argument of tradition is unsustainable in the case of entertainment media primarily because the copying of items can now be done so instantly and completely. Even the use of RAR-compressed AVI or ISO files, or torrent networks, requires no personal skill and only intermediate computing experience. Because for many people copying therefore involves little more than browsing the Internet in search of a genuine and popular torrent file,<sup>26</sup> this implies that occasionally they even acquire or exchange items they do not particularly like, let alone respect. Because of the overall content of the artistic media, it seems unlikely that those who exchange or purchase illegal copies do so out of admiration for the original creator, or tradition, or because they wish to develop socialist culture. One can imagine consumers feeling a sense of duty when they buy their idol’s official CD, but I doubt that many will feel similar piety when the product constitutes a logo-like cartoon animation such as Pukka or Mashimaro.<sup>27</sup> And whereas in the case of high-end luxury items such as watches fans may even take the initiative in fighting counterfeit copies<sup>28</sup> popular entertainment media are unlikely to ever elicit such devotion.

Other factors, potentially as important as social awareness and acceptance in explicating the flood of pirated products, are Chinese nationalism and the fact that copyright was for many years regarded as a primarily Western concern. Nie writes:

*For example, the accession to the WTO was claimed by some Chinese as yu lang gong wu (dancing with wolves). In these Chinese people’s minds, the GATT-WTO system mainly represents Western political and legal cultures.*<sup>29</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Ilhyung Lee, “Culturally-Based Copyright Systems: The U.S. and Korea in Conflict,” *Washington University Law Quarterly* 79 (2001): pp. 1105, 1121-1122.

<sup>23</sup> Jianqiang Nie, *The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China*, p. 184; see also Lucy Montgomery and Michael Keane, “Learning to Love the Market: Copyright, Culture and China,” in *Intellectual Property Rights and Communications in Asia: Conflicting Traditions*, edited by Pradip Ninan Thomas and Jan Servaes (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 131.

<sup>24</sup> See also Laikwan Pang, *Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia*, p. 4.

<sup>25</sup> Smiers argues that to extend exclusive property rights to a person risks impeding a society’s cultural and scientific development and allows cultural conglomerates to freely dominate artistic expression. Joost Smiers, “Art Without Copyright: A Proposal for Alternative Regulation,” *Open 12: Cahier on Art and the Public Domain*, edited by Jorinde Seijdel (Rotterdam: Nai Publishers and SKOR, 2007), p. 44.

<sup>26</sup> ISO files include the information required to burn an exact copy of the original (legitimate) DVD. The term torrent is commonly used to describe the sharing of digital files by way of P2P software.

<sup>27</sup> In July 2007, the copyright ownership of Pukka and Baby Dinosaur Tulli was recognized by the relevant Chinese authorities following an appeal by the Korean Copyright Committee. See Anon., “Han’guk chōjakkwōn, chungguk tūngnok pon’gyōk shijak” [Serious start of registering Korean Copyright in China], Chōjakkwōn wiwōnhoe [Copyright commission], 12/7/07 (online article, [www.koreacopyright.or.kr](http://www.koreacopyright.or.kr)).

<sup>28</sup> To combat the sale of (often Chinese-made) counterfeit watches in the Netherlands, subscribers to the Dutch watch collectors site [www.horlogeforum.nl](http://www.horlogeforum.nl) agreed in mid-May 2008 to target and report all sellers of counterfeit watches on Holland’s main online marketplace, [Marktplaats.nl](http://Marktplaats.nl), from 26 May to 1 June.

<sup>29</sup> Jianqiang Nie, *The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China*, pp. 173-174.

David Dayton, head of the Shenzhen-based procurement and project management company Silk Road International, told me he did not believe the Chinese government was serious about the enforcement of copyright and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) at all and would remain little concerned until Chinese companies themselves began raising the issue. Among the reasons for this he named “the ‘historical’ mistreatment of China by ‘The West,’” which, he argued, left China feeling entitled to some form of compensation:

*I've never been in a government office or university in China that was running legal software – they typically are very open about the fact that ‘only idiots’ would pay those kinds of prices for real software when the fake stuff is a dollar and it works just as well. This attitude is held by the ‘best and the brightest’ in China so you know that the rest of the country isn’t going to care either.<sup>30</sup>*

Although some might argue that Korean pop is as Western as the concept of copyright, a few Chinese students in their mid-twenties told reporter Norimitsu Onishi in an interview in 2006 that although they were aware of Western influence in Korea, they nonetheless felt a far greater affinity with Korean culture.<sup>31</sup> One could interpret such remarks as meaning that they liked aspects of Western mainstream entertainment, but did not wish to be associated with the US.

## CONCLUSION

So do Chinese nationalism and the association of products with China, Korea or even the US affect the extent of infringement on the copyright of entertainment media? It does not appear to be so, though they may, in fact, frus-

<sup>30</sup> David Dayton, pers. communication, 15/5/08.

<sup>31</sup> Norimitsu Onishi, “A Rising Korean Wave: If Seoul Sells It, China Craves It,” *International Herald Tribune*, 10/1/06 (online article, www.ihrt.com).

<sup>32</sup> Clifford Coonan, “‘Guardian’ May be Banned in China,” *Variety*, 23/9/07 (online article, www.variety.com).



In June 2008, on Shanghai’s central Nanjing Road, tourists were targeted by counterfeit product salesmen. The young man in the foreground of the photo presented his business card and asked to be followed into an alley, where at a small, warehouse-like store he offered a great variety of counterfeit fashion accessories and DVDs

trate official countermeasures. In 2007, Chinese national pride threatened to further complicate matters for the Korean entertainment media industry. In September that year it was reported that the Chinese State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) had black-listed *Taewang sashin’gi*, *Taejojong* and *Yŏn Kaesomun* on the basis of the dramas “distorting Chinese history.” The SARFT explained that *Taejojong* included a scene of a fictional attempted assassination, while *Yŏn Kaesomun* depicted the Tang Emperor Li Shimin as ugly and foolish, and the army as having to beg for mercy. In the movie about General Yi, moreover, the Chinese soldiers and their equipment were supposedly portrayed as much weaker than they actually were, while Ming Dynasty figures were not portrayed with historical accuracy.<sup>32</sup> The



following are excerpts from a comment left on a site that reported on these alleged distortions of Chinese history:

*I am Chinese and I don't care about something that happened 2000 or so years ago. What worries me more is that Koreans seriously think that their self-proclaimed ancestor (China/Korea didn't exist then) owned Dongbei for a short period about 2000 years ago, and that they have the right to claim Dongbei belongs to Korea today. [...] Watch out China, somebody in your neighbourhood wants to change your border and get his hand on a big chunk of your land. Korean history doesn't fly on Chinese TV screens.*<sup>33</sup>

Notwithstanding the controversies, however, it seems that Chinese authorities only enforced a ban on the sale of legal copies, and that many Chinese have continued to enjoy watching these dramas via pirated copies, as they are likely to have done anyway.<sup>34</sup> Given similar developments in Japan, where the Korean Wave also saw the rise of various anti-Korean Wave blogs and publications, criticism is unlikely to curb the flow of the Wave much among people from another generation, or encourage the already rampant infringement of copyright; it may well help though to make domestic dramas more popular. I surmise, therefore, that the impact of nationalism and tradition on media piracy is negligible. The lack of any guarantee of government protection – not even of Chinese products, the copyright of which is equally infringed upon – implies that domestic claims have been few in number. Chinese individuals and smaller, local companies may doubt the effectiveness of any attempt to demand compensation or protection themselves, in particular when it entails a Chinese offender. This explains why in 2005 over 99 per cent of all Chinese companies still had to apply for patents.<sup>35</sup>

Perhaps partly encouraged by some degree of nationalism, more and more Chinese are finding that they do not need Koreans to supply them with popular media and talent, and the Chinese entertainment industry is rising

to the occasion. While Chinese movies are once more enjoying increasing popularity both domestically and abroad,<sup>36</sup> Chinese TV dramas and pop acts are also doing well, and as with movies, they can rely on protection from foreign competition if such is required.<sup>37</sup> Chinese media outlets are already producing over five hundred dramas a year, taking advantage of enormous market potential. The fact that Chinese dramas won first prize at the Seoul Drama Festival in both 2006 and 2007 should serve as proof of talent in the Chinese industry. Journalist Ko Chaewan has argued that China is quickly advancing in the cultural production market and adopting many of the new styles, fashions and fads that have made Korean dramas so popular. He believes this development will have a significant effect on the popularity of Korean dramas in China, because Chinese production companies even surpass what their Korean counterparts have achieved so far, having successfully launched, among other things, a hip-hop drama.<sup>38</sup>

Copyright legislation, moreover, is changing fast. Although the Chinese government rarely implements changes to laws on the basis of international negotiations, since the early 1990s it has, in its pursuit of accession to the WTO, conceded several judicial changes that provide a reasonable legal framework for both domestic and international claims. After adopting the Copyright Act in 1990, and ratifying the Berne Convention in 1992, in 2001 China revised its copyright legislation to include regulations for both foreign and domestic copyright holders, trademark protection and for stepped-up measures for the active enforcement of legislation. In July 2006 it also revised its legislation to more effectively target the increasing volume of illegal downloads of copyrighted material, and it has since expanded its scope to, among other things, cinematographic and audio-visual designs. China's rights to all media related to the Olympics has further urged it to step up its measures to secure copyright protection. The sense of urgency may be similar to that felt by the Korean government when, after many years of ignoring infringements of the Copyright Act, the

<sup>33</sup> See Joel Martinsen, "Korean History Doesn't Fly on Chinese TV Screens," *Danwei*, 17/9/07 (online article, [www.danwei.org](http://www.danwei.org)). Grammar in comments corrected by author.

<sup>34</sup> Several DVD shops in central Sydney, which cater mostly to Chinese, Japanese and Korean customers, were selling imported, Chinese copies of the dramas at the time of writing.

<sup>35</sup> See Zijun Li, "Chinese Companies Tackling Intellectual Property Rights Issues," *Worldwatch Institute*, 23/12/05 (online article, [www.worldwatch.org](http://www.worldwatch.org)).

<sup>36</sup> Anon., "Měi měi yǔ gōng, hé ér bù tóng," p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> Paula Miller, "Reeling in China's Movie Fans," *China Business Review*, March/April 2007 (online article, [www.chinabusinessreview.com](http://www.chinabusinessreview.com)).

<sup>38</sup> Chaewan Ko, "Chungguk hallyu pisang sat'ae: Han'guk dūrama No, Hallyu dūrama OK?" [The odd situation of China's Korean Wave: Korean dramas no, Korean-Wave dramas definitely yes?], *Sports Seoul*, 12/6/07 (online article, [sportainment.sportsseoul.com](http://sportainment.sportsseoul.com)).

huge potential loss of revenue from the Korean Wave appears to have suddenly made it worth enforcing. Even the Music Copyright Society of China and China's largest digital music distributor, R2G, have brought a suit against Baidu, probably encouraged by a redress sought by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry.<sup>39</sup> In order to successfully implement legislation, however, the state, local authorities and the business community must cooperate. This, many argue, is not easily achieved<sup>40</sup> but international cooperation is, at least, increasing.<sup>41</sup> On 18 May 2006 the National Copyright Administration of China and the Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism signed an agreement to enhance cooperation on culture and copyright issues, and they have regularly deliberated joint strategies since then.<sup>42</sup>

Legislation and mutual cooperation are the only options for the Korean popular entertainment industry. Because pirated copies in China are very affordable and widely available, it cannot rely on Chinese consumers paying extra and waiting for products they can often already buy a pirated copy of, however positive their impression of Korean culture and history may be. Of course allowing some freedom in exchanging illegal copies of entertainment media may not be a bad move altogether. The use or exchange of illegal copies, which, as Laikwan Pang points out, is very much part of many young people's everyday lives, may serve as important appetizers to related products they might not otherwise look into.<sup>43</sup> But the validity of such a view depends of course on the degree to which counterfeit products have not already become the standard. Another approach to the problem could be to simply compete with the prices of illegally copied media as Hollywood has been trying to do,<sup>44</sup> but in such a case profits will shrink considerably, despite the size of the market, and there is a risk that the low-price products may also be shipped abroad and undercut the price of legal copies there. A third option is to sell products through online

digital media stores, but the technology and bandwidth required are likely to exclude a significant segment of the market. Eventually the solution to piracy will lie in a combination of approaches, as well as education and the enforcement of legal measures. Since these cannot be implemented overnight, the Korean industry will have to be patient and hope that its various efforts and investments will continue to bear fruit, especially while the Wave lasts.

<sup>39</sup> Paul Maidment, "China Faces the Music," *Forbes.com*, 8/4/08 (online article); Shu-Ching Jean Che, "Look Who's Suing Baidu," *Forbes.com*, 28/2/08 (online article).

<sup>40</sup> Andrew C. Mertha, *The Politics of Piracy: Intellectual Property in Contemporary China* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 133; see also Laikwan Pang, *Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia*, pp. 3, 105-106.

<sup>41</sup> The 2006 report by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) repeated its call for an expansion of the level of market access provided to foreign record companies "so that they can assist in the fight against piracy." See IFPI, *The Recording Industry 2006 Piracy Report* ([www.ifpi.org](http://www.ifpi.org)), p. 13. Yi Yŏngnok, of South Korea's Copyright Screening and Settlement Committee's Research Institute, has argued similarly that Korean companies should work with local companies overseas, so they can then file lawsuits together. See Honggu Chi, "Hallyu chŏjakkwŏn 'irŏk'e pohohaseyo'" [Please protect the Korean Wave "like this"], *PD yŏnhap hoebo* [Producers' association bulletin] 447, 25/1/06 (online article, [www.pdjourn.com](http://www.pdjourn.com)).

<sup>42</sup> See Anon., "China, S. Korea Sign Culture, Copyright Cooperation Agreement," *China.Org.Cn*, 19/5/06 (online news report).

<sup>43</sup> Laikwan Pang, *Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia*, p. 41. Rowan Pease has argued that piracy was a major force behind the Korean Wave. See Rowan Pease, "Internet, Fandom and K-Wave in China," in *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, edited by Keith Howard (Global Oriental, March 2006), p. 177.

<sup>44</sup> See Dan Harris, "China Piracy: If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em," *China Law Blog*, 13/11/07 (weblog posting, [www.chinalawblog.com](http://www.chinalawblog.com)).

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# A Search for New Approaches

TO RESEARCH ON KOREAN BUDDHIST HISTORY<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to suggest new approaches to the study of Korean Buddhist history.<sup>2</sup> To this end, I will re-examine the conventional scholarship of the following three issues: Chajang 慈藏 (fl. 636-50) and Buddhism;<sup>3</sup> the Koryŏ 高麗 (918-1392) dynasty and Buddhism; and King Sejong<sup>4</sup> 世宗 (1418-50) and Buddhism.<sup>5</sup> This article will conclude by arguing that we need to take a fresh look at the available primary data, and to conduct an in-depth analysis of first-hand source material in its proper chronological order to advance our understanding of Korean Buddhist history.

Section One of this article, “Reflection on conventional scholarship,” will discuss the limits of conventional scholarship in terms of data, methodology, and common practice. Section Two, “Discourses on the characteristics of Korean Buddhism,” will re-examine the traditional



Lanterns in the Chogye-sa, the headquarters of the Chogye Order

views with regard to the characteristics of Korean Buddhism, focusing on the notion of ‘Buddhism as state protector’ (*hoguk Pulgyo* 護國佛教). Finally, Section Three, “A search for new approaches: Three case studies,” will suggest new approaches to research on Korean Buddhist

1 This article is based on a paper that was presented at the Workshop “History as Social Process: Unconventional Historiographies of Korea,” Universiteit Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands, 24-25 October 2009. A revised and translated version in Korean was presented at the meeting of the International Association for Korean Historical Studies 국제한국사학회 (<http://inter-history.tistory.com>), Sungsil University, Seoul, Korea, 24 November 2009.

2 References to post-division Korean scholarship on Korean Buddhism apply to scholarship in the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

3 The notion of ‘Buddhism’ (*Pulgyo* 佛教) did not exist in premodern East Asian society, including Korea. Instead, Buddhism was known at that time as *Sŏkkyo* 釋教 (lit. the Buddha’s teaching). In addition, the exact meaning of the notion of Buddhism is still being debated in academic circles. In this article, ‘Buddhism’ refers to the Buddhist traditions developed in Korean history.

4 For references to numerous academic works about King Sejong, see Kim Jongmyung “King Sejong’s Buddhist Faith and the Invention of the Korean Alphabet: A Historical Perspective,” *Korea Journal* 47.3 (2007): pp. 136-137 [pp. 134-159]. The online version of this work can be found on <http://www.ekoreajournal.net/archive/index.jsp>.

5 Historically, Buddhism in Korea has not existed alone, but has been assimilated with other traditional religions, including Confucianism and shamanism. Therefore, for a better understanding of the nature of Korean Buddhism, we also need to focus on its relationship with other religious traditions. However, this research focuses on Korean Buddhism itself.

history based on my earlier scholarly work.<sup>6</sup>

Conventional scholarship has focused on primary historical sources such as the *Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms* (*Samguk sagi* 三國史記, 1145, hereafter *SGSG*)<sup>7</sup> and the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms* (*Samguk yusa* 三國遺事,<sup>8</sup> c.1280,<sup>9</sup> hereafter *SGYS*)<sup>10</sup> to study Korean history, including Korean Buddhist history. Currently epitaphs,<sup>11</sup> archaeological remains,<sup>12</sup> epistolary material, and travel literature<sup>13</sup> are also emerging as new source data for research on Korean history. However, this study will argue that we still need to examine primary historical sources further to advance our understanding of Korean Buddhist history. This means that we need to refer to previously neglected available primary data and to conduct a more in-depth analysis of first-hand source material in its proper chronological order.<sup>14</sup>

## I. REFLECTION ON CONVENTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP

Conventional scholarship suffers from limits in the source data consulted for a given topic, in the understanding of data referred to, in its attitude toward previous scholar-

ship, and in the logic of its organization. It also shows a lack of convincing arguments and a tendency to jump to conclusions based on insufficient evidence; besides, it uses concepts whose meaning is unclear.<sup>15</sup> Conventional scholarship moreover tends to be ideology-oriented,<sup>16</sup> as well as oriented towards political history.<sup>17</sup> Issues that, in my view, are in particular need of urgent resolution in order to advance the study of Korean history are the insufficient analysis of available source data, the lack of methodology in research on Korean history, and the existence of certain common practices latent in scholarly circles, such as the exaggerated valuation of personal connections.

### 1. Insufficient analysis of available source data

Historical works, individual literary writings, epitaphs, and tombstones constitute important primary material for Korean Studies, including Korean Buddhist history. In particular, the *SGSG* and the *SGYS* are primary historical sources for the study of Buddhism from fourth- to tenth-century Korea, the latter being the more important of the two for the subject. While the former is the orthodox his-

6 A good precedent of this kind is Kim Chaehyon 김자현 (JaHyun Kim Haboush), "Chosŏn shidae munhwasa-rŭl öttök'e ssŭl kösin'ga-charyo-wa chöpkün pangböp-e taehayö 조선시대 문화사를 어떻게 쓸 것인가? -자료와 접근방법에 대하여," in *Han'guksa yön'gu pangbömnon-gwa panghyang mosaek* 한국사 연구방법론과 방향 모색 (Proceedings of Han'guksa kukche haksul hoeü 한국사 국제학술회의, Seoul kyoyuk munhwa hoegwan 서울교육문화회관, Seoul, Korea, 19-20 June, 2002), pp. 119-134.

7 Part of this work has been translated into English; see Jonathan W. Best, *A History of the Early Korean Kingdom of Paekche* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006).

8 For a bibliographical guide to these two sources, see Kim Tai-jin (ed. & trans.), *A Bibliographical Guide to Traditional Korean Sources* (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1976), pp. 11-17 and pp. 30-34 respectively.

9 Conventional scholarship has dated the compilation of this work to the year 1278, following the argument of Ch'oe Namson 崔南善 (1890-1957). However, new opinions on this issue are emerging; see Kim Jongmyung 김종명, *Han'guk üi segye Pulgyo yusan: sasang kwa üüi* 한국의 세계불교유산: 사상과 의의 (Seoul 서울: Chimmundang 집문당, 2008), pp. 11-17, 30-34.

10 There are two English translations of this work: Ilyon, *Samguk Yusa; Legends and History of the Three Kingdoms of Ancient Korea*, translated by Ha Tae-hung and Grafton K. Mintz (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1972); and Ilyeon, *Overlooked Historical Records of the Three Korean Kingdoms*, translated by Kim Dal-yong (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2006). While the former is an indirect translation prepared with the general reader in mind on the basis of a translation in modern Korean, the latter is a direct translation, made on the basis of both the original in literary Chinese and modern Korean translations.

11 A considerable number of epitaphs from the Koryŏ period are extant. More than half of them are associated with Buddhism and they are very important sources, both in their quantity and in their content. Stone monuments are more important than inscriptions in metal, both in the number of examples and the number of characters recorded. The former are also more aesthetically significant than the latter. The relic stūpas (*pudo pi* 浮屠碑) for National Preceptors (*kuksa* 國師) and Royal Preceptors (*wangsa* 王師) are particularly valuable examples of epigraphic sources; see Hö Hüngshik 許興植, "Koryŏ Pulgyo kümsöngmun üi t'üksöng kwa chöngni panghyang," 고려 불교금석문의 특성과 정리 방향, *Taedong munhwa yön'gu* 大東文化研究55 (2006): pp. 35-64.

12 In his series of groundbreaking works based on epitaphs and archaeological evidence, Gregory Schopen also rebutted traditional scholarship which had focused on canonical texts, and argued that just like laypeople, Buddhist monks in India were also engaged in donative activities for fulfilling their secular wishes and in performing Buddhist rituals for the repose of the dead. Gregory Schopen, *Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997); idem, "Monks and the Relic Cult in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*: An Old Misunderstanding in Regard to Monastic Buddhism," in *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion*, edited by Koichi Shinohara and Gregory Schopen (Oakville - New York - London: Mosaic Press, 1991): pp. 187-201; Gregory Schopen, *Buddhist Monks and Business Matters: Still More Papers on Monastic Buddhism in India* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004); Gregory Schopen, *Figments and Fragments of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005).

13 Xu Jing's 徐兢 *Illustrated Account of Koryŏ* (*Gaoli tujing* 高麗圖經, *Koryŏ togŏng* in Korean, 1123) is a representative travelogue related to Koryŏ Buddhism.

14 Michael Allen is of the same view and has said, "To do my study well, I had to commit myself to reading everything Shin [Ch'aeho] had written - not just the passages that were regularly quoted in Western studies, but the entire books from which those passages were taken. And then I had to read everything else Shin wrote that was not quoted by scholars" (J. Michael Allen, "How Early is Korean Modernity? The 'Early-Modern' in Korean Historiography," in *Han'guksa yön'gu pangbömnon-gwa panghyang mosaek*: p. 158 [pp. 157-167]).

15 Yi Sönggyu 이성규, "Han'guk-üi Chungguksa yön'gu samshimnyön-Sönsa shidae-esö Tang mal kkaji 한국의 중국사 연구 삼십 년-선사시대에서 唐宋까지," in *Hyöndae Han'guk yöksahak üi tonghyang (1945-1980)* 현대 한국 역사학의 동향 (1945-1980), edited by Yöksa hakhoe 역사학회 (Seoul: Ilchogak 一潮閣, 1982), pp. 185-217.

tory compiled by royal order, the latter, a rich source of Buddhist culture in Korea, is an unofficial chronicle by the Zen monk Iryōn 一然 (1206-89). In addition, for the study of Koryō Buddhism, the most important primary source is the *Historical Records of the Koryō Dynasty* (*Koryōsa* 高麗史, 1451, hereafter KRS).<sup>18</sup> The *Veritable Records of the Chosōn Dynasty* [1392-1910] (*Chosōn wangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄, hereafter CWS)<sup>19</sup> is also a valuable official source for the study of Chosōn Buddhism. Furthermore, for the hagiographical and philosophical study of Korean Buddhism, the *Tripitaka Koreana* (*Koryō taejanggyōng* 高麗大藏經, mid-thirteenth century) and the *Collection of Korean Buddhist Works* (*Han'guk Pulgyo chōnsō* 韓國佛教全書, 1998-2004) are indispensable.

Particular problems in Korean scholarship of Korean Buddhist history are the lack of in-depth examination of available primary sources and comparative analysis of particular themes.

## 2. Deficiency of methodology

Conventional scholarship of Korean Buddhist history in contemporary Korea largely lacks a Korea-centred methodology, comparative analysis, and an understanding of Buddhist doctrine.

### *Lack of Korea-centred methodology*

Japanese scholars pioneered Korea's modern historiography during Japan's rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945. Since the liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945, Korean



The woodblocks of the *Tripitaka Koreana*, stored in the Haein-sa Monastery

historians have devoted themselves to overcoming the Japanese imperialist view of Korean history, and their achievements have been considerable. However, the approach of Korean scholars to Korean history has shortcomings in terms of methodology. There have been three paradigms of history writing in Korea: nationalist historiography, Rankean (positivist) historiography, and Marxist historiography.

Emphasizing the national spirit of Korea, to serve in the struggle to survive as the fittest, nationalist historiography developed as a major vehicle of political activism in response to the Japanese imperialist view of Korean history, which was based on a Western linear and imperialist model of history. As the mainstream of Korean historiography, factualists were the first generation of professional historians in modern Korea and they stressed 'facts,' scrutinizing documents and textual criticism. In addition,

16 Chōng Tuhūi 정두희, "Kaein-ūrosō-ūi 'na'-ūi palgyōn-gwa Chosōn chōn'gisa-ūi saeroun mosaek 개인으로서의 '나'의 발견과 朝鮮前期史의 새로운 모색," in *Han'guksa yōn'gu pangbōmnon-gwa panghyang mosaek*, pp. 101-108; Kim Chahyōn, "Chosōn shidae munhwasa rūl öttök'e ssül kōsin'ga-charyo wa chōpkūn pangbōp e taehayō," pp. 119-134; Sō Chungśōk 서중석, "Han'guk hyōndaesa yōn'gu-wa ideologi: 1948nyōn 4wōl P'yōngyang NamPuk chidoja hoeūi rūl chungsim ūro 한국현대사 연구와 이데올로기 -1948년 4월 평양남북지도사회의를 중심으로," in *Han'guksa yōn'gu pangbōmnon-gwa panghyang mosaek*, pp. 315-333.

17 This tendency is presumed to have been formed under the influence of the German historical circles during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) in Korea. This is because Japan was heavily influenced by European countries, including Germany, after the Meiji 明治 Reform (1868-1889) and the contemporary Korean academic world, including the historical circles, stood in turn under the influence of Japanese scholarship. German historical circles before the 1960s had focused on the evaluation of national development and historical figures who played a significant role in German history on the basis of historicism. H. U. Wehler has said that the tradition that emphasized political history, diplomatic history, and military history was established during the period of absolutism. Yi Minho 李敏鎬, "Pellō ūi sahoesa 벨리의 社會史, in *Hyōndae yōksa iron-ūi chomyōng* 現代歷史理論의 照明, edited by Yōksa yōngushil 歷史研究室 (Sōngnam 城南: Han'guk chōngshin munhwa yōn'guwōn 韓國精神文化研究院, 1984), pp. 59-82. Specifically, it was Germany that put particular emphasis on national and political activities in history, which transformed itself into an ideology to support the established order, including the nation (Ibid., p. 77).

18 Jongmyung Kim, *Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea (918-1392)* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1994), pp. 12-13.

19 These *Veritable Records* were registered on the UNESCO Memory of the World list in 1997, the first and only heritage item of its kind in East Asia. As for Buddhist thought and the significance of Buddhism as world heritage property in Korea, see Kim Jongmyung, *Han'guk ūi segye Pulgyo yusan: sasang-gwa ūūi*.

Marxist historiography, which emphasizes that the base (material conditions) determines the superstructures (political, social, and ideological realms), also developed during the Japanese colonial rule of Korea. However, the division of Korea into South and North after Korea's liberation caused a division of historians in Korea. As a result, while historians of a Marxist persuasion disappeared from the scene in South Korea, they were active in North Korea. In addition, few historians truly mastered any of the three paradigms mentioned above. However, while Western models cannot be applied to Korea as they are, Korea-centred methodology has not yet been developed.<sup>20</sup>

### **Need for comparative analysis**

Since the Three Kingdoms period (57 BCE-668 CE), Korea had been in a close relationship with kingdoms that existed in the territory of modern China;<sup>21</sup> to a lesser extent, it had also been in contact with the Japanese isles. However, Korean scholars have primarily studied Korean history within the isolated nation of Korea, to the neglect of its relationship with neighbouring countries.<sup>22</sup> Regarding this phenomenon, it has been said:

*One [form of this parochialism] is the indifference to and ignorance of histories outside Korea, be they Chinese, Japanese, or European. This narcissistic tendency has much to do with the reaction to the degradation by colonialist historiography, that is, Korea's dependence on superpowers.<sup>23</sup>*

It is my recognition that while Western scholars of Korean history refer to works in Korean by Korean historians, Korean historians rarely take into account the achievements of overseas scholars on Korean history.<sup>24</sup> A Western scholar expressed concern about this situation, saying, "I will confess [...] that one thing that worries me is the question of whether or not scholars in Korea will ever read my work."<sup>25</sup> In fact, Korean historians are in general indifferent to and ignorant of the work of foreign scholars, unless it is translated into Korean. Recent academic works and journal articles on Korean history published in Korea and papers by Korean historians presented at international conferences<sup>26</sup> also bear out this situation, thus producing a discrepancy between the two groups in their understanding of Korean history. The two groups' interpretations of the nature of early Chosŏn history is a good example: while the Korean group has argued for the theory of change, some non-Korean scholars have maintained the theory of continuation. For the former group, the latter's argument is none other than the theory of stagnation maintained by Japanese scholars during the colonial period. In contrast, for the latter, the former's opinion entails the subordination of Korean history to the sentiment of nationalism.<sup>27</sup> Korean Buddhist history is not exceptional in this regard.

### **Shortage of knowledge of Buddhism**

Buddhist historians and Buddhist art historians in Korea barely study Buddhist doctrine.<sup>28</sup> There are more than 250 Korean universities, but few of their curricula include

<sup>20</sup> Kwon Yonung, "Korean Historiography in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: A Configuration of Paradigms," *Korea Journal* 40.1 (2000): pp. 51-52 [33-53].

<sup>21</sup> 'China' was only used as the name of a country after 1911 or 1949. Therefore, it is inappropriate to denote kingdoms that existed in the territory of modern China before the twentieth century as China. See Hō Hūngshik, "Koryō Pulgyo kümsōngmun-ūi t'üksōng-gwa chōngni panghyang," pp. 35-64.

<sup>22</sup> In contrast, in his provocative, but fine, rich, and persuasive piece of work, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China 221 BC to AD 1757* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), Thomas J. Barfield offered a new interpretation of relations between China and her northern neighbours, including Koryō, in premodern times.

<sup>23</sup> Kwon Yonung, "Korean Historiography in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century," p. 51.

<sup>24</sup> Some noticeable works of Korean history have been published in foreign languages, including English. Among them are Marina Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology* (Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992); James B. Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyōngwōn and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996); Robert E. Buswell, Jr., "Buddhism Under Confucian Domination: The Synthetic Vision of Sōsan Hyujong," in *Culture and the State in Late Chōson Korea*, edited by JaHyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler (Harvard East Asian Monographs 182, Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London: the Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), pp. 134-159; John B. Duncan, *The Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2000); Edward J. Shultz, *Generals and Scholars* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000); and Sem Vermeersch, *The Power of the Buddha: The Politics of Buddhism During the Koryō Dynasty* (Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 2008), which won the first James Palais Prize from the Association for Asian Studies in 2010.

<sup>25</sup> J. Michael Allen, "How Early is Korean Modernity? The 'Early-Modern' in Korean Historiography," p. 166. The activities of Hyōndae Han'gukhak yōn'guso 현 대한국학연구소 [Institute of Modern Korean Studies], which included reviews of books on Korean history published in the West, led by Ryu Yōngik 柳永益, constituted one exception. However, such review activity by the institute was suspended as of 2010.

<sup>26</sup> For example, Session 246, entitled "History as Progress? Agency and Modernity in Korean History," for the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, Philadelphia, USA, 25-28 March 2010, was composed of three papers by Korean scholars of Korean history. When I pointed out this issue during the Q & A time, no presenter responded to me.

<sup>27</sup> Chōng Tuhūi, "Kaein-ūrosō-ūi 'na'-ūi palgyōn-gwa Chosŏn chōn'gisa-ūi saeroun mosaek," p. 110.



courses on Buddhism. Such courses are offered only at a small number of universities affiliated with Buddhist orders and at a handful of other universities. In addition, courses on Buddhism in the former are apologetic in orientation, while those in the latter are too few in number. Therefore, while Korean historians refer to source data on Korean Buddhism for their research, in general they possess only a smattering of knowledge of Buddhist doctrine, and therefore often jump to hasty conclusions. However, Kim Lina (Lena Kim),<sup>29</sup> a Buddhist art historian and former professor at Hongik University in Korea, and John M. Rosenfield,<sup>30</sup> an art historian and emeritus professor at Harvard University in the USA, have both pointed out that a good knowledge of Buddhist doctrine is crucial for a better understanding of Buddhist art.

### 3. Common practices

Parochialism, lack of interdisciplinary approach, and neglect of previous scholarly work are common practices in Korean historical circles.

Many faculty members in the history departments of Korean universities are alumni of the universities at which they are now employed. In particular, all the professors in the department of Buddhist Studies at Dongguk University, once the Mecca of Buddhist studies in Korea, are alumni of the university. As a result, there is a lack of critical attitude towards the work of senior scholars belonging to the same school, to the disadvantage of the advancement of the field.<sup>31</sup>



Pages from the thirteenth-century *Tripitaka Koreana*

In addition, Korean historians concentrate on a particular sphere, be it political or social, in a particular period, compartmentalizing history<sup>32</sup> and showing indifference to an interdisciplinary approach.<sup>33</sup> The neglect of previous scholarly works on a given topic is another problem found in contemporary scholarship of Korean Buddhist history. For instance, two books<sup>34</sup> examined the role of major Buddhist rituals during the Koryŏ period and interpreted the subject in different manners. The book published in 2001 criticized the conventional view that the Buddhist rituals played a role with regard to the function of Buddhism as a state protector. In contrast, the book published in 2005 simply accepted the traditional view, while neglecting to examine the arguments of the 2001 study.

The above-mentioned issues still exist in Korean academia. In the following, I will examine some discourses on the characteristics of Korean Buddhism, dis-

28 In this article, 'Buddhist doctrine' refers to the basic teachings of the Buddha, including the Four Noble Truths. The content of the basic teachings of the Buddha is in debate among scholars. However, in general it refers to the Buddhist teachings of up to 100 years after the death of the Buddha, i.e. the period when the Buddha's direct disciples were in activity. This article adheres to this generally held definition.

29 In my talk with her in the summer of 2007.

30 After I presented my paper, "The Philosophical Underpinning of the Calamities – Solving Ritual and Its Nature in Medieval Korea," at the Buddhist Conference "Esoteric Buddhist Tradition in East Asia: Text, Ritual and Image," at Yale University, USA, on 9-11 November 2007, Professor Rosenfield approached me and said that my level of knowledge of Buddhist doctrine was what he was advocating.

31 For example, in 2009 the ratio of alumni professors of Princeton University and Harvard University was less than ten percent and twenty percent respectively.

32 Kwon Yonung, "Korean Historiography in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: A Configuration of Paradigms," p. 51; Kim Jongmyung, *Han'guk chungse-üi Pulgyo üiry: sasang chök paegyöng-gwa yöksa chök üimi* 한국중세의 불교의례: 사상적 배경과 역사적 의미 (Seoul: Munhak-kwa Chisöngsa 문학과지성사, 2001), pp. 14-15.

33 Similar problems are also found in Korea's philosophical circles; see Kim Jongmyung, "Han'guk ch'örhakkye-üi tonghyang-gwa t'öksöng" 한국철학계의 동향과 특성, *Ch'örhak sasang* 철학사상 35 (2010): pp. 379-420.

34 Kim Jongmyung, *Han'guk chungse-üi Pulgyo üiry*; An Chiwön 안지원, *Koryö-üi kukka Pulgyo üiry-wa munhwa* 고려의 국가 불교의례와 문화 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2005).

courses that are products of traditional scholarship of Korean Buddhist history, with its limitations in terms of source data, methodology, and common practices.

## II. DISCOURSE ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREAN BUDDHISM

Among the concepts used to characterize Korean Buddhism are 'syncretic Buddhism' ([*hoe*]t'ong *Pulgyo* [會通佛敎]), 'Buddhism as state protector', 'Buddhism for good fortune' (*kibok Pulgyo* 祈福佛敎),<sup>35</sup> and 'skirt Buddhism' (*ch'ima Pulgyo* 치마불교). These concepts represent Korean Buddhism in terms of ideology, history, function, and gender, respectively. Of these four, conventional scholarship has regarded syncretic Buddhism and Buddhism as state protector as the two most important ideas to characterize Korean Buddhism. However, these two concepts are now under scholarly attack.

### 1. Korean Buddhism as syncretic Buddhism

A characterization of the nature of Korean Buddhism from the ideological perspective, 'syncretic Buddhism' stands for a harmonized form of Buddhism that is distinctive from sectarian Buddhism, which is the alleged tradition of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism.

According to Shim Jaeryong, the notion of syncretism was first put forward by Ch'oe Namsŏn 崔南善 (1890-1957), who assigned a central role to Wŏnhyo 元曉 (617-86) in 1930, in response to the Japanese scholar Takahashi Tōru's 高橋亨 (1878-1967) blanket characterization of Korean Buddhism as a mere copy of Chinese Buddhism, lacking any sign of creativity.<sup>36</sup> However, Shim points out that there is no reason to claim that syncretism is a feature peculiar to Korean Buddhism and argues that the term 'syncretism' should not be used to characterize Korean Buddhism in its entirety.<sup>37</sup> Subsequently, the history of the discourse on syncretic Buddhism has

developed into a major issue in the Korean Buddhist academic world, and the meaning of the discourse and its validity have been examined from a critical point of view.<sup>38</sup>

Bernard Senécal has also criticized the notion of syncretic Buddhism, saying that it was rather "an ideal of whole Buddhist harmonization, an ideal being something to tend toward, not something actually realized." To bolster his assertion Senécal continued by saying: "If such an ideal had been concretely achieved, how could we explain, for instance, the bloody feuds that have taken place between the monks of the T'aego Order (T'aegojong 太古宗) and those of the Chogye Order (Chogyejong 曹溪宗)<sup>38</sup> during the years that followed liberation?" He eventually concludes that the "whole Buddhist harmonization"-doctrine does not constitute a distinctive feature of Korean Buddhism.<sup>40</sup>

### 2. Korean Buddhism as a protector of the state

Throughout Korean history, the fortunes of Korean Buddhism have depended on the attitude of the political leadership and the collaboration of Buddhist circles with that leadership. The symbiotic relationship between the nation and the ecclesiastical orders in traditional Korea has led scholars to propose the idea of Buddhism as state protector as one of the typical characteristics of Korean Buddhism.<sup>41</sup> The notion of Buddhism as state protector implies that historically Korean Buddhism has served to protect the state from natural calamities and foreign invasions. Common assertions in this regard include the assertion that many eminent monks of Korea, including the Shilla monk Chajang, served as political advisors and Buddhist rituals were performed to protect the state.<sup>42</sup> In addition, this notion was highlighted, both in academic and monastic circles, as having special cultural value for Korean Buddhism.<sup>43</sup> Buddhist academic circles, Buddhist

35 For the origin, nature, present and future of the notion of Buddhism for good fortune, see a series of articles in *Pulgyo p'yŏngnon* 불교평론 7 (Summer 2001); "Kibok Pulgyo t'oron pang" 기복불교 토론방 (2004). For an argument against the tradition of Buddhism for good fortune, refer to Chinhyu 진휴, "Han'guk Pulgyo ūi kibok chŏk sŏngkyŏk e taehan koch'al" 한국불교의 기복적 성격에 대한 고찰, *Haein* 해인 海印 323 (2009) at (<http://www.haeinji.org>).

36 Takahashi's view of Korean Buddhism was not comprehensive either. For example, his work was selective with regard to Buddhism during the reign of King Sejong; see Kim Jongmyung, "King Sejong's Buddhist Faith and the Invention of the Korean Alphabet: A Historical Perspective," p. 138, note 6.

37 Shim Jaeryong, *Korean Buddhism Tradition and Transformation* (Seoul: Jimoondang Publishing Company, 1999), pp. 148-156.


38 Cho ūnsu 조은수, "T'ong Pulgyo tamnon-ŭl chungsim-ŭro pon Han'guk Pulgyosa inshik '통불교' 담론을 중심으로 본 한국 불교사 인식," *Pulgyo p'yŏngnon* 21 (2004): pp. 1-13 ([www.budreview.com/news/articlePrint.html?idno=335](http://www.budreview.com/news/articlePrint.html?idno=335)).

39 Unique to Korea, the Chogye Order represents mainstream Buddhism in contemporary Korea and its official name is also romanized as Daehan Bulgyo Jogyejong 大韓佛敎曹溪宗. As for its history and related issues, see Kim Jongmyung, "Chogye School," in *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Volume 1, edited by Robert E. Buswell, Jr. (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), pp. 158-159.


40 Bernard Senécal, "On Writing a History of Korean Buddhism: A Review of Two Books," *Korea Journal* 37.1 (1997): pp. 154-177, especially p. 173.

41 For related works, see Jong Myung (Jongmyung) Kim, "Chajang (fl. 636-650) and 'Buddhism as State Protector' in Korea: A Reconsideration," in *Religions in Traditional Korea* (The Seminar for Buddhist Studies, SBS Monographs, Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 1995), p. 23, note 1 [pp. 23-55].

42 Kim Jongmyung, "Chajang (fl. 636-650) and 'Buddhism as State Protector' in Korea," pp. 23-24.



Frontispiece of Yi Nūnghwa's *History of Chosŏn Buddhism* (1918)



Pages from Yi Nūnghwa's *History of Chosŏn Buddhism* (1918)

orders, and even the government in contemporary Korea still use this concept to express a desirable relationship between the nation and Buddhism.<sup>44</sup>

In fact, the emphasis on the idea of Buddhism as state protector is a fairly recent development.<sup>45</sup> A product of the 1920s, the concept was woven into a fixed national ideology by Korean scholars, particularly in the 1970s, when Korea was under the military dictatorship led by President Pak Chŏnghŭi 朴正熙 (1917-1979).<sup>46</sup>

However, the term 'state protection' has been used without a clear definition and much textual evidence suggests that it does not have the meaning commonly used by contemporary scholars.<sup>47</sup> For example, conventional scholarship did not clarify what the term 'state' (Ch. *kuo* 國; Kor. *kuk*) meant in 'the protection of the state' (Ch. *hukuo* 護國; Kor. *hoguk*). Ancient Buddhist scholiasts did not interpret the term *kuo* in a territorial sense. For example, for them the term 'state' as described in the *Book for Humane Kings* (*Renwang jing* 仁王經), an important source text for the notion of Buddhism as state protector, meant one's mind in pursuit of enlightenment. However,

by identifying the true dharma with kingship, contemporary scholars simply conclude that Korean Buddhism is 'Buddhism as state protector'.<sup>48</sup>

Conventional scholarship has also regarded many kings' participation in Buddhist rituals in Korean history as part of the evidence that supports the idea of Buddhism as state protector.<sup>49</sup> However, there is little evidence to indicate that the king was identified with the state. In fact, the replacement of many kings in the latter period of the Shilla 新羅 kingdom (57 BCE-935 CE), when the political situation was in turmoil,<sup>50</sup> and the distinction between the National Preceptor and the Royal Preceptor in Koryŏ, suggest the opposite.<sup>51</sup> There is also some textual evidence to support that Buddhism in premodern Korea did not play a role in protecting the state. For example, kings during the Koryŏ period regarded the people as the root of the state and emphasized that their primary duty lay in securing their lives. However, records point out that the frequent performance of Buddhist rituals during the period made the people's lives harder than before.<sup>52</sup>

Reflexive scholars such as Sŏ Kyŏngsu 徐景洙 (1925-

43 Idem, "Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea," p. 271.

44 Idem, *Han'guk-ŭi segye Pulgyo yusan*, p. 311.

45 Idem, "Chajang (fl. 636-650) and 'Buddhism as State Protector' in Korea," pp. 53-55.

46 Idem, "Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea," p. 271; idem, *Han'guk chungse-ŭi Pulgyo ūiryŏ*, pp. 279-282.

47 Idem, "Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea," p. 270.

48 *Ibid.*, pp. 272-273.

49 Kim Jongmyung, *Han'guk chungse ŭi Pulgyo ūiryŏ*, pp. 282-286.

50 Twenty kings ascended the throne during the 150 years from mid-eighth-century Shilla to its demise in 935 and many of them fell victim to domestic warfare. Yi Kibaek 李基白, *Han'guksa shillon* 韓國史新論 (Seoul: Ilchogak 一潮閣, 1991), p. 133.

51 Kim Jongmyung, *Han'guk chungse-ŭi Pulgyo ūiryŏ*, pp. 295-297.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 300.

86), Robert Buswell, Kim Yongok 金容沃, and Shim Jaeryong 沈在龍 (1943-2004)<sup>53</sup> have already rebutted the notion of Buddhism as state protector by arguing that the concept of Buddhism as state protector resulted from an uncritical examination of the symbiotic relationship between the nation and the ecclesiastical orders. For my part, I have criticized the concept through a series of academic works,<sup>54</sup> and have reached the conclusion that it should not be used to characterize Korean Buddhism. Scholars such as Bernard Senécal,<sup>55</sup> Pankaj Mohan,<sup>56</sup> and Cho ūnsu<sup>56</sup> share this opinion.

It is important to recognize that the concepts of syncretic Buddhism and Buddhism as state protector did not develop on the basis of solid textual evidence, but were developed for ideological or teleological purposes to meet the interests of certain groups.<sup>58</sup> The divergent opinions between conservative scholars and their more reflexive counterparts with regard to the nature of Korean Buddhism have derived from the former's failure to conduct an in-depth analysis of primary historical data. Let me examine the limits of the conclusions drawn by conventional scholarship of Korean Buddhist history, based on my previous work.

### III. A SEARCH FOR NEW APPROACHES: THREE CASE STUDIES

In the following section I will examine three examples of new approaches to the study of Korean Buddhist history.

#### 1. Chajang and Buddhism as state protector

Korean scholars, including Yi Nūnghwa 李能和 (1869-1943), the founder of religious studies in Korea, have regarded Chajang as one of the most important pioneers

for the development of Buddhism as state protector. They have also argued that, as the Great National Overseer (*Tae kukt'ong* 大國統), Chajang founded the Vinaya School in Shilla and controlled the Shilla people through Buddhist precepts, while he also served as political advisor, advocating the idea of 'Shilla as a Buddha land' (*Shilla Pulgukt'o* 新羅佛國土).<sup>59</sup> Their textual basis for the study of the biography of Chajang has been the *SGYS*. However, they have neglected to consult the *Continued Biographies of Eminent Monks* (*Xu gaoseng zhuan* 續高僧傳, 645, hereafter, *XGZ*), a more important source text than the *SGYS*.

In my article on Chajang and Buddhism as state protector,<sup>60</sup> I sought to respond to conventional scholarship concerning the role of Chajang and argued for a revision of the view which regards Chajang as an advocate of Buddhism as state protector. To this end, I examined the life of Chajang as it appeared in the *XGZ* and in the *SGYS* from a comparative perspective.

As far as their contents on the life of Chajang are concerned, the *XGZ* and the *SGYS* have considerable affinity. However, the two sources also contain divergent points of view with regard to various aspects of Chajang's life, including his reception of the five precepts, the motive for his entry into Tang 唐 (618-907) China, the record of his meeting with Mañjuśrī, and the time of and motive for his establishment of the system of the Great National Overseer. The *XGZ* was compiled in 645, just two years after Chajang's return to Shilla from Tang, a full six centuries earlier than the compilation of the *SGYS*. Since the *XGZ* was written much earlier than the *SGYS*, I believe that the information it provides can be regarded as more reliable than that provided by the *SGYS*.<sup>61</sup>

The *XGZ* describes Chajang as a religious cultivator

53 Sō Kyōngsu, "Kwagō chihyang chōk Pulgyo-esō pōsōnal su innūn Pulgyo-ga 과거지향적 불교에서 벗어날 수 있는 불교가," *Pōmnyun* 法輪 135 (1980): pp. 24-32; Robert E. Buswell, Jr., *The Korean Approach to Zen: The Collected Works of Chinul* (Honolulu: The University of Hawai'i Press, 1983), pp. 2-5, ff.; idem., *The Korean Origin of the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra: A Case Study in Determining the Dating, Provenance, and Authorship of a Buddhist Apocryphal Scripture* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1985), p. 91. The revised version of this work was published as Robert E. Buswell, Jr., *The Formation of Ch'an Ideology in China and Korea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); idem., *Tracing Back the Radiance: Chinul's Korean Way of Zen* (Honolulu: The University of Hawai'i Press, 1991), p. 2, ff. This book was an abbreviated version of Buswell, *The Korean Approach to Zen*; Kim Yongok 金容沃, *Na-nūn Pulgyo-rūl irōk'e ponda* 나는 불교를 이렇게 본다 (Seoul: T'ongnamu 통나무, 1990), pp. 80-88; Shim Jaeryong 沈在龍, *Tongyang-ūi chihye-wa Sōn* 동양의 지혜와 禪 (Segyesa 世界社, 1990), pp. 121-122, ff.

54 Kim Jongmyung, "Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea," pp. 270-276; idem., "Chajang (fl. 636-650) and 'Buddhism as State Protector' in Korea," pp. 23-55, which was the first journal article criticizing the notion of Buddhism as state protector; idem., "Hoguk Pulgyo kaenyōm-ūi chae kōmt'o: Koryō Inwang hoe-ūi kyōngu 호국불교 개념의 재검토: 고려 인왕회의 경우," *Chonggyo yōn'gu* 宗教研究 21 (2000): pp. 93-120; idem., *Han'guk chungse ūi Pulgyo ūirye*, pp. 277-297; idem., *Han'guk-ūi segye Pulgyo yusan*, pp. 310-318.

55 Bernard Senécal, "On Writing a History of Korean Buddhism: A Review of Two Books," p. 172.

56 Pankaj N. Mohan, "Beyond the 'Nation-Protecting' Paradigm; Recent Trends in the Historical Studies of Korean Buddhism," *The Review of Korean Studies* 9.1 (2006): pp. 49-67.

57 Cho ūnsu, 'T'ong Pulgyo tamnon-ūl chungshim-ūro pon Han'guk Pulgyosa inshik," p. 12.

58 Kim Jongmyung, *Han'guk chungse ūi Pulgyo ūirye*, p. 311.

59 Idem., "Chajang (fl. 636-650) and 'Buddhism as State Protector' in Korea," pp. 25-51.

60 *Ibid.*, pp. 23-55.

rather than as a political advisor. In comparison, Iryŏn, author of the *SGYS*, did not regard Chajang's religious attainment very highly.<sup>62</sup> For a better understanding of the *SGYS*, we need to examine the milieu of its composition, because it was compiled, with sponsorship from the king, as a social, political, cultural, and ideological product of the transitional period of Koryŏ society.<sup>63</sup>

In reaction to the difficult situation of mid-Koryŏ society, literary works that emphasized the enduring Korean traditional heritage appeared and the *SGYS* was one such product. Iryŏn wrote the *SGYS* when the Koryŏ dynasty was suffering political and social hardship. Political hegemony and conflicts with the military, as well as strife between the military and the aristocracy, continued to cause serious social problems up to Iryŏn's time. In addition, after the age of fifty Iryŏn maintained close relations with the royal court and so his work was written during a time when the bond between him and the king was strong.<sup>64</sup>

During Iryŏn's lifetime, the *Lives of Eminent Korean Monks* (*Haedong kosŭng chŏn* 海東高僧傳) was compiled by Kakhun 覺訓 (fl. early thirteenth century) in 1215. The work was compiled by the order of King Kojong 高宗 (1213-59), and is an example of cooperation between the ruling class and the monastic order, just as the *SGYS* reflects the close relationship between Iryŏn and the court of King Ch'ungnyŏl 忠烈王 (1274-1308).<sup>65</sup>

The *SGYS* focuses on the royal lineage as a distinct social class, the supremacy of the Shilla dynasty among the Three Kingdoms, the area of Kyŏngju 慶州 in geographical terms, and Buddhism in ideological terms, but lacks an objective view of history. With regard to Chajang in particular, Iryŏn's work is not based on solid textual evidence<sup>66</sup> and Iryŏn intentionally made Chajang into an advocate for the idea of Buddhism as state protector.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, the *SGYS* is a problematic source, with several issues still to be resolved, relating to its compiler, the date of its compilation, its original edition, the back-

ground of its compilation, its structure and content, and the historical evaluation of the source.<sup>68</sup>

After my comparative analysis of the two source texts on the life of Chajang, I came to the conclusion that Chajang, in his role as the Great National Overseer, did not found the Vinaya School in Shilla, nor did he control the Shilla people through the Buddhist precepts. Moreover, his asserted role as political advisor has been over-emphasized. Lastly, it is highly questionable whether he ever advocated the idea of Shilla as a Buddha land. In fact, Chajang's real concern was not with political matters, but with ascetic cultivation; his concerns were primarily religious.<sup>69</sup> For these reasons the commonly held view regarding the role of Chajang in the history of Korean Buddhism needs to be revised.<sup>70</sup>

It appears that as far as the discussion of the relationship between Chajang and the idea of Buddhism as state protector is concerned, the most common misunderstanding found in conventional Korean scholarship lies in its lack of a proper analysis and understanding of the available first-hand source material. These elements together have resulted in the overemphasis of Chajang's political role during the Shilla dynasty.<sup>71</sup> Chajang cannot be regarded as an advocate of the tradition of Buddhism as state protector.

## 2. Koryŏ and Buddhism

Contemporary scholarship has, primarily based on the *KRS*, regarded Koryŏ as a Buddhist nation and characterized Koryŏ Buddhism as state-protecting Buddhism. In particular, it has been argued that Buddhist rituals during the period served to support the idea of Buddhism as state protector.<sup>72</sup> However, much counter-evidence in the *KRS* points to the contrary.

During the Liao 遼 dynasty (907-1125), a contemporary nation that influenced Koryŏ Buddhism, it was customary for Buddhist believers to ordain their eldest sons. Even during its decay, when the Liao government needed to

61 Ibid., pp. 36-53.

62 Ibid., p. 35.

63 Ibid., pp. 35-39.

64 Ibid., pp. 36-38.

65 Ibid., p. 38.

66 Ibid., p. 39.

67 Ibid., p. 50.

68 Kim Jongmyung, *Han'guk chungse-ŭi Pulgyo ŭirye*, pp. 363-369.

69 Idem, "Chajang (fl. 636-650) and 'Buddhism as State Protector' in Korea," p. 25.

70 Ibid., p. 53.

71 Idem, "Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea," pp. 53-55; Kim Jongmyung, *Han'guk chungse-ŭi Pulgyo ŭirye*, p. 278.


72 Idem, "Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea," pp. 3-5.

mobilize all its manpower, it still admonished Buddhist monks and nuns not to break their vows.<sup>73</sup> However, Koryŏ was different from Liao as far as the status of Buddhism was concerned.

The way in which the people of Koryŏ viewed Buddhist customs was not always positive. King Munjong 文宗 (1046-83) opposed cremation because it was a Buddhist practice. Actions of self-immolation undertaken by monks, such as burning their heads or arms as an ordination ritual, were not regarded as proper for Confucian gentlemen (*kunja* 君子). The people of Koryŏ often had negative opinions of monks and nuns. The primary motivation for many to become a monk or a nun was for political reasons or to escape from the agony of their lives, and the eldest son was rarely allowed to become a monk.<sup>74</sup> In addition, Koryŏ monks were frequently drafted for military service; the existence of a Demon Subduing Corps (*Hangmagun* 降魔軍) is a good example. Monastic circles also had restricted access to certain institutions, to the social disadvantage of the monks. For example, a monk's son could not enter officialdom and local officials' sons who became monks could not become local officials themselves.<sup>75</sup>

Such textual evidence indicates that Koryŏ was not a Buddhist state in the strict sense of the term. Ch'oe Pyŏnghŏn 崔炳憲,<sup>76</sup> former professor of Korean Buddhist history at Seoul National University 서울대학교 concurs with me in this view. Therefore, conventional scholarship that has regarded Koryŏ as a Buddhist state needs to be re-examined.

Historical records such as the *KRS* indicate that various



Frontispiece of Ch'oe Namsŏn's edition of the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms*

types of Buddhist, Confucian, Daoist, shamanistic, astrological, and geomantic rituals were held throughout the Koryŏ period. In particular, Buddhist rituals flourished during this time. The importance of Koryŏ Buddhist rituals for understanding Koryŏ society is obvious from the amount of historical records related to Buddhist rituals; the Koryŏ king's great concern for them; the amount of funds assigned to them; and the influence of Buddhist customs on the society. For example, in the *KRS*, which due to its precise information and abundant records of native legend and custom is the most important source for the study of Koryŏ Buddhist rituals, there are some

6,000 records concerning Koryŏ Buddhism, of which about 1,300 are related to Buddhist rituals. The *SGSG* and the *SGYS* record only around ten cases of Shilla Buddhist rituals, suggesting that Koryŏ was more interested in holding Buddhist rituals than was Shilla. Koryŏ kings also took a strong interest in Buddhist rituals and King T'aejo 太祖 (918-43),<sup>77</sup> the founder of the Koryŏ dynasty, and his successors personally participated in various types of Buddhist rituals throughout the dynasty. In addition, more Buddhist rituals were held during the period than at any other time in Korean history, a frequency also unsurpassed in China or Japan. Some important Buddhist rituals were unique to Koryŏ.<sup>78</sup>

The most important characteristic of Koryŏ Buddhism is that medieval Korea's essential ideas were expressed in the form of Buddhist rituals.<sup>79</sup> Koryŏ Buddhist rituals were the Koryŏ people's Buddhist expressions of indigenous Korean beliefs. However, primarily aimed at ances-

<sup>73</sup> Idem, *Han'guk chungse ūi Pulgyo ūiryŏ*, p. 311

<sup>74</sup> An examination of the life of the lower nobility in the medieval West may be useful for a better understanding of the place of monks and nuns in medieval Korea. The lower nobility in twelfth- to thirteenth-century Europe could survive in two ways: by becoming a knight or by becoming a friar. Those who were not inclined to become a knight or were not the eldest son of a family tended to become friars. They were left by their parents at a monastery and were supposed to live up to the monastery's strict discipline and rigorous schedule. According to the daily schedule of the Benedictine Order, they were required to conduct three to eight hours of labour, to eat just one meal, to sleep less than four hours, and to practise modesty and temperance. "DIA-VISION at Beaufort Castle: The Life of the Nobility of the Middle Ages in Beaufort Castle," *Les Amis de l'Ancien Château de Beaufort, Association sans but lucrative*, (Luxembourg), October 2009.

<sup>75</sup> Kim Jongmyung, "Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea," pp. 47-49; idem, *Han'guk chungse-ūi Pulgyo ūiryŏ*, pp. 311-316.

<sup>76</sup> In my talk with him in November 2007.

<sup>77</sup> Regarding King T'aejo's Buddhist politics in Koryŏ, refer to Kim Jongmyung, "King T'aejo's Buddhist View and His Statecraft in Tenth-century Korea," presented in Session 66, entitled "Buddhism and the Politics of Power in Medieval Korea: A Re-examination," which I organized, at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, Philadelphia, USA, 25-28 March 2010.

<sup>78</sup> Kim Jongmyung, "Buddhist Rituals in Medieval Korea," pp. xiii-3.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

tor worship and longevity of the royal family, they did not, on the whole, function to legitimate the exercise of political power.<sup>80</sup> Those scholars who have shown interest in Koryŏ Buddhist rituals have focused on a limited historical survey. Their textual analysis has been weak and they have ignored the sociopolitical context of the time, thus failing to clarify the historical meaning of the Buddhist rituals in the context of the Koryŏ period.<sup>81</sup> In spite of its significance for the study of Koryŏ Buddhist rituals, the *KRS* does have certain limits for study in this area. Nevertheless, contemporary scholarship has argued on the grounds of this text that Koryŏ Buddhist rituals functioned to legitimate the exercise of political power.

In fact, Buddhist rituals were not the most significant among rituals performed in Koryŏ, but functioned rather as auxiliary rituals, classified as miscellaneous entertainments among felicitous rites (*karye chaphŭi* 嘉禮雜戲) to the great auspicious rituals (*killŷe taesa* 吉禮大事), the most important of all the types of Koryŏ rituals.<sup>82</sup> In addition, challenging the traditional perspective, I have argued that Koryŏ Buddhist rituals functioned to solace the heart of the royal court, but had little to do with the strengthening of political power because they were held regardless of whether kingship status was strong or weak.<sup>83</sup> It should also be noted that though the Koryŏ court strongly sponsored Buddhism, Confucianism was the ideology for governing the nation and Confucian scholar-officials stood against Buddhism. Koryŏ Buddhism offered worldly benefits to the royal court and in return the religion secured socio-economic stability under the court's protective umbrella.

### 3. King Sejong and Buddhism

Scholars of Korean history have regarded the Chosŏn period as the time bridging the medieval era and the modern age of Korea. As a result, traditionally the history of the Chosŏn period has occupied a central position in research on Korean history.<sup>84</sup> In particular King Sejong's reign has been considered the most glorious period, not only of the Chosŏn dynasty, but in all Korean history. King Sejong is still considered the greatest Korean king

of all. While that may be the case, the argument that an in-depth examination of written sources, both in classical Chinese and in the Korean alphabet, is necessary for a better understanding of the diversity of society in the Late Chosŏn period<sup>85</sup> is also applicable to research on the reign of King Sejong.

Primarily based on the *Veritable Records of King Sejong* (*Sejong sillok* 世宗實錄, hereafter, *SJSL*), which contains the most important information on King Sejong's reign and is the single most important text for the study of Buddhism during his reign, and the *CWS*, a valuable official source for the study of Chosŏn Buddhism, traditional scholarship has argued that the core of the anti-Buddhist policy in the early Chosŏn period, including the reign of King Sejong, was the confiscation of monastic estates and servants, the reduction of temples and numbers of monks, and the removal of Buddhist rituals from national rites. In particular, with regard to the relationship between King Sejong and Buddhism, the commonly held view is that King Sejong adopted strong anti-Buddhist policies at the initial stage of his reign and at best tolerated Buddhism. Of evidence that might be marshalled to the contrary, it is said that the king merely recognized Buddhism in a superficial manner; that he had no clear perception of Buddhism in his early career; that the invention of the Korean alphabet had nothing to do with Buddhism; and that the *CWS* includes more examples of King Sejong being against Buddhism than of him favouring the religion.<sup>86</sup> However, traditional scholarship has neglected to perform an in-depth analysis of the relationship between Chosŏn and Buddhism and between King Sejong and the religion as specified in the source texts, thus arriving at conclusions that are inconsistent with the sources.<sup>87</sup>

My research based on relevant records in the *SJSL* and the *CWS*, in their proper chronological order, showed that King Sejong favoured Buddhism from the outset of his reign and maintained a positive and pious stance toward Buddhism throughout his time as king, eventually leading him to the invention of the Korean alphabet and to promoting its usage. In fact, King Sejong's anti-Buddhist activities were limited to a few instances. A record

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-15.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. xiii-13.

<sup>84</sup> Kim Chahyŏn, "Chosŏn shidae munhwasa-rŭl ōttŏk'e ssŭl kŏsin'ga-charyo-wa chŏpkun pangbŏp-e taehayŏ," p. 122.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>86</sup> Kim Jongmyung "King Sejong's Buddhist Faith and the Invention of the Korean Alphabet: A Historical Perspective," pp. 151-152.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

from the middle period of his reign indicates that these included the abolition of the Buddhist shrine in the inner court, the integration of Buddhist religious orders, the prohibition of the entry of monks into the capital area, and a prohibition to enter the monkhood. Verbal evidence from Chŏng Inji 鄭麟趾 (1396-1478), a high-ranking official during the reign of King Sejong, supports the interpretation that the king only undertook a few anti-Buddhist activities: “King Sejong abolished three to five great abuses of Buddhism.” As a result, I suggested the need to re-examine commonly accepted theories on Buddhism during the reign of King Sejong. I also came to the conclusion that the king’s creation of the Korean alphabet was closely related to his faith in Buddhism.<sup>88</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In this article I have examined the relationship between Chajang and Buddhism, the Koryŏ state and Buddhism, and between King Sejong and Buddhism, and on the basis of this examination suggested new approaches to research on Korean Buddhist history. Regarding the relationship between Chajang and the idea of Buddhism as state protector, the most common misunderstanding found in conventional Korean scholarship lies in its lack of a proper analysis and understanding of the available first-hand source material. The conventional idea that regarded the role of Buddhism during the Koryŏ period as the protection of the state was an ideological product, and the common view of the relationship between King Sejong and Buddhism was also a product of a partial and insufficient examination of primary sources. Therefore, we need to refer to all the available primary data and to conduct a more in-depth analysis of first-hand source material in their proper chronological order for the advancement of the study of Korean Buddhist history. In addition, researchers cannot simply rely on the evidence of only a limited number of particular sources, including historical material compiled by the government, in which they are interested. Historicization and contextualization of source data,<sup>89</sup> a focus on myth, memory, and symbol,<sup>90</sup> and an exploration of new angles on history<sup>91</sup> are also necessary to advance research on Korean Buddhist history, and by extension, research on Korean history in general.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., pp. 134-159.

<sup>89</sup> Kim Chahyŏn, “Chosŏn shidae munhwasa-rŭl ōttŏk’e ssŭl kŏsin’ga-charyo-wa chŏpkun pangbŏp-e taehayŏ,” 127-128.

<sup>90</sup> John B. Duncan, “Sŏyang sahak-kwa Han’guk chon’gundae” 서양사학과 한국 전근대, *Han’guksa yŏn’gu pangbŏmnon-gwa panghyang mosaek*, pp. 51-59.

<sup>91</sup> Barfield had no knowledge of classical Chinese. Nevertheless, his *The Perilous Frontier* has been an essential text for the study of Chinese-nomadic relations in premodern times. This suggests that originality in approach may be no less significant than a perfect understanding of primary data in the study of history.



# Writing History in Koryŏ

SOME EARLY KORYŌ WORKS RECONSIDERED

Studying Koryŏ historiography is equal to delving into the realities of Koryŏ's present of practical engagement with the past.<sup>1</sup> The Koryŏ dynasty was a period during which the pursuit of objectively verifiable historical knowledge was explicitly (although not exclusively) tied to its practical and ideological application, predominantly (though again, not exclusively) in the field of politics. As such, the practice of historiography had strong implications for the practice of politics in Koryŏ. There has been ample attention for this phenomenon in the East Asian context, but to date little research has been published on Koryŏ historiography and none that argues that inasmuch as politics influenced historiography, historiography influenced politics.

Sometimes, looking at a past far removed from our present times and condition may unearth surprising similarities that seem to bridge the temporal gap between the two periods. While it is customary to depict Koryŏ state historiography as a particularly successful offshoot of the Chinese historiographical tradition, within the confines and the implicit assumptions of the genre, it occupied a much larger field of historiographical production than is habitually assumed. And while Koryŏ state historiography undoubtedly set the standard for authorita-



Pages from the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*

tive (national) history, it simultaneously functioned as a field where different players and notions interacted and influenced each other, creating a web in which variations and even contradictions of the norm were formulated and voiced. If we treat history as a social practice where various players have either a stake in inscribing themselves in the history of the community or where they find it relevant to produce representations of history that suit their existential preferences, a chequered historical landscape with different, often divergent, perspectives on the same history appears, even within the confines of tra-

<sup>1</sup> This term was coined by Michael Oakeshott and denotes the presence of ideas, traces and artefacts of the past in the present and their meanings for those who live in the present. See Michael Oakeshott, *On History and Other Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1982), pp. 18-19. From the perspective of a historian, Johan Huizinga also distinguished between traces of the past recognized as such and traces of the past that go unrecognized, but nonetheless influence the present. See Johan Huizinga, *Hoe Bepaalt de Geschiedenis het Heden? Een Niet Gehouden Rede* (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1945).

ditional historiography written in classical Chinese. As I have shown elsewhere, in Koryŏ this resulted in an appreciation of the multiplicity of Koryŏ histories.<sup>2</sup> The state histories produced by those who may be called professional historians were based on sound, time-tested and empirically solid methods and anchored in authoritative source materials, but if one ignores the more informal, intuitive, often fluid and highly contextual understandings of traditional Koryŏ histories, one runs the risk of entirely misunderstanding the genre.<sup>3</sup> Running through the solidly-researched and painstakingly-composed authoritative historiography are ideas, notions and experiences which define the genre in Koryŏ as much as its formal demands on style, composition and format. These ideas, notions and experiences are less articulated than the formal demands of the genre, but relate to contemporary issues debated outside the field of historiography. They characterize Koryŏ historiography as a means to use the recorded past to deal with the present of practical engagement, while utilizing present realities to compose meaningful narratives of the past, distilled from an unarticulated repository of historical concepts and facts to which all Koryŏ literati had access. Researching Koryŏ historiography as a social practice with an awareness of these aspects not only reveals the workings and dynamics of writing history in Koryŏ, but also brings to light the contents, dynamics and functions of historical narratives in society and the nature of historical debates in general. It demonstrates how traditional historiography is qualitative qua much closer to contemporary historiography than is generally supposed or acknowledged.

By concentrating on a number of Koryŏ historical writings and on the crucial practice of the royal lecture, in

which history and politics were seamlessly integrated, it will be possible to obtain a glimpse of some of the realities of Koryŏ's presents of practical engagement. The social and political role of historiography and the historiographical role of politics in Koryŏ alert us to the fact that in all periods and places, historiography is also a social process. In this sense, although popular participation was not a feature of Koryŏ historiography, the historiographical situation in premodern and (post)modern societies is not qualitatively different, but merely different in context.

## HISTORIOGRAPHY AS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PRACTICE IN KORYŎ

Historiography during the Koryŏ period is, to a certain extent, characterized by a dearth of materials.<sup>4</sup> Although the oldest extant history of Korea dates from this period, this text, the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* (*Samguk sagi* 三國史記), was not the first history written in Koryŏ. A history now usually known as the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* (*Ku samguksa* 舊三國史) was written probably sometime during the early eleventh century and has only survived in scattered quotations. Since it is no longer extant, it has become the subject of extensive historiographical speculation. However, despite the plausible conjectures that are sometimes made, due to the unavailability of primary sources it must remain just that, namely speculation.

Despite this rather unfortunate situation, the extant sources do disclose some information about the practice of historiography during the early Koryŏ period. Koryŏ historiography did not emerge out of a vacuum, but succeeded a historiography that was heavily influenced by Chinese example. The works mentioned immediately

2 Remco E. Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea, 918-1170: History, Ideology and Identity in the Koryŏ Dynasty* (Leiden/Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, Brill's Korean Studies Library, Vol. 1, 2010).

3 Although it is commonly accepted that the first professional historians appeared rather late, during the second half of the Chŏson period, I think it is permissible to speak of professional historians in Koryŏ in the case of the state historians. These were appointed to compile historical records or write histories, were paid to do so and had also been trained in the practice of historiography, even though they would only fulfil such a position for a limited period of time during their careers.

4 The representative studies on Koryŏ historiography are Ko Pyŏngik 高柄翊, "Samguk sagi-e issŏsŏ-ŏi yŏksa sŏsul 三國史記에 있어서의 歷史敘述," in *Kim Chaewŏn paksa hoegap kinyŏm nonch'ong* 金載元博士回甲紀念論叢, edited by Kim Chaewŏn paksa hoegap kinyŏm nonch'ong p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe 金載元博士回甲紀念論叢編纂委員會 (Seoul: Kim Chaewŏn paksa hoegap kinyŏm nonch'ong p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 1969), pp. 51-86; Yi Usŏng 李佑成, "Samguk sagi-ŭi kusŏng-gwa Koryŏ wangjo-ŭi chŏngt'ong ŭishik 三國史記의 構成과 高麗王朝의 正統意識," *Chindan hakpo* 震檀學報 38 (1974): pp. 203-207; Kim Ch'ŏlchun 金哲俊, "Koryŏ chunggi-ŭi munhwa ŭishik-kwa sahak-ŭi sŏngkyŏk 高麗中期的 文化意識과 史學의 性格," *Han'guksa yŏn'gu* 9 (1976): pp. 59-86; Ha Hyŏn'gang 河炫綱, "Koryŏ shidae-ŭi yŏksa kyesŏngŭishik 高麗時代의 歷史繼承意識," *Yihwa sahak yŏn'gu* 梨花史學研究 8 (1976): pp. 12-20; Edward J. Shultz, "Kim Pushik-kwa Samguk sagi 金富軾과 三國史記," *Han'guksa yŏn'gu* 韓國史研究 73 (1991): pp. 1-20; idem, "An Introduction to the Samguk sagi," *Korean Studies* 28 (2004): pp. 1-13; Shin Hyŏngshik 申滄植, *Samguk sagi yŏn'gu* 三國史記研究 (Seoul: Ilchokak 一潮閣, 1981); idem, "Kim Pushik 金富軾," in *Han'guk yŏksaga-wa yŏksahak* 韓國 역사가와 역사학, volume one, edited by Cho Tonggŏl 趙東杰, Han Yŏngu 韓永遇 and Pak Ch'ansŏng 朴贊勝 (Seoul: Changjak-kwa p'ipyŏng 창작과 비평, 1994), pp. 57-76; idem, *Han'guk sahaksa* 韓國史學史 (Seoul: Samyŏngsa, 1999), pp. 84-120; Yi Kangnae 李康來, *Samguk sagi chŏn'goron* 三國史記典據論 (Seoul: Minjoksa 民族社, 1996); Chŏng Kubok 鄭求福, *Han'guk chungse sahaksa* 韓國중세사학사 (Seoul: Chimmundang 集文堂, 2000), pp. 227-284; idem, "Kim Pushig-ŭi (1075-1151) saengae-wa ŏpchŏk 김부식의 (1075-1151) 생애와 업적," *Chŏngshin munhwa yŏn'gu* 82 (2001): pp. 3-24.

below are not extant, but it is clear that at least two histories based on Chinese models were compiled in Koguryŏ. The first, the *Transmitted Records* (*Yugi* 遺記), was compiled sometime during the early Koguryŏ period. The second history that the sources mention is known in slightly greater detail. The Confucian academician Yi Munjin 李文眞 (d.u.) compiled the *New Collection* (*Shinjip* 新集) in 600. Judging from the office that Yi Munjin held, scholar in the Confucian Academy (*t'aehak paksa* 太學博士), he was trained as a Confucian scholar and it stands to reason that his *New Collection* was compiled according to the Chinese example of the *Records of the Grand Historian* (*Shiji* 史記).<sup>5</sup> References to only one history from Paekche have survived. The *Documents and Records* (*Sŏgi* 書記) was written by *paksa* or scholar Ko Hŭng 高興 in 375.<sup>6</sup> It probably served as the model for the *Japanese Documents and Records* (*Nihon shoki* 日本書記, 720).<sup>7</sup> In Shilla, finally, historical writings were also produced, but these works have only survived as fragments. State histories and similar works have all been lost. Only references to the *State History* (*Kuksa* 國史) by *taeach'ang* 大阿浪 Kŏch'ilbu 居柒夫 (?-579) survive.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, the historical works of the Three Kingdoms have all been lost. Another similarity between these works is that they were, without exception, compiled by single scholars. This method, which was adopted by Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145-86 BCE), was used in China until the Tang established the method of 'divided compilation' (分纂). Partly owing to the enormous amounts of material a historian had to deal with, the Tang historiographers divided the material into portions which were then assigned to several scholars. The state historian would supervise the editorial work and write the all-important historical comments. This method is *mutatis mutandis* still used in the editing of state histories, both in China and Korea and in the West.

Until the Koryŏ dynasty, historiography on the Korean peninsula used the method of the single 'grand historian' working alone. Probably under the influence of the new

historiographical system of the Tang, Koryŏ adopted the system of partial editing. Koryŏ's form of government and its institutions were, for a large part, derived from Tang and Song models. The way Koryŏ institutions functioned was significantly different from what their nominal similarity with Tang and Song institutions would suggest, but nonetheless Koryŏ looked towards these two dynastic examples when it created, adapted and streamlined its own bureaucracy from the beginning of the dynasty until the reign of Sŏngjong (as well as to Liao examples, but not for its historiographical offices).<sup>9</sup> Koryŏ's historiographical institutions reflect this influence. The earliest reference to a state-appointed historian according to the Tang model (supervising editor of state history or *kamsu kuksa* 監修國師) is found on the stele for Buddhist master Wŏnjong; according to this inscription, the text of the inscription was composed by Kim Chŏngŏn 金廷彦, whose titles and offices are listed as secretary (*taesŭng* 大丞), royal academician (*Hallim haksa* 翰林學士), presiding minister of the Department of Ministries (*naebongnyŏng* 內奉令), assistant executive in political affairs (*ch'amji chŏngsa* 參知政事) and supervising editor of state history (*kamsu kuksa*).<sup>10</sup> An inscription in honour of Buddhist master Pŏbin 法印 from 978 confirms the content of the 975 inscription.<sup>11</sup> The first official mention of an appointment of a state historian appears in 988, when Yi Yang 李陽 mentioned himself, in a memorial, as a junior reparationer and assistant royal recording editor (of the royal diary) (*Ubogwŏl kyŏm chi'gigŏju* 左補闕兼知起居注).<sup>12</sup> In the Tang system, the editors and court diarists were historians concerned with the recording of the actions and speech of the ruler and with the remonstrance of his actions based on historical precedents.<sup>13</sup> The first full mention of the appointment of historians is from 1013, almost a full century after the founding of the dynasty. It shows the initial orientation towards the Tang dynastic historiographical office and the later influence of the Song institutions on the existing structure.<sup>14</sup> The initial

5 *Samguk sagi* 三國史記 [hereafter SGSG] 20: 198. Also see Yi Pyŏngdo 李丙燾, *Han'guk yuhaksaryak* 韓國儒學史略 (Seoul: Asea munhwasa 亞細亞文化社, 1986). According to Yi Usŏng, it is plausible that Yi Munjin was Chinese. See Yi Kibaek 李基白 (ed.), *Uri yŏksa-rŭl ottŏk'ae pol kosh'in'ga* 우리 歷史를 어떻게 볼 것인가 (Seoul: Samsŏng munhwago 三星文化文庫, 1976), pp. 13-15.

6 Yi Kidong 李基東, "Kodae kukka-yŏksa inshik 古代國家의 歷史認識," in *Han'guksaron* 6 (1981): pp. 1-21; Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Uri yŏksa-rŭl ottŏk'ae pol kosh'in'ga*, pp. 11-31.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 7-9.

9 Shūtō Yoshiyuki 周藤吉之, "Kōrai shōki no kanri teido: toku ni ryōfu no zaisō ni tsuite 高麗初期の官吏制度—特に兩部の宰相について," reprinted in *Kōraichō kanryōsei no kenkyū* 高麗朝官僚制の研究 (Tokyo: Hōsei daigaku shuppankyoku 法政大學出版局, 1980), pp. 95-123.

10 *Yŏju Kodalwŏn Wŏnjong taesa haejint'ap pimun* 驪州高達院元宗大師惠眞塔碑文 in *Yŏktae kosŭng pimun* 歷代高僧碑文 [hereafter YKP] 2: 18.

11 *Haemi Powŏnsa Pŏp'in kuksa posŭngt'ap pimun* 海美普原寺法印國師寶乘塔碑文 in YKP 2: 74.

12 *Koryŏsa* [hereafter: KS] 3: 13a.

Koryŏ system seems to have been roughly similar to its Tang model, although many times smaller in size.<sup>15</sup> The practical duty of Koryŏ historians was the same as that of their Tang colleagues: they were “to record the administrative affairs of the day.”<sup>16</sup> One court diarist recorded the deeds of the ruler (royal recording secretary or *kigŏrang* 起居郎) and the other recorded the ruler’s words (royal recorder or *kigŏsain* 起居舍人). This material was then edited by the editor of the court diary (royal recording editor or *kigŏju* 起居注). Scattered surviving references to the practice of historiography during the Koryŏ dynasty indicate that daily notes were made and recorded in temporary historical records. According to a reference from the reign of Ŭijong, these records were called ‘successive daily records’ (*yŏktae illok* 歷代日錄) and perhaps also *hwangbaek tŭngmul* 黃白等物 (translation uncertain).<sup>17</sup> A reference from the reign of King Ch’ungsuk 忠肅王 (1294-1330-1332-1339) reveals that these records were known as the *Palace Daily Records* (*haenggung illok* 行宮日錄) during the later part of the Koryŏ period.<sup>18</sup> The supervising editor of state history then compiled the state histories based upon the notes of the court diarists and these temporary records. Things could go wrong, however: during the early Koryŏ period at least, no copies were kept of the notes and temporary records. The notes were sent directly to the historians, as were notes from other government institutions.<sup>19</sup> In the case of a fire or war, historical records were often lost. The Khitan destruction of

Kaegyŏng in 1011 meant the loss of virtually all historical records; the *Veritable Records* (*Shillok* 實錄) for the reigns of T’aejo, Hyejong, Chŏngjong, Kwangjong, Kyŏngjong, Sŏngjong, and Mokchong were all destroyed when the capital was ransacked. This loss of the *Veritable Records* was the reason behind Hyŏnjong’s directive of 1013 that appointed historians and instructed them to try to compensate for the loss of the historical records by talking to elderly people who might remember important events from the beginning of the dynasty. The 1013 appointment of historians had a clear purpose: the recreation of the historical records. The fact that this is the first appointment on record is also, in all probability, due to the destruction of all previous records. It does not seem plausible that after the disruptive Khitan invasions and the burning of Kaegyŏng in 1011, Hyŏnjong would have been able to create a complete historiographical office *ex nihilo*. It stands to reason that between Kim Chŏngŏn and Ch’oe Hang there will have been other supervising state historians, if only because there had apparently been complete records for the reigns of the first seven Koryŏ rulers which had been edited into veritable records. It takes manpower, raw materials and professional skills to edit a veritable record, all of which were apparently available to the Koryŏ bureaucracy. Later in the dynasty, the supervising state historian was not necessarily the person who edited the veritable records. When Injong ascended the throne, Han Anin 韓安仁 (?-1122) requested him to appoint a

13 Denis Twitchett, *The Writing of Official History Under the T’ang* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 8-10. The omissioner was a position from which court diarists were often recruited. These officials “were expected to exercise criticism and a sort of moral censorship over the emperor’s pronouncements and actions. They were allowed considerable freedom of speech to exercise this function and had influence far greater than their relatively low ranks would suggest.”

14 In the ninth month of 1013 the *Standard Koryŏ History* (*Koryŏsa* 高麗史) records, for the first time, the appointment of state historians. Minister of Personnel and Assistant Executive in Political Affairs Ch’oe Hang 崔沆 (*ibu sangsŏ ch’amji chŏngsa* 吏部尙書參知政事) is appointed as supervising editor of state history (*kamsu kuksa*), Minister of Rites Kim Shimŏn 金審言 (*yebu sangsŏ* 禮部尙書) as editor of state history (*su kuksa* 修國史), while Executive of the Ministry of Rites Chu Chŏ 周佇 (*yebu shirang* 禮部侍郎), Drafting Advisor of the Department of the Royal Secretariat-Chancellery Yun Chingo 尹徵古 (*naesa sain* 內史舍人), General Censor Hwang Churyang (*shiŏsa* 侍御使), and Junior Policy Monitor Ch’oe Ch’ung (*usŭp’yu* 右拾遺) are appointed as editors (*such’an’gwan* 修撰官). The history that was compiled is not extant, nor is its title known. *KS* 4: 15a.

15 According to the *Standard Koryŏ History* the following positions existed for official historians: supervising editor of state history (*kamsu kuksa*) (Tang system), editor of state history (*su kuksa*) (Song system), co-editor of state history (*tongsu kuksa* 同修國史) (Song system), compiler of history (*such’angwan* 修撰官) (Tang system), and intendant of the Office for Historiography (*chiksa’gwan* 直史館) (Tang system). The positions of editor of state history and co-editor of state history did not exist under the Tang, but were created by the Song bureaucratic apparatus. These were later added to the Koryŏ historiographical offices. Apart from these offices, which were concerned with the editing of histories, there were the court positions of the historians who took notes, the royal recorder and the royal recording secretary (*kigŏrang* and *kigŏsain*), and the royal recording editor (*kigŏju*). These offices were instituted after the example of the Tang. See *KS* 76: 26a-b.

16 *KS* 76: 26a-b.

17 *Pak Insŏk myojimyŏng* 朴仁碩 墓誌銘 in Kim Yongsŏn 金龍善 (ed., and ann.), *Koryŏ myojimyŏng chipsŏng* 高麗墓誌銘集成 [hereafter *KMC*] 158: 13 (Kangnŭng 尙書: Hallimdae Ashia munhwa yŏn’guso 韓聯代 아시아문화연구소, 1997. Second revised edition). It is not completely clear whether *hwangbaek tŭngmul* should be interpreted as historical records of some kind. Although the context clearly seems to suggest that such an interpretation is correct (the successive daily records are also mentioned), Kim Yongsŏn translates it as “artefacts of yellow gold and white silver”. This translation makes more sense with regard to the meanings of the characters, but does not seem to fit in this context. See Kim Yongsŏn, *Yŏkchu Koryŏ myojimyŏng chipsŏng* 역주 고려묘지명집성 (Kangnŭng 尙書: Hallimdae Ashia munhwa yŏn’guso 韓聯代 아시아문화연구소, 2001), vol. 2, p. 111.

18 *Han Chongyu myojimyŏng* 韓宗愈墓誌銘 in *KMC* 271: 3.

19 Shūtō Yoshiyuki, *Kōraichō kanryōsei no kenkyū*, p. 380.

historian to edit the veritable records of his father and predecessor Yejong. As the historiographical bureau was in operation during this time, the position of editor of the veritable records must have been subject to the politics of the day, more so, at least, than those of the historians who recorded the day-to-day events from which the veritable records would eventually be compiled.<sup>20</sup>

The duty of the court and state historians consisted of two different but related tasks. One was the recording of historical fact; the other was the compilation of these facts and the commenting upon them. A memorial from the waning days of the dynasty clearly illustrates what this meant (while also suggesting that daily practice did not always adhere to the ideal norms):

*The duty of the historian consists of the immediate recording of the words and actions of the ruler and of the rights and wrongs and successes and failures of the officials. They immediately write these down so they can be shown to future generations and serve to edify them. That is why, from time immemorial, there has never been a state that did not consider the duty of the historians important. [...] The historian should prepare two copies of his historical draft. When his period in office has expired, he should send one set to the Bureau of History and keep the other set in his house for future reference. Officials below the level of general compilers of history (kük such'an'gwan 克修纂官) should draft reports on everything they hear and see and send this to the Office of Historiography. Furthermore, all important and minor officials from the capital and from the provinces should report each of their actions to the Bureau of History and make sure that these records are reliable. Please give instructions to the extent that this will be implemented as an everlasting rule.<sup>21</sup>*

Ch'oe Kyŏn's 崔鑄 memorial of 1389 refers to the traditional notion of state history and suggests a practical and

time-tested way of ensuring the historian would have enough raw material to work with. Ch'oe's memorial is from a period long after the establishment of the dynasty, but the perception of what state history was and how it should function had not changed fundamentally. Ch'oe Sŭngno's reasons for drafting his *Appraisal of the Political Achievements of the Five Reigns* (*Ojo chŏngjŏk p'yŏng* 五朝政績評) at the end of the tenth century were identical; the essence of historiography was "the immediate recording of the words and actions of the ruler and of the rights and wrongs and successes and failures of the officials."<sup>22</sup> The above-mentioned inscription from 978 for the Buddhist master Wŏnjong, by Kim Chŏngŏn, explains the duty of the state historian along the same lines. Interestingly, it also describes Kim Chŏngŏn as a historian of long standing. Part of it reads as follows:

*The ruler instructed Chŏngŏn as follows: "In the past you were appointed as state historian and as such you have read the records and the imperial edicts yourself. You have sung the praises of the virtue of our ruler. Remembering that the previous king increased the [number of] royal academicians and treated them generously, you should repay his kindness by composing the inscription for the national preceptor. So take up a large brush, compose the text, engrave it on a stele and record his virtues."<sup>23</sup>*

The quotation above is of interest not only because it clearly and unambiguously establishes Kim Chŏngŏn as the first Koryŏ state historian on record – and perhaps Koryŏ's first state historian ever – but also because of the classical Chinese text's intimation that Kim Chŏngŏn had already been state historian for a considerable period by the time he was ordered to write this inscription. Apart from these two institutionally significant facts, the description of the duties of the state historian is worthy of note. The stele inscription records the duties of the state

<sup>20</sup> KS 97: 14b. "After Injong had ascended the throne, Han Anin was promoted from executive assistant of the Chancellery to assistant chancellor to the Secretariat. He told Injong: 'Yejong was on the throne for seventeen years. It is proper to record his achievements during that time for posterity. I request that you follow the ancient example of the Song and appoint an editor for the veritable records'."

<sup>21</sup> The memorial was written by historian Ch'oe Kyŏn 崔鑄, together with other – unnamed – scholars, during the first year of the reign of Kongyang 恭讓王 (1389). KS 76: 27a-b.

<sup>22</sup> Ch'oe Sŭngno's *Appraisal of the Political Achievements of the Five Reigns* starts as follows: "[...] I have pledged to work for the country. I humbly think of the historian Wu Jing 吳兢 [670-749] of the Kaiyuan 開元 period [713-742], who compiled and presented his work, *Essentials of Government of the Zhenguan Period* (*Zhenguan zhengyao* 貞觀政要), to encourage Emperor Xuanzong 玄宗 to emulate the policies of Emperor Taizong 太宗. [...] Since King T'aejo's founding of the dynasty, all that I have come to know I still know by heart. I therefore wish to record all the policies of the last five reigns, tracing the marks left, good and bad, and that can guide Your Majesty's conduct of government through this presentation." KS 93 93:2b. Translation borrowed from Peter H. Lee (ed.), *Sourcebook of Korean Civilization, Volume I: From Early Times to the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 273-274. Transcription of Chinese names adapted to pinyin.

<sup>23</sup> Powŏnsa Pŏpin kuksa posŭngt'ap pimun in YKP 2: 74-80.

historian as being acquainted with all records, books and court edicts, as well as having to “sing the praises of the virtue” of the ruler. The crucial concept in this expression is not so much the “singing of... praises” but rather the celebration of the “virtue of (the) ruler.” The first and foremost duty of the state historian – indeed, of any historian – was the pronouncement of a judgement on the virtue of the ruler, based upon a critical inspection of the documents that had recorded his speech and actions. The historiographical tradition that Koryŏ had succeeded proceeded from classical Confucian principles, which effectively meant that the historiographers of court affairs were not answerable to the ruler and his ministers when they recorded his actions and speech. A ruler was never allowed to see – or edit – the notes from which the veritable records of his own rule would be compiled after his death. Only the veritable records of the previous reigns were available to him, so that they might serve as a mirror for his own policies.

The strong taboo that made it impossible for the ruler to edit the historiographical judgement on his reign naturally meant that reasonably objective historiography was within reach. It should be noted, though, that although an overwhelming majority of rulers indeed did not dare to tamper with the notes for the veritable records for their own reign, the scholars who took those notes were by no means ideal impartial observers, nor were they meant to be.

*[I]t is important to remember, in the context of the didactic preoccupations of traditional Chinese historiography, that the basic material for the historical record, the Court Diary, was written not by mechanical reporters of what occurred, but by officials holding posts with serious political and moral responsibilities, who saw themselves and were perceived by others as active participants in, and commentators on, state affairs.<sup>24</sup>*

The above citation refers to the early Tang practice of historiography, but also applies to early Koryŏ historiography. The historian was meant to “sing the praises of the virtue” of the ruler, but only if there were virtues to be praised. If not, he was supposed to remonstrate with the ruler and argue his case on the basis of his extensive

knowledge of historical precedents. The ideal of Confucian historiography, as practised in both Tang China and Koryŏ, was to record historical events consisting of the actions and speech of the ruler and his ministers, and the consequences of these actions, with explicit reference to the concrete and contemporary situation.<sup>25</sup> Objective historiography, in the sense in which the term has been misused ever since Leopold von Ranke’s successors took the reins of the historiographical discipline, would have meant little to a Confucian historiographer. Without its own context to function in, historical contemplation was worthless.

The historical context of Confucian historiography did not stop at the direct historical situation, contemporary with the time during which it was written. Indeed, in order to be able to function as a mirror for the use of rulers and statesmen, the context in which a history functioned was understood to be much wider than that. It was technically supposed to encompass the whole of Sinitic civilization, in both its temporal and spatial dimensions. A certain amount of objectification or limited decontextualization did, then, take place in the process of producing Confucian-oriented historiography. To a certain extent, perhaps, this objectification was more implied than explicitly incorporated: the use of classical Chinese, references to the corpus of Sinitic classical works, the formats of the histories and the like ensured their potential intelligibility across the Sinitic cultural zone. One of the cardinal functions of Confucian historiography was to serve as a mirror for proper conduct and benign rule. More often than not, this function is explicitly stated in the history itself or in its foreword or dedication. The fact that this function was considered to be of the utmost importance obviously implied the applicability of lessons learned from the past, which presupposed the possibility of abstracting somewhat more widely-applicable principles from particular situations.

This feature is not unique to Confucian historiography. It is not unique to Confucian ideology either, but it is an important constituent element of it. Formal arguments, as expressed by, for instance, memorials to the throne, take a similar shape. Typically, the contents of a formal argument concerned with the present of practical engagement

<sup>24</sup> Twitchett, *The Writing of Official History Under the T'ang*, p. 10.

<sup>25</sup> See Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea*, pp. 147-194. Both ‘natural’ phenomena such as the occurrence of rain, the birth of animals and the success of harvest, and ‘human’ affairs such as invasions, policies, and rebellions were seen as being indissolubly tied to the ruler’s behaviour in terms of virtue.

are preceded and introduced by direct references to historical precedents, both positive and negative, applicable to the case in question. In most instances, the precedents come from Chinese history or myth, although there are exceptions in which the historical background of the argument is restricted to peninsular history. Against this historical background, then, the argument unfolds. Memorials were often meant to remonstrate, to criticize or to start a discussion. In this sense the arguments memorials contain are different from the legitimating explanations attached to important edicts and proclamations. Nonetheless, the style of argument in such edicts and proclamations is identical to that in memorials. Furthermore, the same kind of reasoning based upon precedent is found in epitaphs and commemorative inscriptions, where it is customarily used to embed personal histories in a larger historical context. Michael Oakeshott has characterized this use of history as follows:

*The question asked is not, What did this object or utterance mean in the circumstances in which it was made or uttered? or, What may it be made to report indirectly, about a past which has not survived? but, What use or meaning has it in a current present-future of practical engagement? Indeed, with our attention fixed upon a puzzling present-future and upon the value here and now of whatever has been said or done in the past, it is often a matter of indifference to us where or when it may have been said or done, whether it stems from a legendary or so-called "historic" situation, or whether it was the voice of Zeus or Confucius or Shakespeare, the Duke of Wellington or Rip van Winkle which spoke. All that matters is that its utterance shall be unmistakable and usable.<sup>26</sup>*

The ability to start an argument by proceeding from a historical precedent, as described in the above quotation, was one of the concrete purposes of historiography. At the

risk of being overly obvious, it should be mentioned that the composition of texts that referred to the historical or mythical past was only possible if the authors had access to a corpus of references. Corpora of Chinese references had been available to Koryŏ literati from the beginning of the dynasty, but as Kim Pushik lamented in his dedication to the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*, Koryŏ literati had little to refer to in terms of their own history. References to Koryŏ and peninsular history only became available with the editing of peninsular histories and other writings and, as *Jottings to Break Up Idleness* (*P'ahanjip* 破閑集) and *Supplementary Jottings in Idleness* (*Pohanjip* 補閑集) show, once a Koryŏ corpus of references had been established, referring to Koryŏ or earlier peninsular events became more commonplace. This was not to the exclusion of the much older practice of referring to Chinese examples, but instead created a sort of joined corpus of Sino-Korean references.<sup>27</sup>

In order for an argument to unfold convincingly and to have practical relevance, then, a firm historical context was deemed indispensable. If the prevalent style of formal argument and debate was dependent upon the immediate accessibility of historical references, it should need little further explanation that historiography was not just about the past in the Koryŏ period, but also possessed a generally recognized administrative and managerial dimension. The concern for the present of practical engagement did not cancel out interest in the past, but did, at the very least, condition it to the extent that the format of considerations on and interpretations of the past was specifically intended to serve as a guide to dealing with the present.


In the light of the significant practical value attached to works of historiography, it is to be expected that the authors of historiographical works were fully aware of this aspect. Moreover, as "active participants in, and commentators on, state affairs" these authors and compilers of historiographical works were, almost without exception, active as officials. These men not only recorded the past and

<sup>26</sup> Oakeshott, *On History and Other Essays*, p. 40. I realize that in the East Asian context the authority of the source cited was more important than Oakeshott suggests in his essay was the case in the European context, but the principle he elucidates remains valid, I think, for East Asia too. In particular, in isolated historicized anecdotes used in arguments based on precedent, historically and ideologically unassuming figures comparable to Rip van Winkle could very well make an appearance.

<sup>27</sup> This phenomenon is also made evident in the Chinese poetry practised by Koryŏ literati. In a linguistic sense, they were more consistent and conservative than Chinese literati, for not having the advantage of being native writers of the language, Koryŏ poets allowed themselves little or no poetic license with regard to rhyme. Chinese poets, on the other hand, were much freer in their use of rhyme. However, Koryŏ poets clearly distinguished themselves from their Chinese examples and counterparts by incorporating 'typical' Koryŏ or peninsular themes and references in their poetry. They expanded their linguistically perhaps somewhat limited corpus of references, as it were, by adding Koryŏ and peninsular history to it. See François Martin, "Expression Chinoise et Spécificité Coréenne," in *Cahiers D'Études Coréennes* 5 (1989): pp. 147-167 (edited by Daniel Bouchez, Robert C. Provine and Roderick Whitfield. *Twenty Papers on Korean Studies Offered to Professor W.E. Skillend*. Paris: Centre D'Études Coréennes).

shaped the way it was referred to; they also played leading roles in the present of practical engagement for the benefit of which historiographical works were produced. To add one more dimension to their ‘conflict of interest’, the absolute majority of the well-known and respected historiographers also doubled as royal lecturers in the palace. The royal lecture was an institution that came to enjoy enormous popularity and influence under Yejong. It institutionalized lectures to the ruler on Chinese classics, which were given by famous scholars. Apart from the ruler, other scholars and officials were present in large numbers and the ruler usually had one or more prominent scholars question and react to the appointed lecturer.<sup>28</sup>

The list of royal lecturers reads as a list of state historians. In fact, all recorded royal lecturers can, without exception, be shown to have held a historiographical office at or around the time of lecturing. It has long been unclear whether the forty-nine times royal lectures were recorded in the *Standard Koryŏ History* (*Koryŏsa* 高麗史) and the *Essentials of Koryŏ History* (*Koryŏsa chŏryŏ* 高麗史節要) in fact constitute the total number of royal lectures during the Koryŏ period. The epitaph of Yun Ŏni 尹彦頤 (?-1149), who was a popular royal lecturer in his day, implies that the total number of royal lectures was in reality more than forty-nine. It mentions that he first wrote and then lectured on the *Oral Explication of the Monthly Directives* (*Wŏllyŏng kuŏi* 月令口義). The inscription then states that he gave royal lectures every year during Injong’s reign, for which “he received a jewel-studded belt more than once.” The epitaph concludes with the assertion that Yun was known as the ‘Confucius of Haedong’ 海東孔子 (an honour he had to share with Ch’oe Ch’ung 崔冲 and Yi Kyubo 李奎報) and was well-versed in the six classics and the histories. The epitaph alerts us once again to the explicit connection between Chinese learning, historiography and the royal lectures, but also strongly suggests that the royal lectures were held more often than the extant



Part of Kim Injon’s biography in the *Standard Koryŏ History*

sources specify.<sup>29</sup> Neither the *Standard Koryŏ History* nor the *Essentials of Koryŏ History* record Yun Ŏni’s writing of, and lecturing on, the *Oral Explication of the Monthly Directives*, or his yearly lectures for Injong, or even a frequency that justifies what is stated in his epitaph.<sup>30</sup> This suggests that Yun gave royal lectures more frequently than has been recorded. If this holds true for Yun Ŏni, it would most probably be true for the other royal lecturers as well, raising the frequency, and consequently the significance, of the royal lecture. The piece of information that settles this question is from the epitaph for Yi Inyŏng 李仁榮, a civilian official. He is not mentioned in

28 Given that more often than not scholars critical towards each other found themselves formally opposing each other during the royal lectures, the lectures also seem to have served as some sort of modest arena in which ideological battles were fought. The fact that not only the royal lecturer himself, but also his opponent was mentioned in the sources as a matter of principle, attests to the importance attached to the debates.

29 Yun Ŏni *myojimŏng* 尹彦頤 墓誌銘 in *KMC* 115: 89, 97, 100.

30 The *Standard Koryŏ History* mentions that Yun Ŏni lectured for Injong in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth years of his reign. One year later, Yun fell from grace and was banished, not to return to court for some years. It seems probable, then, that Yun gave royal lectures mainly before his banishment in 1136 and perhaps again after his return to the court.



the *Standard Koryŏ History* and the *Essentials of Koryŏ History* as a royal lecturer, but his epitaph explicitly mentions his having read the royal lecture.<sup>31</sup> The only time Yi Inyŏng is mentioned in the *Standard Koryŏ History* is as a historian who fails a particularly ingenious poetry challenge thought out by Ŭijong.<sup>32</sup> It does seem to be the case, then, that more royal lectures were held than have been recorded, which underlines both the ideological and the political significance of the royal lecture.

What exactly was the significance of the royal lecture with regard to the practice of historiography in Koryŏ? This is partly illustrated by a text written by Kim Yŏn 金緣 (also known as Kim Injon 金仁存, ?-1127) about the Ch'ŏngyŏn'gak 清燕閣 (Pavilion of Bright Debate), the *Record of the Pavilion of Bright Debate* (*Ch'ŏngyŏn'gak ki* 清燕閣記). The *Record of the Pavilion of Bright Debate* was so highly valued that Yejong ordered it to be engraved in stone and exhibited.<sup>33</sup> Inscription in stone was a rare honour bestowed only upon the most respected and honoured texts. The compilers of the *Standard Koryŏ History* obviously felt the same way, because they decided to record it in its entirety in Kim Yŏn's biography, where the *Record of the Pavilion of Bright Debate* takes up the lion's share of the description of Kim's life. Kim Yŏn explained the creation and development of this pavilion, which doubled as royal library (edicts from the Song and Liao emperors were also kept there) and lecture hall for the royal lectures.<sup>34</sup> It was established early in the reign of Yejong. Due to its location within the inner palace, the scholars who were institutionally part of the Ch'ŏngyŏn'gak actually lived and worked in the nearby Pomun'gak 寶文閣 (Pavilion of Precious Learning) which was located outside the inner palace; this made it easier for the scholars to walk in and out of the building without being bothered by the strict palace regulations. The royal lectures and institutions such as Ch'ŏngyŏn'gak and Pomun'gak had been borrowed from Song example; Kim Yŏn emphasized in his text that

*the pavilions of learning and the entertaining of wise scholars have taken the institutions of Xuanhe 宣和 [reign name of Song emperor Huizong 徽宗] as their example [...]. Although there are differences in scale, there are certainly no differences in the intention of treating wise and able scholars with special courtesy.*<sup>35</sup>

In a manner characteristic of this period, Kim Yŏn has Yejong state that “now that the warfare and fighting at the three borders has ceased [Koryŏ] has achieved a culture that is equal to that of China.” In this manner, both the establishment of the pavilions and the creation of the royal lectures functioned as important emblems of on the one hand Sinitic culture and on the other hand of Koryŏ's cultural achievements based upon that culture. The other significant aspect was the opportunity the royal lectures (and other assemblies in one of the two pavilions) afforded for ruler, ministers and scholars to gather and discuss the affairs of state in a broader perspective than that of regular cabinet meetings. Yejong habitually invited scholars to discuss the affairs of state with him. In the document that announced the posthumous name of Yejong, Pak Sŭngjung 朴昇中 (fl. middle twelfth century) writes that

*[Yejong] often received the scholars who attended him. He took pleasure in always having them lecture, providing a structure to govern the country and giving it a firm basis.*<sup>36</sup>

This mention of the scholars in the text that conferred his posthumous title upon him reveals what Yejong thought important in the governing of the country and how he set about achieving it. It also shows that scholars, of whom Pak Sŭngjung was a prominent example, appreciated this and acknowledged that the royal lectures performed an important function in providing Koryŏ with a sound intellectual foundation for its government.

31 *Yi Inyŏng myojimyoŏng* 李仁榮 墓誌銘 in *KMC* 222:11.

32 *KS* 17: 24a.

33 *KS* 96: 9b.

34 Out of a total number of 25 lectures held during the reign of Yejong, only the first – when the pavilion had not yet been built – and the twenty-fourth, for unknown reasons, were held elsewhere, respectively in the Mundŏkchŏn hall 文德殿 and the Changnyŏngjŏn hall 長寧殿. See Kwŏn Yŏnung 權延肅, “Koryŏ-shidae-ŭi kyŏngyŏn 高麗時代の 經筵,” *Kyŏngbuk sahak* 慶北史學 6 (1983): pp. 1-32, esp. p. 8.

35 *KS* 96: 7a.

36 *Yewang shich'aek mun* 睿王謚冊文 in *Tong munsŏn* [hereafter *TMS*] 28: 18a-19a.

## THE ROYAL LECTURE

The royal lecture functioned as a meeting that was both political and intellectual and in this way was little different from the writing of history. The same concern for the present of practical engagement underlay both activities. The list of subjects lectured upon illustrates this concern: it is composed entirely of chapters from the Chinese classics that were deemed to be of eminent practical value.<sup>37</sup> The royal lecturers were also known to lecture the heir apparent.<sup>38</sup> Kim Puüi had the chance to lecture Injong when the latter still resided in the Eastern Palace, the traditional residence of the heir apparent:

*The king asked [Puüi] about the border defence policy and he answered him as follows: "When Du Mu 杜牧 of the Tang answered an inquiry about current affairs, he wrote that there is no better policy than self-government and when emperor Zhenzong of the Song discussed the border defence policy with Wen Yanfu 文彦博, [Wen] answered that the first priority is to govern oneself, not to invade other countries and not to help distant countries. Wang Anshi 王安石 evaluated this opinion as proper and further said that if one governs oneself well, even in a small country of only seventy li one can be ruler of a realm 天下. Mencius said that a country of thousand li does not have to be afraid of other countries, but the reason that we, while our realm covers a thousand li, are afraid of others, is that we do not govern ourselves. At present, Koryŏ occupies the old territories of the Three*

*Han and how could that be no more than seventy li? Nonetheless, we fear other countries and this must be undoubtedly so because we do not make it our priority to govern ourselves. [...] Using one's strong points and observing the changes in the situation of the enemy is precisely what Liang Shang 梁商 suggested and this is extremely appropriate for our present situation. We should have the walls of the capital and of the garrisons of each province made higher and the moats dug deeper. We should keep in stock powerful arrows, poisoned arrows, cannon and flare rockets and we should dispatch people to supervise and manage this by meting out appropriate rewards and punishments."*<sup>39</sup>

Since there are no notes left from the royal lectures, we can only make, at best, an educated guess about their contents. Judging from the recorded subjects of the royal lectures, and assuming that since the same scholars and historians who gave the royal lectures also lectured the heir apparent, it may be surmised that the contents of these two kinds of lecture were similar – although the status of the lectures differed greatly. Kim Puüi's answer to the then heir apparent Injong perfectly illustrates the style of reasoning that needs history as its raw material. Kim argues his case – the self-sufficiency of Koryŏ in both ideological and military respects – by referring to poets, rulers, philosophers and statesmen of Chinese history and related their experiences – or at least the historical condensation of these experiences – to Koryŏ's present of


37 Kwŏn Yŏnung, "Koryŏ-shidae-üi kyŏngyŏn," pp. 1-32. Another example of the practical aspect of the royal lecture is the book Yun Ŏni compiled on the months of the year, and the lecture he held about it.

38 Kim Yŏn is recorded as having lectured to the heir apparent. Other lecturers include Kim Puüi. Given the fact that both of these scholars were also popular lecturers for the royal lectures, it stands to reason to surmise that the lectures for the ruler and those for the heir apparent were given by the same persons. The following persons can be verified as having lectured once or more: in 1106, Yun Kwan lectured on *Against Luxurious Ease* 無逸篇 and O Yŏnch'ong 吳延寵 lectured on the *Book of Rites* 禮記 (KS 14: 26b-27a). In 1116, Pak Kyŏngin 朴景仁 lectured on the *Book of Documents* 尚書 (KS 14: 17b). In the following years, Ko Sŏnyu 高先柔 gave a lecture on three chapters in the *Book of Documents* (大禹謨, 皋陶, 益稷) and Chi Ch'anghŭp 池昌洽 gave lectures on the *Doctrine of the Mean* 中庸 and the *Game of Pitch-Pot* 投壺 (KS 14: 18a). Pak Sŏngjung 朴昇中 lectured many times during the reign of Yejong: on the Qian trigram 乾卦 in the *Book of Changes* 周易 (KS 14: 19a); the *Great Plan* 洪範 in the *Book of Documents* (KS 14: 31b-32a); on the *Doctrine of the Mean* (KS 14: 32b); again on the *Great Plan* (KS 14: 33a); on the *Monthly Directives* 月令 in the *Book of Rites* (KS 14: 37a); again on the *Great Plan* (KS 14: 36a); and again on the *Monthly Directives* (KS 14: 36a). Kim Yŏn is recorded once; he lectured on the *Great Plan* (KS 14: 25a). Hong Kwan 洪灌 held a royal lecture on the *Book of Documents* (KS 14: 26a). Kim Puil 金富侁, the eldest of four Kim brothers to pass the state examinations and hold high office, gave lectures on the *Book of Odes* 詩經 (KS 14: 26a); again on the same book (KS 14: 35b); and on the *Great Plan* (KS 15: 22a-b). Kim Pushik, the third of the four brothers, also lectured on the *Book of Documents* (KS 14: 37a); on the Qian trigram of the *Book of Changes* (KS 14: 39a); on the *Book of Changes* and the *Book of Documents* (KS 16: 29b); again on the Qian trigram and on the Peace hexagram (KS 16: 27a); and the last time he appeared as royal lecturer, he talked about The Great Taming Force hexagram 大畜卦 and the Returning hexagram 卦 (KS 16: 45a). The youngest brother Kim Puch'ŏl 金富轍 (later known as Kim Puüi 金富儀) lectured on *Against Luxurious Ease* (KS 16: 2a); The *Great Plan* (KS 16: 26b); and the *Book of Documents* (KS 16: 31a). Han Anin 韓安仁 held royal lectures on the Peace hexagram (KS 14: 26a) and Lao-tzu (KS 14: 30a). Yi Yŏng 李永 spoke about the *Book of Documents* (KS 14: 27b), while Chŏng Kŭg'yŏng 鄭克永 lectured about the *Monthly Directives* (KS 14: 33b). Chŏng Chisang 鄭知常 is on record as lecturing on *Against Luxurious Ease* (KS 15: 22b). The subject of Yi Inyŏng's lecture is not recorded (KMC 106: 11). Im Chon 林存 discussed the *Book of Documents* (KS 14: 36a). Chŏng Hang 鄭沆 talked about the *Book of Odes* (KS 15: 22b), the *Doctrine of the Mean* (KS 16: 19a) and again about the *Book of Odes* (KS 16: 30b). Yun Ŏni 尹彦顒 held lectures about the Qian trigram (KS 16: 19a), the *Doctrine of the Mean* (KS 16: 26a) and the *Monthly Directives* (KS 16: 30a). Chŏng Sŏmmyŏng 鄭襲明 talked about the *Book of Documents* (KS 17: 15a) and Ch'oe Yuch'ŏng 崔惟清, finally, held a lecture on the *Book of Documents* (KS 17: 21b). Interestingly, there is also an entry in the sources on a Buddhist monk delivering a lecture in the palace on the *Flower Garland Sutra*, apparently as a royal lecture and not as a dharma talk (KS 16: 31a).

39 KS 97: 3b-4b.

practical engagement.

The institute of the royal lecture influenced and was influenced by the practice of historiography. It was influenced by historiography since it relied upon historical precedent to explain, legitimate or refute the policies, ideas and interpretations of the classics. It influenced it because those same scholars who prepared and held the royal lectures occupied the historiographical positions at court. An epitaph for a high official from 1146 describes the respect in which the royal lectures were of immediate practical use during Yejong's reign. It mentions how a scholar of good repute was customarily ordered to record the royal lectures and the discussion afterwards. His notes were then distributed among the *chaesang* 宰相, the highest ranking and most influential officials.<sup>40</sup> The royal lecture was an expression of how history was perceived and how history was used in dealing with the present; this aspect ensured that the relationship between historiography and the royal lecture worked both ways. Considering the inextricable relations between the practice of historiography, historiographers, royal lecturers and the royal lecture, it is both justified and necessary to treat them in the same context. The way the royal lectures functioned both as emblems of Sinitic and Koryŏ culture and as a debating space for ideological and political issues clearly illustrates how intertwined history – or historiography – was perceived to be with the present of practical engagement. Extant historiographical materials from the Koryŏ period all point to this characteristic. Historical studies that were pursued out of antiquarian interest, for example, have not survived, if they were composed at all. Even those historiographical works that to a present-day observer may seem to be obscure, antiquarian and to possess little practical relevance, were composed with the present of practical engagement in mind. The difficulties an observer encounters when trying to separate the practice of historiography from its practitioners and their



Painting of Podök flying to Paekche with his entire monastery

other activities are instructive. Historiography in Koryŏ was never supposed to function independently; it was supposed to be an integral part of society and especially of the political world. The way a text like the *Record of the Pavilion of Bright Debate* signals both admiration for the achievements of Sinitic culture and esteem for Koryŏ's own accomplishments alerts us to a similar phenomenon; the separation inflicted upon the different elements in the text is artificial and not inherent in the text.

History was alive in Koryŏ in a very literal sense; it fulfilled an indispensable function in dealing with the present. Historians were important, both ideologically and politically. It is no coincidence that a large number of Koryŏ's most influential statesmen were also capable historians in their own right. The separation

of Koryŏ politics and Koryŏ historiography is largely a modern construct. Using the recorded past to cope with the present was as much a part of politics as using the present to compile the past was a part of historiography. Both, moreover, were entirely legitimate actions.

After this brief examination of the purpose with which history was written and how it was used in the early to mid Koryŏ period, it is now necessary to take a concrete look at extant Koryŏ historiographical works.

### EARLY KORYŎ HISTORICAL WORKS

The earliest extant Koryŏ historical work is the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* which was completed in 1146, more than 200 years after the establishment of the dynasty.<sup>41</sup> During that time, various histories and veritable records were compiled, but none of these has survived in its complete form. Only scattered quotations from earlier works have survived. According to these fragments, the earliest Koryŏ history was the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*. Its first mention appears in the collected writings of Ŭich'ŏn 義天 (1055-1101), Koryŏ's famous scholar-monk of royal blood. In the *Collected Writings of National Mas-*

<sup>40</sup> Ch'oe Shiyun *myojimjyŏng* 崔時允 墓誌銘 in *KMC* 84: 7-9.

<sup>41</sup> The traditional date is 1145, but according to the *Standard Koryŏ History*, the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* was completed, according to the lunar calendar, in the twelfth month of the twenty-third year of the reign of Injong. Converted to the solar calendar, this month corresponds to February 1146.

ter *Taegak* (*Taegak kuksa munjip* 大覺國師文集), Ŭich'ŏn recounts the legend of the famous Koguryŏ monk Podŏk 普德. The entire entry is as follows:

*Prostrating before the portrait of Sage Podŏk in the room that he flew to the Kyŏngbok-sa Temple in Kodae-san*  
 孤大山景福寺飛來方丈禮普德聖師影 [Kodae-san Kyŏngbok-sa Piraepangjang ye Podŏk sŏngsa yŏng]

*The equal teachings of the Nirvana sutra [Yŏlban-gyŏng*  
 涅槃經]

*Have been transmitted by our teacher. When the two sages Wŏnhyo 元曉 and Ŭisang 義湘 clasped the sutras and went in search of a master*

*Our teacher was an unrivalled Buddhist monk.*

*Following his karma, he travelled south and north*

*The Way knows no receptions and followings.*

*How sad! After he flew away with his room*

*Tongmyŏng's old country was in danger.*

*The eminent Koguryŏ monk Podŏk Hwasang was a monk of Pallyong-sa Temple 盤龍山. When King Chang was led astray by Daoism and abolished Buddhism [as the state religion], the master immediately flew with his room to Kodae-san in Wŏnsan Province in Paekche. Afterwards, a transcendental appeared in Maryŏng 馬嶺 and said to a certain person: "The day your country will perish is at hand." This is how it is written in the Haedong samguksa 海東三國史.<sup>42</sup>*

The source mentioned in Ŭich'ŏn's recording of the legend of Podŏk is the *Haedong samguksa* or the *History of the Three Kingdoms of Haedong*. As I have shown elsewhere, 'Haedong' was a geonym that referred to the peninsula and that was particularly used in contrast with China and Sinitic civilization.<sup>43</sup> It occurs in numerous book titles from the Koryŏ dynasty and is often omitted in contemporary references.<sup>44</sup> The geonym may have been used here because it was originally part of the title, or

perhaps to accentuate the indigenous nature of the work. Be that as it may, despite its first mention as the *History of the Three Kingdoms of Haedong*, this history of the Three Kingdoms has subsequently become known simply as the *Samguksa* (conventionally translated into English as the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* to prevent confusion with Kim Pushik's *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* – classical Chinese does not distinguish between single and plural). Chŏng Kubok suggests that Ŭich'ŏn used the epithet 'Haedong' to distinguish the *Samguksa* from the Chinese historical work *Samguozhi* 三國志 (*Tales of the Three Kingdoms*), but this is not a very convincing argument.<sup>45</sup> Those who were able to read Ŭich'ŏn's writings would have been trained in the Chinese classics to the degree that they would not have mixed up the Chinese *Samguozhi* and the Koryŏ *Samguksa*, despite the identical first two characters (it must be admitted, though, that the Three Kingdoms were a historical notion both in China as *Samguo* and on the Korean peninsula as *Samguk*, making confusion a possibility). Moreover, the passage quoted by Ŭich'ŏn unambiguously refers to matters relating to the peninsula. It is therefore more plausible that Ŭich'ŏn used the epithet 'Haedong' to emphasize its native provenance, in accordance with the contemporary use of 'Haedong'.

Another mention of the *History of the Three Kingdoms* comes two centuries later, in Yi Kyubo's famous epic poem about King Tongmyŏng. In this poem, Yi not only points out that the *History of the Three Kingdoms* had become difficult to obtain in the thirteenth century, but he also refers to it as the *Ku samguksa* 舊三國史, or the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*. The prefix 'old' had become necessary since the dominant historical work of the middle and later Koryŏ period was the *Samguk sagi* or *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* of 1146. In contrast with the relatively small chance that the 'Samguksa' would be confused with the 'Samguozhi', the word 'Samguksa' could easily be mistaken for a shortened version of 'Samguk sagi', hence the use of the prefix 'old'.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>42</sup> TKM 17: 8a-b.

<sup>43</sup> See Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea*, pp. 29-58.

<sup>44</sup> See for example the *Secret Records of Haedong* (*Haedong pirok* 海東秘錄) from 1106, the *Haedong Book of Prophecies of the Ancient and Wise* (*Haedong kohyŏn ch'amgi* 海東古賢識記) mentioned in 1151 or the *Haedong Literary Mirror* (*Haedong mun'gam* 海東文鑑) written during the waning years of the dynasty. KS 12: 21a; KS 54: 2b; TS 127:10a.

<sup>45</sup> Chŏng Kubŏk, *Han'guk chungse sahaksa*, pp. 189-226, esp. 221; Pak Hannam 朴漢男, "P'yŏnnyŏn t'ongnok-gwa kit'a sasŏ-ŭi p'yŏnch'an 評년통록과 기타 사서의 편찬," in *Han'guksa* 17, pp. 175-187; Kim Ch'ŏlchun, "Yi Kyubo Tongmyŏngwang p'yŏn ŭi sahakchŏk koch'al: Kusamguksagi charyo-ŭi punsŏg-ŭl chungshim-ŭro 李奎報「東明王篇」의 史學史的 考察; 舊三國史記 資料의 分析을 중심으로," *Tongbang hakchi* 東方學志 46-47-48 (1985): pp. 55-73.

<sup>46</sup> Even the *Standard Koryŏ History* records 'Samguk sagi' as 'Samguksa' in the entry that mentions the completion of the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* and its dedication to Injong. If even the dedication of the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* contains the abbreviated form 'Samguksa', the confusion between 'Samguksa' as an abbreviation for the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* and the same word, 'Samguksa' as the original title of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*, is easy to imagine. See KS 17: 14b.

The loss of many early Koryŏ records makes it impossible to ascertain the exact date of the compilation of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*, but it is possible to make an educated guess. It was probably composed before the reign of Sŏngjong because the records after Sŏngjong are detailed to the extent that the compilation of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* would have been mentioned. It is hard to imagine that such a significant event as the presentation of an official history would not have found its way into the annals of the Koryŏ dynasty.<sup>47</sup> A likely possibility, then, for the time period in which the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was composed, is the period before Sŏngjong. In 1011, the invading Liao army destroyed most of Kaegyŏng and, as mentioned earlier, the lost historical records were reconstructed by, among other techniques, interviewing elderly people in the bureaucracy and at court. The reign of Sŏngjong, which had started in 983 and ended in 999, would have been close enough in the past for people to have memories of it that would have roughly matched the lost historical records. The reigns of Kwangjong and Kyŏngjong, however, would be a different matter; Kwangjong had ascended the throne in 950 and Kyŏngjong in 975, which would ask significantly more of human memory (and hearsay) than the reign of Sŏngjong. In 1013 (the time when Hyŏnjong instructed his historians to compile a new history), it could not have been easy to find persons with knowledge of the early days of Kwangjong's reign, more than 60 years before. There are several circumstances which make it plausible that the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was compiled during Kwangjong's reign (925-949-975). Kwangjong's reign predates that of Sŏngjong and was a lengthy one. The twenty-six years during which Kwangjong was in power afforded him sufficient time to undertake such a time-consuming, costly and demanding task as the compilation of a state history. In fact, only T'aejo had enjoyed a comparable period on the throne, but owing to the political, institutional and other difficulties the founder of the Koryŏ dynasty faced during his years in power, the possibility that the *Old His-*

*tory of the Three Kingdoms* was compiled during his reign is implausible. Further indirect evidence strengthening the case for Kwangjong is constituted by the facts that the very first records of state historians receiving official appointments and assignments are from this period; that many records during his reign have been lost, presumably including the record mentioning the compilation of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*; and that Kwangjong's interest in history is well-attested.<sup>48</sup> A final clue is provided by the surviving fragments of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* itself; these fragments reveal that it used the *kijŏnch'e* 紀傳體, a format that betrays strong Chinese influence.<sup>49</sup> Kwangjong's preferential treatment of Chinese literati is well-known and the influx of Chinese scholars into Koryŏ during his reign was considerable.<sup>50</sup> Their influence, moreover, was huge. It was during this period that the Chinese-style state examinations were introduced in Koryŏ, an achievement that can be largely attributed to Kwangjong's close adviser of Chinese descent, Shuang Ji 雙冀.<sup>51</sup> The very fact that Ch'oe Sŏngno, an avid admirer of Sinitic culture, took it upon himself to criticize Kwangjong for his excessive appreciation of Chinese literati reveals much about the influence these Chinese scholars enjoyed during the reign of Kwangjong.

Apart from these external arguments, there is also an internal argument that points to the reign of Kwangjong as the likely period of compilation. As mentioned above, the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was written according to the *kijŏnch'e* format that arranged the historical narrative around historical persons. It did so by using the *pon'gi* 本紀 (basic annals), a format meant for the exclusive use of the Son of Heaven; the *sega* 世家 (hereditary houses) which was meant for his vassals, meaning kings; and the *yŏlchŏn* 列傳 (biographies) for the biographies of men, and sometimes virtuous women. The latter format was also used for overviews of international relations, in which every state with which ties were maintained had its own chapter. The very fact that the *Old History of the*

47 Although it is impossible to say this with any certainty, it seems likely that the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was compiled as an official state-sponsored history.

48 Ch'oe laments Kwangjong's indiscriminate veneration of Chinese literati and their activities. See below.

49 This is ascertained by the existence of the reference in the *Ode to King Tongmyŏng* (*Tongmyŏngwang p'yŏn* 東明王篇) to the *pon'gi* 本紀 ('basic annals') and by the existence of *yŏlchŏn* 列傳 ('biographies'). Both are characteristic of this manner of arranging historical events and grouping them around historical persons. The basic annals were meant for the Son of Heaven, the hereditary houses (*sega* 世家) for his vassals and the biographies for the biographies of individual men and sometimes women. See Chŏng Kubŏk, *Han'guk chungse sahaksa*, pp. 211-212, 215.

50 Kim Kaptong 金甲東, "Kwangjong-gwa Kyŏngjong-ŭi wanggwŏn kanghwa chŏngch'aek 光宗과 경종의 왕권강화정책," *Han'guksa* 12, pp. 99-124.

51 Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch'oe Sŏngno sangsŏmun yŏn'gu* 崔承老上書文研究 (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1992), pp. 162-174; idem, *Koryŏ Kwangjong yŏn'gu* 高麗光宗研究 (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1981); Ch'ae Hŭisuk 蔡熙淑, "Koryŏ Kwangjong-ŭi kwagŏje shilshi-wa Ch'oe Sŏngno 高麗光宗의 科擧制 실시와 崔承老," *Yŏksa hakpo* 歷史學報 164 (1999): pp. 67-97; Hŏ Hŭngshik, *Koryŏ kwagŏ chedosa yŏn'gu* 高麗科擧制度史研究 (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1981), pp. 2-19.

*Three Kingdoms* had basic annals, which were normally only used for the Chinese Son of Heaven, again points at the reign of Kwangjong as the likely time for its composition.<sup>52</sup> Kwangjong, after all, stands out for his unabashed embracing of imperial titles and prerogatives. Strangely, this fact has been overlooked in all research on *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* up to date. Kwangjong's reign was characterized to an important extent by an imperial tradition that stressed Koryŏ's independence vis-à-vis China<sup>53</sup> and by the simultaneous existence of a strong sinification movement.<sup>54</sup> The composition of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* in this climate makes sense; the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* also combined the two identity-defining elements of autonomy and thorough sinification.

The most important fact about the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*, however, which is often overlooked, is that it is a Confucian history. Despite assertions to the contrary, the very few extant fragments point in this direction and so does the background to the compilation of this first Koryŏ history. According to Chŏng Kubok, the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* shows signs of an immature digestion of Confucian historiography: the overall structure of the work was Confucian, but the recorded stories were reproduced in their original form.<sup>55</sup> Apart from the questionable evolutionary thinking implied in this statement (it proceeds from an understanding that Confucian historiography was to be digested by Koryŏ historians in the future and that this would be a progressive process), it is doubtful whether the fact that the recorded stories were reproduced in their original form is a true hallmark of the immaturity of Confucian historiography. Rather, it is an admission that the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* is always thought of in contrast to the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*, Kim Pushik's twelfth-century history of the Three Kingdoms and the earliest extant history of the peninsula. One of the main reasons for the idea that the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*, even though it has

not survived, should still be researched and possesses 'immense' significance<sup>56</sup> is revisionist; the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* is used to 'topple' the unrivalled significance of the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*. The debate surrounding the historiographical merits and faults of the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* is over a century old and is still going strong. I have dealt with the debate on the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* elsewhere, but in essence it is about the alleged tributary and non-autonomous nature of Kim Pushik's history. Historians are quite enthusiastic at the prospect of a history that is the antithesis to the dominant perception of the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* as a sinophile and nonautonomous work, while in fact all remaining clues point to the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* being a history that was compiled according to Confucian guidelines. After all, it should not pass unnoticed that at the time of the establishment of the Koryŏ dynasty, a more or less Confucian tradition of historiography had been in existence on the peninsula for more than five hundred years.<sup>57</sup> It is hard to imagine that the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was written in an intellectual vacuum that ignored this tradition. Besides, the underlying assumption of this debate is that Confucianism and autonomy are mutually exclusive. As I have showed elsewhere, there is no such thing as 'Confucianism' as an exclusive ideology, and the Confucianism of Kim Pushik was certainly not inherently hostile to autonomy; in fact, quite the opposite is true.<sup>58</sup> The debate on the nature of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* is predominantly informed by its presupposed differences from the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*, and in particular by concerns with regard to the debate of autonomy versus sinophilia. Given the fact that only a very limited number of fragments from the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* are extant, there are comparatively few internal reasons for continuing research on it. One important internal reason to look at the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* though is the fact that, in all probability,

52 The *Standard Koryŏ History*, for instance, has no basic annals, but instead, hereditary houses. The same goes for all the other histories edited in the Chosŏn period (apart from during the nineteenth century). Basic annals were associated with Sons of Heaven, hereditary houses and vassal states. Deviation from this principle instantly signalled deviation from the formal order of things.

53 Kim Ch'anghyŏn has devoted a book to Kwangjong's imperial movement. See Kim Ch'anghyŏn 김창현, *Kwangjong-ŭi cheguk* 광종의 제국 (Seoul: P'urŭn yŏksa 푸른역사, 2003).

54 Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch'oe Sŭngno sangsŏmun yŏn'gu*, pp. 162-174; idem, *Koryŏ Kwangjong yŏn'gu*, esp. pp. 31-46; Ch'ae Hŭisuk, "Koryŏ Kwangjong-ŭi kwagŏje shilshi-wa Ch'oe Sŭngno," pp. 67-97; Hŏ Hŭngshik, *Koryŏ kwagŏ chedosa yŏn'gu*, pp. 2-15.

55 Chŏng Kubŏk, *Han'guk chungse sahaksa*, pp. 189-226.

56 Ibid., pp. 189.

57 As mentioned before, state histories based on the principles of Confucian historiography had already been compiled in Paekche, Shilla and Koguryŏ.

58 See Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, especially pp. 317-350.

Kim Pushik relied upon it heavily when he compiled the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*.<sup>59</sup>

Little is known about Koryŏ's oldest history. Due to a lack of sources, educated guesswork is the most that can be aspired to. Fortunately, though, two characteristics can be established on the basis of known facts. First, the repeated assertion of most historians that the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was Koguryŏ-oriented can be dismissed as wishful thinking.<sup>60</sup> The very title of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* suggests that it is a history of the Three Kingdoms, not a mere history of Koguryŏ and Koryŏ. While this title in itself does not preclude a possible emphasis on Koguryŏ history, one would expect a different title if the idea of Koguryŏ-successionism were indeed the driving force behind the compilation. Why call it *History of the Three Kingdoms*, if it mainly deals with Koguryŏ and Koryŏ? The fact that it clearly refers to the Three Kingdoms in its title is a manifestation of Samhan-successionism, regardless of the relative weight these three states carried within the historical narrative. The dominant interpretation of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* supposes an official ratification of Koryŏ's Koguryŏ-successionism to have been the motive for the compilation of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*. Based upon the available evidence, however, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it was compiled, rather, as a justification of Koryŏ's unification of the Three Kingdoms and as confirmation of Koryŏ's installation of the Three Kingdoms and the Three Han as its charter states.<sup>61</sup> The compilation of the *History of the Three Kingdoms* directly

referred to the understanding that the Three Kingdoms belonged together, just as the Three Han had. To focus solely on Koguryŏ (or Shilla or Paekche, for that matter) would be to miss an obvious point.

Second, the mythical nature of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* cannot be taken for granted. Apart from the fact that there is an often-encountered conflation of nativism, autonomy, independence, myth and Koguryŏ on the one side and Confucianism, tributary relations, dependence, rationalism and Shilla on the other, the surviving fragments of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* clearly reveal its structure. It was written according to Confucian guidelines, as is clear from its format, and within that format it tried to encompass Koryŏ's mythology and history. This is not a view of history that can rightly be characterized as 'mythical'. Perhaps it included more 'mythical' stories than the twelfth-century *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*,<sup>62</sup> but even so, the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was an early manifestation of a Confucian view of history, adapted to the circumstances on the peninsula. This in itself is an extraordinarily important fact that is too often overlooked in unsubstantiated essentialist debates on Koryŏ identity.<sup>63</sup> Such an assumption is supported by the fact that when Hyŏnjong, in 1013, ordered Hwang Churyang, Ch'oe Chung, Yun Chinggo 尹徵古 and Chu Chŏ 周佇 to try to recompile the lost records by gleaning as many facts as possible from elderly people, the persons appointed were all Confucian scholars.<sup>64</sup> That the official state records were compiled by the state historian and his assistants is telling; it shows how influential Con-

59 Tanaka Toshiaki 田中俊明, "Sankokushiki zanshin to kŭ sankokushi 三國史記撰進と旧三國史," *Chōsen gakuho* 朝鮮學報 83 (1977): pp. 1-58, esp. pp. 6-7; Yi Kangnae, *Samguk sagi chŏn'goron*, pp. 206-256.

60 The fact that it was not compiled by Kim Pushik is given much weight; as such, it must have been less Confucian, less rationalist and less sinophile. The second most important argument is the idea that since the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* incorporated more mythical elements without fitting them into a preconceived (and foreign) Confucian framework, it was generically much closer to Koguryŏ, portrayed as nativist and non-rational, than to Shilla, described as sinocentric and rationalist. The suggestion that the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* possessed more mythical contents than the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* is quite possibly correct, but there are not enough sources to allow a conclusion and the opposite scenario cannot be excluded. Chŏng Kubŏk, *Han'guk chungse sahaksa*, pp. 189-226; Kim Ch'ŏlchun, "Yi Kyubo Tongmyŏngwang p'yŏn ūi sahakchŏk koch'al," pp. 55-73; Pak Hannam, "P'yŏnnyŏn t'ongnok-gwa kit'a sasŏ-ŭi p'yŏnch'an," p. 185.

61 During this period the terms 'Samguk' 三國 (Three Kingdoms) and 'Samhan' 三韓 (Three Han) were often used interchangeably. See Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, pp. 29-58.

62 According to Yi Kyubo it did. He wrote in the introduction to his *Ode to King Tongmyŏng*: "In the Fourth Month of 1193, the *kyech'uk* year, I obtained a copy of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*. There, I read the Basic Annals of King Tongmyŏng and the remaining evidence of his deeds exceeded what the world says about him. At first, I could not believe it, considering it bizarre and fantastic. Only by reading it thoroughly three times, did I wade across to its source. His deeds were not fantastic, but sagely; not bizarre, but supernatural. Moreover, how could a national history in which everything is recorded as it happened contain a false story? When My Lord Kim Pushik recompiled the national history, he abbreviated [this story] rather much. I wonder whether he wanted his national history to be a book that would correct the world and as such considered it inopportune to show later generations such truly strange things, removing them entirely from it. In the basic annals of Xuanzong of the Tang and in the biography of Yang Guifei there is no mention of a geomancer rising to Heaven and then entering Earth. It is merely that poet Bai Letian [Bai Juyi] feared that these occurrences may be lost and composed a song to record them. Such truly groundless, licentious, bizarre and deceitful things were made into a poem and shown to later generations. The deeds of King Tongmyŏng are not the work of a shape-shifting spirit who drew a veil over the people's eyes, but constitute traces of the supernatural from the days when our country was truly created and this must be recorded. If not, how will later generations look at this? Accordingly I have composed an ode to record these deeds. I wish the world to know of our country's erstwhile sage." See *Tongguk Yi Sangguk chip* 東國李相國集 3: 1a-b.

63 See the aforementioned studies on Koryŏ's Koguryŏ-successionism.

fucianism had become in these matters. It also forms a historiographical bridge between the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* and the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*, suggesting, again, that both works were part of the same tradition. Perhaps the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was compiled to justify the Koryŏ state (which had, at the time of compilation, been formed less than fifty years before) and to emphasize why the Three Kingdoms or the Three Han belonged together. Hence the name of the work, which stresses the presence of the Three Kingdoms in Koryŏ's history. It stands to reason that the contents of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* were very different from those of the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*; after all, they are separated by two centuries. Nonetheless, they are products of very similar historiographical traditions and are much more alike than is normally supposed.

### CH'OE SŪNGNO

As seen above, during the early Koryŏ period state historiography (or at the very least, official historiography and private historiography by state servants) was Confucian in character to the extent that history was thought to serve the state and facilitate proper government. One example of this approach to past and present is Ch'oe Sŭngno 崔承老 (927-989), who evaluated the achievements of the first five kings in his famous *Appraisal of the Political Achievements of the Five Reigns* and who stated his policy suggestions in *On Current Affairs* (*shimuch'aek* 時務策). These memorials have usually been presented as political philosophy. This is certainly a correct characteriza-

tion, though it is not exhaustive,<sup>65</sup> as the memorials are as much historiographical as they are philosophical. Ch'oe's lengthy commentaries can be considered pieces of historical writing, since they exhibit the same characteristics as other pieces of historical writing from this period.<sup>66</sup> They reflect upon the past, refer to historical sources and past examples and try to distil a significance which is relevant to the present of practical engagement.<sup>67</sup> By the same token, historical writings from early Koryŏ can be characterized as politically-motivated documents, and indeed have been interpreted in such a manner.<sup>68</sup> Interpreting writings on political philosophy in a historiographical context, though, seems to be decidedly less popular.

Ch'oe Sŭngno descended from the three famous Confucian scholars, known as the Three Ch'oe's (*sam Ch'oe* 三崔): Ch'oe Ch'iwon 崔致遠 (857-?), Ch'oe Ŏnwi 崔彥協 (868-944) and Ch'oe Sŭngu 崔承祐 (?-936). Ch'oe Sŭngno was only twelve years old when he first met T'aejo. He was a child prodigy taken by his father to see the new strong man on the peninsula to whom they had surrendered three years earlier, in the retinue of Shilla King Kyŏngsun 敬順王. Ch'oe received T'aejo's special attention when he proved capable of reciting the *Analects* (*Lunyu* 論語) by heart. He subsequently received an academic appointment and eventually was given charge of the preservation of the state's documents (a position previously held by Ch'oe Ŏnwi). He also drafted the diplomatic correspondence that was sent abroad. During the turbulent early years of the dynasty, Ch'oe became one of the most

64 At the same time, other renowned scholars of Confucianism were appointed as historians: Ch'oe Hang as supervising state historian and Kim Shimŏn as editing state historian. See *KS* 4: 15a.

65 Kim Ilhwan 金日煥, for instance, presents an analysis of Ch'oe's thought as 'realist Confucianism' 實踐儒學, which was eminently suited to react to contemporary circumstances. Kim uses this argument to construct a political and contemporary interpretation of Ch'oe as an example of progressive and modern (sic) Confucianism. Kim Ilhwan, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi yugyo chŏngch'i sasang yŏn'gu 崔承老의 儒教政治思想 研究," *Yugyo sasang yŏn'gu* 儒教思想研究 4-5 (1992): pp. 129-160.

66 Hong Sŭnggi's 洪承基 monograph is the only study to discuss Ch'oe's views on history. He does this in a very sophisticated and abstract way, concluding that Ch'oe's ideas on history were classically Confucian. See Hong Sŭnggi, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi Yugyojuŭi sahangnon 崔承老의 儒教主義史學論," *Chindan hakpo* 92 (2001): pp. 369-384. There are a number of monographs on Ch'oe Sŭngno, all of which interpret his writings as pieces of political philosophy, with the exception of Hong Sŭnggi's study; Ha Hyŏn'gang, "Koryŏ ch'ogi Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi chŏngch'i sasang yŏn'gu 高麗初期 崔承老의 政治思想 研究," in *Ihwa sawŏn* 梨大史苑 12 (1975): pp. 1-28; O Yŏngbyŏn 吳瑛燮, "Ch'oe Sŭngno sangsŏmun-ŭi sasangjŏk kiban-gwa yŏksajŏk ŭiŭi 崔承老 上書文의 思想의 基盤과 歷史의 意義," *T'aedong kojŏn yŏn'gu* 泰東古典研究 10 (1993): pp. 231-264; Yi Cheun 李在云, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi chŏngch'i sasang 崔承老의 政治思想," *Sanun sahak* 汕耘史學 3 (1989): pp. 163-186; Kim Ch'ŏlchun, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi shimu ishipp'alcho-e taehayŏ 崔承老의 時務二十八條에 對하여," in *Yosŏng Cho Myŏnggi paksa hwagap kinyŏm pulgyosahak nonch'ong* 曉城趙明基博士華甲記念 佛教史學論叢 (Seoul: Yosŏng Cho Myŏnggi paksa hwagap kinyŏm pulgyosahak nonch'ong kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 曉城趙明基博士華甲記念佛教史學論叢刊行委員會, 1965), edited by Yosŏng Cho Myŏnggi paksa hwagap kinyŏm pulgyosahak nonch'ong kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe, pp. 227-256. Reprinted in *Han'guk sahaksa yŏn'gu* 韓國史學史研究 (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1990), edited by Ilgye Kim Ch'ŏlchun chŏnjip kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 一溪金哲俊全集刊行委員會, pp. 185-226.

67 I have relied on the corrected and crosschecked versions of Ch'oe's memorials in Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch'oe Sŭngno sangsŏmun yŏn'gu*. The memorials have been recorded in the *Standard Koryŏ History*, but also (partly) in the *Essentials of Koryŏ History*, the *Korean Literary Anthology* and other literary collections. Yi Kibaek compared all extant versions and chose the most plausible ones. I shall refer to the pages of this study when I refer to Ch'oe's memorials instead of the pages of their locus classicus in the *Standard Koryŏ History*.

68 The debate on the political motivations that underlie the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*, for instance, is a good example. See Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, pp. 317-350.



respected statesmen, untouched even by Kwangjong's purges.<sup>69</sup> When he wrote his memorials at Sŏngjong's behest and presented them to him in 981, he had already served five kings.<sup>70</sup> According to the dominant Confucian historiography of the day, Ch'oe was an ideal historian, in the sense that he knew the circumstances first-hand and through the documents, and understood the value of the past in relation to the present. His memorials are testimonies to this well-accepted dual role of Confucian official and scholar-historian.

Ch'oe Sŭngno was one of the most prominent Confucian statesmen of the Koryŏ dynasty. The excellence of his lineage played an important role in his career; it would not have been conceivable for so gifted a person with that background to pursue a different kind of career. One thing, however, distinguishes him from his three famous forebears: they all went to Tang China, passed the state examinations and served a number of years in the Tang bureaucracy before returning to the peninsula. Ch'oe Sŭngno, on the other hand, finished his education on the peninsula. It is not known why he never went to China to pursue his studies, although it is easy to imagine that both the tumultuous situation in his home country and the uncertain political circumstances in China after the fall of the Tang kept him from going abroad. His peninsular education is more than just a testimony to the level of education available on the peninsula at this time; it also thoroughly influenced his outlook on the world. Although usually portrayed as a traditional Confucian scholar and statesman whose heart was with China, Ch'oe displayed a very peninsular-oriented perspective in his judgements. His habit of addressing Sŏngjong and other rulers as *sŏngsang* 聖上 ('sacred ruler'), his mention of T'aejo's mandate of Heaven and his references to the sons of T'aejo as 'offspring of the Imperial House' 皇家

之支葉 all portray the peninsular habit of appropriating the imperial status of the Chinese Son of Heaven, both ontologically and symbolically.<sup>71</sup> A closer look at Ch'oe's memorials will tell us more about his decidedly peninsular political outlook.

The *Appraisal of the Political Achievements of the Five Reigns* is a document that can perhaps best be characterized as a mirror for the king. Ch'oe explicitly stated and repeated that the purpose of his appraisals was to have the ruler reflect upon the deeds of his predecessors and if good, repeat them, while if bad, avoid them. Ch'oe's appraisal of the five rulers was meant to be used by the present ruler, Sŏngjong. The manner in which he tried to extract significance from the past, relevant to the present, was historical. Looking back and holding up what had happened to Chinese history and Confucian philosophical dogma, Ch'oe constructed an implicit image of the ideal ruler of Koryŏ.<sup>72</sup> His explicit example was without doubt T'aejo, whose monumental achievement of unifying the peninsula and establishing the dynasty was "the merit of the founding ancestor" (*shijojidŏk* 始祖之德).<sup>73</sup> Interestingly, Ch'oe acknowledged T'aejo's possession of the mandate of Heaven and apparently also attached value to the prophecy that Wang Kŏn would become king of Koryŏ.<sup>74</sup> In Ch'oe's estimation, Wang Kŏn was the telos of peninsular history; even Wang Kŏn's erstwhile lord and later enemy Kungye, who gets the worst possible treatment in the *Standard Koryŏ History*,<sup>75</sup> was mobilized in such a manner as to prop up Wang Kŏn as the heavenly-preordained ruler of the peninsula. Heaven had "borrowed the hands" of Kungye to establish a measure of order on the peninsula, and made him ruler of Koryŏ so that Wang Kŏn could succeed him.<sup>76</sup> Wang Kŏn then became T'aejo, the founding ancestor of Koryŏ, when "he unified the realm," compared to which "no achievement is loftier and no vir-

69 Kim Ch'ŏlchun argued that Ch'oe's memorials to Sŏngjong emerged out of Ch'oe's experiences during that time. The ideal Ch'oe presented to Sŏngjong was that of a harmonious relationship between a wise ruler and his wise(r) ministers. Kim also pointed out the historical contradiction or perhaps irony involved: for Sŏngjong to be able to be a strong monarch, the ruthless purges under Kwangjong had been necessary preconditions. Ch'oe Sŭngno, though, was unequivocal in his condemnation of Kwangjong's purges. Kim Ch'ŏlchun, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi shimu ishipp'alcho-e taehayŏ," pp. 221-222.

70 T'aejo, Hyejong, Chŏngjong, Kyŏngjong and Kwangjong. Sŏngjong was the sixth monarch he served. For a detailed description of Ch'oe's life and an analysis of his political philosophy, see Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch'oe Sŭngno sangsŏmun yŏn'gu*, pp. 163-174.

71 Ibid., pp. 7, 10, 67-68.

72 Kim Ch'ŏlchun, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi shimu ishipp'alcho-e taehayŏ," p. 221.

73 Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch'oe Sŭngno sangsŏmun yŏn'gu*, p. 2.

74 Ibid., p. 7. Ch'oe connected the prophecy with the possession of the mandate of Heaven; as in Chinese history, it was foretold when a future ruler was about to receive the Mandate. For a detailed analysis of this prophecy, which had been engraved on a Chinese bronze mirror, see Yi Pyŏngdo 李丙燾, *Koryŏ shidae-ŭi yŏn'gu: t'ŭkhi to'cham sasang-ŭl chungshim-ŭro* 高麗時代の研究 - 특히 圖讖 思想을 中心으로 (Revised edition, Seoul: Asea munhwasa 亞細亞文化史, 1980), pp. 37-39.

75 G. Cameron Hurst III, "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Personalities in the Founding of the Koryŏ Dynasty," *Korean Studies Forum* 7 (1981): pp. 1-27.

76 Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch'oe Sŭngno sangsŏmun yŏn'gu*, p. 7. Ch'oe also refers to Kungye as "the previous king," as does the *Standard Koryŏ History*. See Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, pp. 27-58.

tue is greater.”<sup>77</sup> Ch’oe heaps praise upon T’aejo as the dynasty’s founder, upon his frugality, his knowledge of diplomacy, his courteousness towards inferiors, his veneration of both Confucianism and Buddhism and his ability to make people come from afar to serve him.<sup>78</sup> By praising T’aejo in this manner, he made him the yardstick for all other Koryŏ rulers. Admonishing Sŏngjong, Ch’oe states confidently that if he (Sŏngjong) would only adhere to T’aejo’s policies, there would be no reason why Koryŏ could not rival the Tang.<sup>79</sup> Ch’oe’s criticism with regard to T’aejo is limited to the fact that Koryŏ still lacked the achievements of a civilized state during his reign.<sup>80</sup> It is immediately followed by the qualification that this is to be expected in a state that has just been founded.

Ch’oe’s adoption of T’aejo as the standard against which all other rulers are to be measured is, in a sense, surprising, since he had the impressive examples of the Tang dynasty at his disposal. Although emperor Taizu 太祖 of the Tang does figure once as an example, Ch’oe mainly used Chinese dynasties as material for comparison rather than for direct imitation. The first eight years of Kwangjong’s reign, for instance, rivalled the Three Dynasties (of Xia, Shang and Zhou).<sup>81</sup> It was not Kwangjong’s unconditional love for Chinese culture that made Ch’oe say this. Indeed, Ch’oe condemned Kwangjong’s undiluted sinophilia in his later years, and his blind preference for all things and persons Chinese.<sup>82</sup> In the eleventh proposal of his *On Current Affairs*, Ch’oe adopts a similar tone with regard to the fourth of the *Ten Injunctions* (*hunyo shipcho* 訓要十條), which emphasizes the differences between Koryŏ and China:

*It is impossible not to adhere to the ways of China, but since the customs of all regions throughout the country each follow their own characteristics, it seems to be difficult to change them all. Our vulgar ways must be corrected according to Chinese rules with regard to the teachings of [proper] ceremony and music, poetry and literature and with regard to the moral principles between ruler and minister, father and son. But with regard to such things as transport and clothing, we can adhere to our local customs and reach a balance between luxury and thrift. There is no reason to strain ourselves unreasonably to be the same.*<sup>83</sup>

In Ch’oe estimation, Kwangjong’s sinophilia had unbalanced Koryŏ to such an extent that when Sŏngjong ascended the throne, his reign could be characterized as an opportunity for a “renaissance” of the still young dynasty.<sup>84</sup> The key to good government, that which was to be strived for, the goal of Ch’oe’s Confucian political philosophy, was not pure sinophilia, nor was it any kind of idealism usually associated with sinophile Confucians. Rather, it was that during a good reign “good deeds and bad deeds, as it were, are in balance.”<sup>85</sup> This balanced realism, then, was what Ch’oe was seeking and what he wanted to instil in Sŏngjong. The same realism is prevalent in Ch’oe appraisal of T’aejo: T’aejo’s realistic policies – frugality, venerating both Buddhism and Confucianism, and cautious but decisive diplomacy – attracted Ch’oe’s praise. This is not to say that Ch’oe did not have a firm, classically Confucian base from which he judged. On Kwangjong, for instance, he remarks that had cooper-

77 Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch’oe Sŏngno sangsŏmun yŏn’gu*, p. 7. Kim Ch’ŏlchun stresses the contrast Ch’oe wanted to show to Sŏngjong between T’aejo and Kwangjong during Kwangjong’s most violent periods. Kim Ch’ŏlchun, “Ch’oe Sŏngno-ŭi shimu ishipp’alcho-e taehayŏ,” p. 185-226.

78 Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch’oe Sŏngno sangsŏmun yŏn’gu*, p. 11, 14, 32

79 Ibid., p. 71.

80 Ibid., p. 32.

81 Ibid., p. 71.

82 Ibid., pp. 55, 60. Ha Hyŏn’gang sees this as a result of Ch’oe’s preoccupation with reforming Shilla society, which had been dominated by the bone rank system 骨品制, into Koryŏ society, which should adhere to the tenets of a well-ordered, hierarchical society, as described in the Confucian classics. Ha Hyŏn’gang, “Koryŏ ch’ogi Ch’oe Sŏngno-ŭi chŏngch’i sasang yŏn’gu,” pp. 1-28.

83 Compare the text of the fourth injunction: “Fourth injunction: Although our eastern country has long cherished the Tang traditions and followed all of its institutions with regard to writing, material culture, music and ritual, where geographical location is different and the soil also differs, the character of the people does as well. There is no reason to strain ourselves unreasonably to be the same. The Khitan are a state of birds and wild animals. Their customs are not like ours, their language is also different. We should take great care not to model our dress and ceremonies on theirs.” See KS 2: 15b. This is the original text: 其四曰，惟我東方，舊慕唐風，文物禮樂，悉遵其制，殊方異土，人性各異，不必苟同，契丹，是禽獸之國，風俗不同，言語亦異，衣冠制度，慎勿效焉。 For the translation of this injunction, I again refer to Peter Lee’s *Sourcebook*, p. 264. For a discussion of the forged nature of the *Ten Injunctions* (which makes this fourth injunction actually of a later date than Ch’oe’s text), see Remco E. Breuker, *Forging the Truth: Creative Deception and National Identity in Medieval Korea* (Special issue of *East Asian History* 35, Canberra: Division of Pacific and Asian History, 2009). The contents of the injunctions are discussed in Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, pp. 317-406.

84 Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch’oe Sŏngno sangsŏmun yŏn’gu*, p. 71; Kim Ch’ŏlchun, “Ch’oe Sŏngno-ŭi shimu ishipp’alcho-e taehayŏ,” pp. 185-226.

85 Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch’oe Sŏngno sangsŏmun yŏn’gu*, p. 71. Ch’oe returns, in his concluding remarks to the *Appraisal of the Political Achievements of the Five Reigns*, to the first eight years of Kwangjong’s reign as the realizable goal of good government, thus emphasizing the importance of this period in his scheme of things.

ation and trust between the ruler and his ministers been better, Kwangjong would have lived longer and the country would have benefitted. He faults both Kwangjong and his ministers for not having made this happen.<sup>86</sup> This is a theme that later also surfaces in Kim Pushik's understanding of benevolent rule. Ch'oe also makes many references to the Chinese classics, in particular to the *Book of Rites* 禮記, the *Book of Documents* 書記, *Mencius* 孟子, the *Analects* 論語, the *I Ching* 易經 and the *Spring and Autumn Annals and the Commentary of Zuo Qiuming* 春秋左傳, mobilizing their authority in determining what is a good ruler.<sup>87</sup> And if we read Ch'oe's memorials with these classical texts in mind, it becomes immediately clear that his implicit image of the ideal ruler is thoroughly Confucian: generous, broad-minded, courteous towards inferiors, cooperative with his ministers and able to summon people from afar by relying on his civilizing virtue. Most studies of Ch'oe Sŭngno have emphasized this aspect of his political thought, and not without reason.<sup>88</sup>

The peninsular aspect of Ch'oe's thought, however, must not be overlooked. His ideas about what constitutes an ideal ruler were tested and adapted by the rulers he had seen in person. On the one hand, he elevated T'aejo to a position of unassailable authority for his successors. T'aejo was both the purpose of peninsular history and its new starting point. When Ch'oe appeared to give credence to the prophecy that foretold Wang Kŏn's rule, he was cementing Wang Kŏn's position as the necessary purpose of peninsular history. On the other hand, when he criticized Chŏngjong for wanting to move the capital on the basis of a similar prophecy, he was judging Chŏngjong according to the standard that was set by T'aejo and supported by Chinese precedents.<sup>89</sup> Ch'oe's appraisals, admonitions and suggestions are both rooted in ideology and suited to Koryŏ's practical circumstances. The surviving twenty-two points (of an original twenty-eight) of his *On Current Affairs* confirm this. In *On Current Affairs* he deals with the pressing border problems in the North (number one), the need to economize and restrict the economic influence of Buddhism (numbers two, four, eight, ten, thirteen, sixteen, seventeen and eighteen), the

need to bring the provinces under Koryŏ's direct rule (number seven), the importance of maintaining (and re-establishing) distinctions between the classes (numbers nine and seventeen), the need to preserve Koryŏ's distinctiveness vis-à-vis China (number eleven), the importance of the ruler doing as little as possible in governing the country (number twenty) and the need to worship only one's own ancestral spirits (number twenty-one), as well as some other contemporary concerns. The argument in all the above-mentioned cases is similarly constructed: it consists of an ideological part and a practical part. Let us take, as an example, the excessive state spending on Buddhism. The practical part of the argument states that too much money, resources and corvéé labour are sacrificed to Buddhist festivals, temples, statues, monks, etc. The ideological part states that

*[t]he three teachings each have their own functions. Persons that adhere to these teachings should not confuse them and try to make them into one. Adhering to Buddhism is the principle of polishing one's mind. Adhering to Confucianism is the principle of governing the country. Polishing one's mind is of help for the afterlife; governing the country is a current affair.<sup>90</sup>*

In other words, Buddhist faith is a personal affair that should not be paid for by the state. Another example is Ch'oe's championing of stronger central control of the provinces. The Koryŏ-specific and practical part of the argument laments the inefficiency of the administration from the capital and the loss in revenue this entails. The ideological part bemoans the fate of the farmers who are at the mercy of the unscrupulous local gentry, who by definition are not ideal rulers; only the ruler who makes continuous efforts is able to dispense righteousness to the people. Ch'oe's need for distinction among the social classes, in dress and dwelling places, again leans on an analogous construction. Quoting the *Book of Rites*, he argues that Heaven has laid down the height of the houses of the several social classes; this should not be tampered with. Referring to the abuses at the Koryŏ court,

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60; Kim Ch'ŏlchun, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi shimu ishipp'alcho-e taehayŏ," pp. 185-226.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 23, 26, 30, 32, 34, 64.

<sup>88</sup> Kim Ilhwan, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi yugyo chŏngch'i sasang yŏn'gu," pp. 129-160; Ha Hyŏn'gang, "Koryŏ ch'ogi Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi chŏngch'i sasang yŏn'gu," pp. 1-28; O Yŏngbyŏn, "Ch'oe Sŭngno sangsŏmun-ŭi sasangjŏk kiban-gwa yŏksajŏk ŭiŭi," pp. 231-264; Yi Cheun, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi chŏngch'i sasang," pp. 163-186; Kim Ch'ŏlchun, "Ch'oe Sŭngno-ŭi shimu ishipp'alcho-e taehayŏ," pp. 185-226. Kim Ch'ŏlchun's study is the only one that really situates this Confucian ideal with regard to Ch'oe's experience as a statesman.

<sup>89</sup> Yi Kibaek (ed.), *Ch'oe Sŭngno sangsŏmun yŏn'gu*, p. 42.


<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 148.

he decries the fact that high officials from poor families cannot afford wear the silk robes they are supposed to wear, while lower officials from rich families can. Finally, Ch'oe's insistence that a ruler do as little as possible in governing the country rests on the assumption that there are able ministers carrying out the tasks necessary for running the country; in practical terms, it warns Sŏngjong not to be arrogant and to listen to his officials.

Both in his insistence that Koryŏ should preserve a clearly separate identity from China and in the way he structured his arguments, Ch'oe Sŏngno proved himself to be a Confucian scholar with strong peninsular roots. In itself, this is quite natural, though it often passes unnoticed. Some tension is present in Ch'oe's analyses and appraisals of the Koryŏ rulers and the standards according to which he judges them. This tension is inherent in the application of any presumed universal standard to particular situations.<sup>91</sup> It is furthermore intensified by the way he used T'aejo as an additional model for Koryŏ's rulers; although for a significant part Ch'oe's image of T'aejo had been constructed by relying on Confucian characteristics of the ideal ruler, it must not be forgotten that T'aejo's most evident virtue had been the founding of the Koryŏ dynasty. This very peninsular fact informed Ch'oe Sŏngno's perception of the political history of the first five Koryŏ reigns, which is perhaps best exemplified by his standards for judging Koryŏ's rulers. He referred both to Chinese precedent and to T'aejo's rule, and lifted both out of their historical context to such an extent that they served as models for the present of practical engagement. Chinese precedent became the principle upon which the Koryŏ dynasty was to function, while the memory of T'aejo's reign guided all future rulers.<sup>92</sup>

### THE RECORDS OF KARAK (KARAKKUK KI)

Such works as the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* and Ch'oe Sŏngno's memorials aimed at describing and understanding the history of the state, but other works produced during the early Koryŏ period focused on regional history. The *Records of Karak* (*Karakkuk ki*



Part of the *Records of Karak* in the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms*

駕洛國記) was compiled in 1076 by Kim Yanggam 金良鑑 (fl. late eleventh century), who at that time served as the governor of Kŭmgwan 金官 (Kŭmgwanju 金官州). The *Standard Koryŏ History* did not record who compiled the *Records of Karak*, just the fact that it had been incorporated in the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms* (*Samguk yusa* 三國遺事).<sup>93</sup> The *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms* only divulges that its compiler was a “magistrate of Kŭmju and man of letters” (“Kŭmgwan chi ju sa munin” 金官知奏事文人) and that the *Records of Karak* had been incorporated in abbreviated form.<sup>94</sup> The lineage records of the Kwangsan Kim lineage (*Kwangsan Kimsshi chokpo* 光山金氏族譜), however, mention that their lineage member Kim Yanggam compiled the *Records of Karak* when he served in Kŭmju sometime between 1075 and 1084.<sup>95</sup> A stele with an inscription dating from 1884 mentions that Munjong ordered Kim Yanggam to repair the tomb of King Suro 首露王, the founder of Karak, and to institute memorial services and write the *Records of Karak*.<sup>96</sup> This inscription is of course of a very late date, but the information recorded in it was based upon local

91 To a certain extent, Ha Hyŏn'gang recognizes this, by stressing the fact that Ch'oe's policies were well-adapted to the circumstances on the Korean peninsula. Ha, however, does not analyse the relationship between Ch'oe's personal background and stage of activity and his appeals to Confucian philosophy. See Ha Hyŏn'gang, “Koryŏ ch'ogi Ch'oe Sŏngno-ŭi chŏngch'i sasang yŏn'gu,” pp. 1-28.

92 Elsewhere, I have elaborated on this point by focusing on the figure of the Koryŏ ruler. See Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, pp. 147-194.

93 *KS* 57: 8a-b; *Samguk yusa* (hereafter *SGYS*) 2: 243-255). Also see Chŏng Kubŏk, *Han'guk chungse sahaksa*, p. 66.

94 *SGYS* 2: 243.

95 Judging from the date of compilation mentioned in the text itself of either 1076 or 1077, it seems plausible that Kim Yanggam served in Kŭmju during the late 1070s.

96 *Karakkuk T'aejo-rŭng sungsjŏn pisŏk* 駕洛國太祖陵崇善殿碑石

records and does not conflict with extant sources. The stele records the history of the tomb from the burial of Suro until the erection of the stele and the restoration of the tomb in 1884. The exact year of the compilation of the *Records of Karak* is not mentioned, but the text in the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms* mentions a date of either 1076 or 1077; the year of compilation is referred to as the thirty-first year of Munjong's reign (1077) and the second year of the Liao reign name Taikang 太康, which corresponds to 1076. This corresponds to the period in which Kim Yanggam rapidly rose in the bureaucracy to become one of the most important officials during the late eleventh century.<sup>97</sup> According to the epitaphs for one of his granddaughters and that for his son, Kim Yanggam reached the office of chancellor in the Department of the Royal Secretariat-Chancellery (*munha shijung* 門下侍中), Koryŏ's highest office.<sup>98</sup> He also fulfilled the highest historiographical office of supervising editor of state history (*kamsu kuksa*), which is a clear indication of his suitability to have written the *Records of Karak*.

The *Records of Karak* was locally compiled, based upon records from the region. Judging from the extant version in the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms*, it was an attempt to integrate Kaya's history into Koryŏ's past, as much as an effort to preserve Kaya's history. The fact that an important central official<sup>99</sup> wrote a regional history such as the *Records of Karak* is significant. It shows the importance that was attached to the pre-Koryŏ history of the peninsula and the importance of regions in forming the historical descent of Koryŏ. The *Records of Karak* describes how the country was established by King Suro, but does not stop at the demise of the Kaya kingdom. The work goes beyond the history of Kaya and describes the history

of the region through Shilla and up to Munjong's reign of Koryŏ, implying a certain kind of territorial belonging and continuity. It quotes from a Kaya 伽倻 temple inscription, which – although it has a distinct apocryphal flavour and dates from the late ninth century at the very earliest, but probably from early Koryŏ – expresses the wish for a wise ruler to appear and remedy the situation in the Eastern Land (Tongguk) “where the capitals are divided.” It is hardly credible that this wish for unification existed in Kaya, but it is entirely plausible in the Koryŏ context. Even if this inscription is a later interpolation, it is from Munjong's reign at the latest and testifies to the notion of territorial belonging that had come into existence during the eleventh century. Kaya's history was considered part of Koryŏ's history by virtue of its territory and its ties with the Shilla ruling house. This notion is strengthened by the way Suro's descendants surrendered to the newly-risen Shilla, which is described in a manner reminiscent of how the last king of Shilla, Kyŏngsun, surrendered Shilla and his authority to rule to T'aejo. The attention paid to the absorption of Kaya into Shilla and the succession to the Shilla throne of the Kaya lineage via the general who unified the peninsula, Kim Yushin 金庾信, is remarkable.<sup>100</sup> It indicates the continuing importance of Kaya as a historical memory. The similarity of Kaya's peaceful absorption into Shilla to that of Shilla into Koryŏ further reinforces Kaya's place in Koryŏ's past.<sup>101</sup> The absorption of Kaya by Shilla into Koryŏ was not forgotten during the Koryŏ period. Effective symbols of Kaya's annexation were the custom of investing members of the royal family as Marquises of Kūmgwan (Kūmgwan hu 金官侯) and the presence of a palace called Kūmgwan Palace.<sup>102</sup>

97 In 1070, Kim Yanggam was appointed as junior assistant executive and policy critic of the Department of Ministries (*Sangsŏ usŏng chwaganū idaebu* 尚書右丞左諫議大夫), after which he was steadily promoted (KS 8: 24a). In 1073, he went to the Song as an envoy (KS 9: 10b). Kim apparently made some impression at the Song court, because he appears in many contemporary Song records. After he returned, Kim resumed his career and finally became chancellor. The Song documents in which Kim appears are part of an annotated collection of Song documents which are of use to Koryŏ historiography. See *Ci quan Gaoliguo wangshi wangyi qiji huishu Songdazhaolingji 237 zhengshi 90 shiyi 10 Gaoli* 賜權知高麗國王事王徽起居回書 宋大詔令集 237 政事 90 四裔 10 高麗 in Chang Tongik 張東翼 (ed.), *Songdae Yŏsa charyo chimnok* 宋大麗史資料集錄 (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2000), pp. 206-212.

98 *Ch'oe Yunŭi ch'ŏ Kim-sshi myojimyŏng* 崔允儀妻金氏墓誌銘 (1152) in KMC 123: 4. This epitaph mentions Kim Yanggam as paternal grandfather and his rank as imperial (!) executive of the chancellery (*munha shirang p'yŏngjangsa* 門下侍郎平章事). The epitaph for Kim Ŭiwŏn 金義元, Yanggam's son, mentions his father's highest office as custodial acting grand protector, chancellor and supervising editor of the state history (*sudaebo munha shijung kamsu kuksa* 守太保門下侍中監修國史) See *Kim Ŭiwŏn myojimyŏng* (1153) in KMC 133: 5.

99 Even if Kim Yanggam did not write the *Records of Karak*, the fact remains that some high official during Munjong's reign from 1019 until 1083 did. The internal evidence dating the text to 1076 or 1077 is unambiguously convincing and there is no external evidence that contradicts this dating. As for the status of the governor of Kūmju, the local administrative unit of Kūmju (or Kimhae) was significant. Its port was pivotal in the trade with Japan and strategically it was important since it proved to be a popular target for pirates to attack. An entry from 1292 in the *Standard Koryŏ History* refers to the longstanding relations between Koryŏ and Japan in which Kimhae-guk 金海國 (Kaya 伽倻) had always played a crucial role. KS 30: 33a-b.

100 The sister of Kim Yushin married King Muryŏl 武烈王 of Shilla and gave birth to his children.

101 The absorptions of Kaya into Shilla and of Shilla into Koryŏ were not as peaceful as the official record portrays, but in this case that is not important. What matters here is the historiographical representation, rather than the historical truth of both events.

102 Kim Ch'anhyŏn 金昌賢, *Koryŏ Kaegyŏng-ŭi kujo-wa kŭ inyŏm* 고려개경의 구조와 그 이념 (Seoul: Shinsŏwŏn 新書院, 2002), p. 35.

Kūmgwan was an alternative name for Kaya or Karak.<sup>103</sup> The title was only awarded to princes of the blood.<sup>104</sup> Munjong, who fathered thirteen sons, invested them as dukes (*kong* 公) and marquises (*hu* 候), unless they had entered the Buddhist clergy, in which case they were granted high clerical positions and titles. His lay sons were invested with the following titles: Chosŏn hu 朝鮮候, Kyerim hu 鷄林候, Pyŏnhan hu 弁韓候, Puyŏ hu 扶餘候, Chinhan hu 辰韓候, Sangan kong 常安公, Nangnang hu 樂浪候 and Kūmgwan hu. Koryŏ claimed clear ancestral rights to the regions mentioned in these titles: Shilla (Kyerim), Pyŏnhan and Chinhan. Chosŏn and Sangan refer to regions under the control of the Liao dynasty at that time; Sangan (better known as Ch'ŏllyŏng-hyŏn 鐵嶺縣) was hotly contested territory.<sup>105</sup> Nangnang refers to P'yŏngyang and as such to uncontested Koryŏ territory, but the use of the geonym Nangnang here has connotations with the territory's former incarnation as a Han commandery, suggesting a possible claim on that ancient history. These particular titles were personal, in that they could not be transferred to heirs, but similar titles connected to these regions can be found throughout the Koryŏ dynasty.<sup>106</sup> It is plausible to assume, then, that the *Records of Karak* also claimed Kūmgwan or Kaya for Koryŏ. This use of the title *Kūmgwan hu* also puts in perspective the accepted beliefs about legitimation: apparently, there was more to historical succession than the Three Kingdoms. Koryŏ's main idea of historical succession was connected to the Samhan, which was in principle a more encompassing notion than any of those of the Three Kingdoms. The realization that Kaya was part of Koryŏ's history is also reflected in a eulogy for Kim Chinyang 金震陽, an important late Koryŏ official, written by Yi Sungin 李崇仁 (1349-1392). In it he describes a historical excursion undertaken by Kim Chinyang and a friend, with the explicit intention of reminiscing upon the peninsula's past, a tour of Koryŏ's *lieux de mémoire*.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>103</sup> KS 57: 8a.

<sup>104</sup> KS 9: 16b; KS 10: 7b; KS 10: 18a; KS 10: 27b; KS 88: 18b; KS 90: 17a-b. The relevant entries in the *Essentials of Koryŏ History* repeat the same information.

<sup>105</sup> After having been designated by Wang Kŏn as one of Koryŏ's border points, Ch'ŏllyŏng-hyŏn 鐵嶺縣 was fought over by Koryŏ and Liao, and later Jin. It was also the stake in a border dispute between Koryŏ and the Ming in the late fourteenth century. See KS 89: 27b.

<sup>106</sup> See for instance KS 61: 49b; KS 91: 1b-2a; KS 88: 29b; KMC 126: 8; KMC 214: 9-10; KMC 199: 33; KMC 477: 36; KMC 23: 42. Perhaps because many of his sons joined the Buddhist clergy, Munjong did not invest any one of them as Mahan hu 馬韓候. In fact, Mahan is decidedly underrepresented compared with the use of Chinhan and Pyŏnhan.

<sup>107</sup> Pierre Nora, *Les lieux de mémoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984-1992), 3 vols.

<sup>108</sup> KS 57: 8b.

<sup>109</sup> *Ch'okcha chŏn pyŏng ch'an* 草屋子傳并贊 in TMS 51: 21a-22a.

<sup>110</sup> The state had awarded the tomb of Suro land in order to pay for the yearly memorial services. The *Karakuk ki* records the death of a Koryŏ official who wanted to reduce the size of the land grant. His insensitivity with regard to the sanctity of Suro's tomb was rewarded with exhausting dreams in which vengeful ghosts haunted him. He died not much later, still haunted by ghosts.

They started at Kimhae, “the place where King Suro built his capital” and continued on to Hwangsan River 黃山江, the eastern border of Suro's state.<sup>108</sup> From there they went to Kyŏngju and various historical places associated with Shilla.<sup>109</sup> Evidently, by this time Kaya's heritage had been given a solid place in Koryŏ's past, next to that of Shilla.

Kaya's history also constituted a source of pride for Koryŏ. The fact that the kings of Kaya, Shilla and Koryŏ had always taken good care of the tomb of Suro was in itself a commendable fact, according to the *Records of Karak*. The fact, however, that the tomb of Suro had survived for close to nine centuries was something that was unequalled, even in China. Tang historian Xin Tifou 辛替否 had remarked that after a sufficiently long period of time countries disappeared without leaving any trace, but as Kim Yanggam proudly writes, in the case of Kaya and King Suro “his words are not to be believed.” It was not just the physical presence of the tomb that was important; Shilla King Munmu 文武王 (r. 661-681), who was descended, through his mother, from the royal house of Kaya, was praised for making sure that the ancestor worship rituals for Suro and his successors continued to be celebrated by the Shilla rulers. The above-mentioned, probably interpolated, temple inscription boasts an uninterrupted line of descent and the uninterrupted performance of ancestor worship rituals for Suro on the peninsula. While this has no basis in historical fact, it certainly indicates the significance attached to the idea of succession between the different states on the peninsula and the celebration of that succession. Through the continued celebration of memorial services at the tomb of King Suro in the Shilla and Koryŏ periods, it was publicly remembered that the Koryŏ ruler had succeeded this ancient king of the southernmost part of the peninsula.<sup>110</sup> T'aejo had, after all, formally succeeded the Shilla rulers, who, in their time, had admitted to their bloodline the heirs of the last Kaya king, who had surrendered to Shilla.

The *Records of Karak* was a historical work written under clear Confucian influences. The version contained in the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms* alerts us to this fact. The physical description of King Suro resembles that of the most famous Chinese emperors; heaven is called *hwangch'ŏn* 皇天 or Imperial Heaven; the traditional lull in tilling the land is used to build the royal palace, which was, for that matter, of modest proportions. However, while structurally the *Records of Karak* may have been compiled along Confucian guidelines, this did not entail a revision of the contents. One conspicuous characteristic of the text is the fact that it often uses imperial designations with regard to its royal protagonists. King Suro, for instance, refers to himself using the imperial personal pronoun *chim* 朕 and the demise of kings and queens is described as *pung* 崩. The way both of these terms are used is imperial and was maintained by the compiler of the text. Buddhist elements are also maintained: Suro's wife, for example, came from the ancient Indian kingdom of Ayodhyā, the place where King Asoka was said to have lived. Mythical elements are also recorded without further comment. The magical battle between the king of Kaya and T'arhae-wang 脫解王 is related without removing or downplaying the importance of magic.<sup>111</sup>

The maintenance of incongruous and perhaps implausible elements within a more or less Confucian structure was also typical of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* (the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* is quoted on the last page of the *Records of Karak*).<sup>112</sup> Like the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms*, the *Records of Karak* is not 'mythical'; it merely recorded the available history and myths and did so in a Confucian and well-established historiographical format. The compilation of the *Records of Karak* is another expression of the strength of the Confucian historiographical tradition in Koryŏ. It also reinforces the idea of peninsular territorial belonging through a succession of ruling houses, the notion of peninsular interstate succession and the incorporation of regional histories and myth into the history of Koryŏ. It is not coincidental that the *Records of Karak* was compiled during the reign of Munjong. Under Munjong, Koryŏ was perhaps at the apex of cultural and diplomatic self-confidence; also under

Munjong, the unruly counties were forcibly drawn into the central bureaucracy. Attention to local history and myth and the absorption of these elements into the history of the larger community, then, were both necessary and to be expected.

#### P'YŎNNYŎN T'ONGJAE AND THE SOK P'YŎNNYŎN T'ONGJAE

Munjong's reign is often described as the golden age of Koryŏ, when it was at the peak of its power, both internationally and creatively. The reign of Yejong (1079-1105-1122) is, if not precisely equal to that of Munjong, at least an undisputed second in terms of cultural and intellectual achievements. Closely connected to the cultural and intellectual developments of this time was the compilation of a historical work which was, according to the communis opinio in Korean historiography, entitled *Further Chronological Annals* (*Sok p'yŏnnyŏn t'ongjae* 續編年通載).<sup>113</sup> Judging from the title, it was considered to be the successor volume to the *Chronological Annals* (*P'yŏnnyŏn t'ongjae* 編年通載), about which nothing is known, at least with regard to Koryŏ. There is, however, a work from the Song dynasty with that title. Compiled by the Song scholar Zhang Heng 章衡, it recorded the genealogy of the Song imperial family and the history of the Song dynasty. According to the leading interpretation by scholars of Korean historiography, Yejong is said to have been touched after reading the Koryŏ version of the *Chronological Annals* and to have ordered Hong Kwan 洪灌 (d.u., flourished late eleventh to early twelfth century) to compile a similar volume which would contain the history of the peninsula from the Samhan on.<sup>114</sup>

There are some very compelling reasons to doubt whether there ever was a Koryŏ *Chronological Annals* and these must be removed before we can proceed with a discussion of the *Chronological Annals*. The original entry in the *Standard Koryŏ History* does not mention that there was a book of that name in Koryŏ; it merely recorded that after he had read the *Chronological Annals*, Yejong wanted Hong Kwan to compile a history of the peninsula. This entry is found in the *Standard Koryŏ History* biography of Hong Kwan. The entry in the *Essentials of Koryŏ History*

<sup>111</sup> SGYS 2: 243-255.

<sup>112</sup> SGYS 2: 255.

<sup>113</sup> Chŏng Kubŏk, *Han'guk chungse sahaaksa*, pp. 67; Pak Hannam, "P'yŏnnyŏn t'ongnok-kwa kit'a sasŏ-ŭi p'yŏnch'an," p. 175-180.

<sup>114</sup> KS 121: 9b. According to Chŏng Kubok, Samhan here refers to the Three Kingdoms, but there is no reason to suppose that is indeed the case. As has been amply shown, Koryŏ ultimately traced its ancestry back to the Three Han, rather than to the Three Kingdoms. A history book dealing with the history of the peninsula since the Three Han would make excellent sense then, and any mention of it can be taken at face value. See Chŏng Kubŏk, *Han'guk chungse sahaaksa*, p. 67.

that contains the same information mentions a *sokpyŏn* 續編, a successor volume, which is probably the reason why it has been thought that a Koryŏ *Chronological Annals* had been compiled.<sup>115</sup>

There are three reasons to doubt the existence of the *Chronological Annals* in Koryŏ. The first reason is the original entry in the *Standard Koryŏ History*, which does not mention that Hong Kwan was supposed to compile a successor volume. The second reason is that, apart from the entries mentioned above, none of the extant sources mention the *Chronological Annals*. These reasons are, nevertheless, not compelling enough to suppose that there was no Koryŏ *Chronological Annals*: the *Essentials of Koryŏ History* often complements information in the *Standard Koryŏ History*, and the fragmentary nature of the extant sources on Koryŏ makes it impossible to exclude the possibility of entries on the compilation of the *Chronological Annals* having been lost. The third and most important reason is, however, that it is entirely implausible to suppose the existence of a Koryŏ historical work called the *Chronological Annals*.

The background against which the compilation of the supposed successor volume of the *Chronological Annals* took place was characterized by a sudden and unprecedented influx of Song culture. Over a period of two years between 1114 and 1116, the Koryŏ court received the newly composed Song ritual music (*taesŏngak* 大晟樂) as a gift from the Song emperor. The scale of this gift was unmatched: over 600 musical instruments, dozens of scores and ritual books, ritual paraphernalia and implements, and even trained musicians entered Koryŏ between 1114 and 1116.<sup>116</sup> Two Koryŏ diplomatic missions – the first led by An Chikung 安稷崇 (1066-1135) in 1114 and the second by Wang Chaji 王字之 (1066-1122) and Mun Kongmi 文公仁 (d.u., fl. late eleventh/early twelfth century) – had been sent to Song China with the explicit intent of obtaining the new ritual music of the Song. The introduction of *taesŏngak* in Koryŏ was of great cultural importance: by performing Song Confucian ritual music in the Koryŏ context, the initial Chinese orientation was first subverted and then mobilized to serve the Koryŏ state.<sup>117</sup> Precisely in this period, in 1116, Yejong ordered Hong Kwan to compile a history of the peninsula from the

Three Han on. It is well known that culture in its diverse manifestations blossomed during Yejong's reign and as such it is entirely plausible that Yejong ordered a history to be compiled; after all, Yejong himself was reported to have said, in a text written by Kim Injon 金仁存 and engraved in stone by none other than Hong Kwan, who was also famous for his calligraphy, "now that the warfare and fighting at the three borders has ceased [Koryŏ] has achieved a unified culture that is equal to that of China."<sup>118</sup> But with regard to the compilation of a successor volume to a Koryŏ history called *Chronological Annals*, there remains doubt. It is not very plausible to posit the compilation of a successor volume, when this supposed successor volume started with the history of the Three Han. Koryŏ's historians credited Koryŏ with a long history, but not to such an extent that it predated the Three Han. There are no internal reasons, then, to suppose that a Koryŏ version of the Song *Chronological Annals* (*Biannian tongzai* 編年通載) was compiled before Yejong's edict. In external terms, however, the Song gift of *taesŏngak* suggests a motive, I would argue, for the compilation of the Koryŏ *Chronological Annals*.

The most important reason for the Song emperor to bestow such a dazzling gift upon Koryŏ, admittedly less than a loyal friend of the Song, lay in the fact that the ritual *taesŏngak* music effectively proclaimed the virtue of the Song as few other things could. I have dealt with the introduction of Song ritual music elsewhere,<sup>119</sup> but suffice it to say here that *taesŏngak* sung the praises of the Song and as such was also attractive to Koryŏ, for it could be successfully adapted to extol Koryŏ. In this context, and judging by the date of Yejong's instruction to Hong Kwan, it is very plausible that he ordered Hong Kwan to compile a Koryŏ history in the same vein as the Song *Biannian tongzai*, which recorded the genealogy of the Song imperial family. It is eminently plausible, even to be expected, that a copy of the Song imperial genealogy found its way to Koryŏ with one of the two embassies carrying the gifts of *taesŏngak*. The purposes of the gift of *taesŏngak* and of the *Biannian tongzai* would be identical, after all: they both lauded the Song imperial house. Moreover, the book would have been read by Hong Kwan while he served as Koryŏ envoy to the Song.<sup>120</sup> Koryŏ scholars that served

<sup>115</sup> KSC 8: 18a.

<sup>116</sup> KS 70: 5b-9a. Also see TMS 35: 19b-21a. Im Chon, *Sa hŏsŏp taesŏngak p'yo* 謝許習大晟樂表. The imperial gift of Song ritual music, instruments, scores, ritual books, and so forth has never been surpassed in scale. See TMS 34: 18a-19b. Also see KS 70: 28a-b; KS 13: 33b; KS 70: 28a-b.

<sup>117</sup> See Remco E. Breuker, "Listening to the Beat of Different Drums: Ideology, Ritual and Music in Koryŏ," *Review of Korean Studies* 7.4 (2004): pp. 147-174.

<sup>118</sup> KS 96: 9b.

<sup>119</sup> Breuker, "Listening to the Beat of Different Drums," pp. 147-174.



on embassies to the Song imperial court were famous for their hunger for Chinese books. Seen in this light, then, it is highly probable that the entry in the *Essentials of Koryŏ History* mistakenly refers to a successor volume. In fact, Hong Kwan was trying to compile a Koryŏ history along the lines of the Song *Biannian tongzai*.

The compilation of the *Chronological Annals* was headed by Hong Kwan. He had at his disposal some of the finest scholars of the period: Yi Kwe 李軌, Hŏ Chigi 許之奇, Pak Sŏngjung 朴昇中, Kim Puil 金富侁 and Yun Hae 尹諧. Hong Kwan was at that time scholar at the Pavilion of Precious Learning (*Pomun'gak haksa* 寶文閣學士) and one of the most respected scholars of his day. Seven generations later, his descendants still took pride in his accomplishments and reputation.<sup>121</sup> He was famous both for his learning and for his calligraphy. A student of the style of the famous Shilla calligrapher Kim Saeng 金生 (711-799), Hong did the calligraphy on the plaques of the Pomun'gak, Ch'ŏngyŏn'gak, Pojŏnhwa-ru 寶殿畫樓 (Treasure Hall Painted Pavilion) and the Chipsangiŏn 集祥殿 (Hall of the Assembled Auspicious Signs), the actual working space of the ruler.<sup>122</sup>

As mentioned above, the Song *Biannian tongzai* 編年通載 dealt with the genealogy of the Song imperial house. As such, it was closely connected to the imperial ancestor worship rituals. This connection is, among other things, borne out by the role its compiler Zhang Heng 章衡 had in the debates surrounding the proper ritual line of succession of the Song imperial line.<sup>123</sup> The connection is

also another clue to understanding Yejong's concern for the compilation of Koryŏ's *Chronological Annals*. In addition, it is connected to the introduction of the Song ritual music in the same years. In order to understand this not very obvious relation, it is necessary to look at the royal/imperial ancestral shrines in Koryŏ.<sup>124</sup>

The royal/imperial ancestral shrines were a focal point of Koryŏ state and society. This is shown, for instance, by the fact that the newly introduced Song ritual music was first performed at these shrines, which served as focal points of both the state and the royal/imperial family.<sup>125</sup> The former rulers were enshrined there together with their most trusted ministers, embodying their indispensable symbiosis.<sup>126</sup> The importance of the ancestral shrines increased during the reigns of Sukchong, Yejong and Injong due to the fact that patrilineal succession to the throne had become normal by this period.<sup>127</sup> The increasingly heated power struggle between the great lineages and the royal/imperial house also underlined the central position of the ancestral shrines in Koryŏ's state structure.<sup>128</sup> Although separate shrines for Koryŏ's deceased rulers had existed from the beginning of the dynasty, the Koryŏ ancestral shrines according to the Chinese model were only established during the reign of Sŏngjong in 992.<sup>129</sup>

The royal/imperial ancestral shrines were a sacred place, rivalled by few other locations. They accommodated the tablets of former Koryŏ rulers, which gave the shrines their sacred character, but politically they were

<sup>120</sup>SGSG 48: 458. In the short biography of Kim Saeng 金生 in the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*, it is mentioned that Hong Kwan went as a member of an embassy to the Song capital sometime between 1102 and 1106. He had taken with him an example of the calligraphy of Shilla master Kim Saeng, which elicited an enthusiastic response from Song scholars. The embassy with which Hong Kwan went to the Song was not an official one. During this period the relations with the Song were unilaterally unofficial. Although the Song court frequently sent official ambassadors to Koryŏ, Koryŏ responded by sending unofficial envoys.

<sup>121</sup>Pak Chŏnji ch'ŏ Ch'oe-sshi myojimyŏng 朴全之妻崔氏墓誌銘 in *KMC* 432: 8, *KMC* 434: 3.

<sup>122</sup>KS 11: 35b; KS 12: 2a.

<sup>123</sup>SS 106: 10b-11a; SS 107: 10a.

<sup>124</sup>Koryŏ possessed a dual royal-imperial system, according to which the ruler was both king and emperor. Symbols and language connected to kingship and emperorship were used simultaneously and interchangeably, or they depended on the occasion. The ancestral shrines also possess characteristics of both systems. See Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, pp. 147-194.

<sup>125</sup>KS 70: 5b-9a; KS 70: 28a-b; KS 13: 33b.

<sup>126</sup>Due to Koryŏ's complicated indigenous kinship system, many and frequent problems arose in the arrangement of the ancestral tablets. Chinese ritual regulations stipulated that the fathers should be put on the one side and their sons on the other side, and so on. In Koryŏ, where succession to the throne by a brother was quite common for a long period, this system could not be adopted as it was. For an excellent description and analysis of this issue and the debates it gave rise to, see Martina Deuchler, *The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology* (Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series 36. Cambridge: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies.), pp. 29-87.

<sup>127</sup>Ch'oe Sun'gwŏn 崔順權, "Koryŏ chŏn'gi omyoje-ŭi yŏn'gu 高麗前期 五廟制의 研究," reprinted in *Koryŏ T'aemyo ŭirye yŏn'gu nonjip* 高麗 太廟 儀禮 研究 論集 (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa 경인문화사, 2002), pp. 79-111, esp. pp. 80-85. The ancestral shrines figured prominently in the daily life of the Koryŏ royal/imperial family and state officials. The tablets belonging to the deceased rulers were ceremoniously kept informed of all important official events. Military campaigns, royal/imperial marriages, the designation of an heir apparent, the coronation of a king: all important events pertaining to the state and the royal/imperial house were officially passed on to the ancestral spirits. The Ritual Section of the *Standard Koryŏ History* detailed descriptions of the instances when the deceased rulers enshrined in the ancestral shrines had to be informed of what was about to happen. These are too numerous to include here. Moreover, the most important state rituals included an additional ceremony at the ancestral shrines. See *KS* 67: 35a-b; *KS* 68: 22a-23b.

<sup>128</sup>For a further exploration of this issue see Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, pp. 147-194.

also of paramount importance. Sŏngjong's establishment of the ancestral shrines had transformed the Wang lineage's ancestor worship from essentially a family affair into a state affair and the direct father-to-son succession after Sukchong cemented the status of ancestral shrines.<sup>130</sup> They furnished a strong source of political legitimation, a visual and tangible representation of Koryŏ's past and, through the rituals, prayers and prophecies that took place there, also of its future.

The connection between *taesŏngak* and the royal/imperial family and ritual music is revealed in an anecdote recorded in Kim Pushik's biography in the *Standard Koryŏ History*:

*In 1124, when the king had posthumously ennobled the late grandfather of Yi Chagyŏm 李資謙, Pak Sŏngjung, in an attempt to curry favour with Yi, requested that court music be played when Yi visited the tomb of his grandfather [to ceremonially inform him]. Kim Pushik reacted with the following words: "Music is played at the royal/imperial ancestral shrines, for it symbolizes life. But in the case of a tomb, how can music be performed when [the mourner] is wearing white clothes [of mourning], and performing the rites and wailing?"*<sup>131</sup>

Kim Pushik's antagonism towards Yi Chagyŏm (who had in effect usurped the power of the ruler, Injong, who was both his son-in-law and grandson) is well-known, as are the ideological objections he voiced against this infringement of royal power.<sup>132</sup> Here, Kim relies on the intrinsic sanctity of ritual music, as described by the Confucian classics and developed during the Tang and Song dynasties.<sup>133</sup> The way Kim phrased it in the above quotation suggests that court music could not be played at tombs, but in fact it could as long as they were royal tombs. What Kim protests against is the usurpation of royal music by

Yi Chagyŏm. Ritual music, then, was not something to be regarded lightly, especially not in connection with the ancestral shrines which symbolized royal power. Because of its ritual importance, the performance of ritual music could become a formidable political weapon.<sup>134</sup> The emperor's gift, his new Confucian ritual music, should first and foremost – though not exclusively – be performed at the royal/imperial ancestral shrines, an opinion that the Song emperor shared with Yejong. Royal power received prestigious support by accepting this imperial gift. The performances at their ancestral shrines were intended to further strengthen the royal/imperial house as the focal point of the Koryŏ state; *taesŏngak* was certainly not intended for use at the tombs of the powerful families, such as the Kyŏngwŏn Yi 慶源李 lineage to which Yi Chagyŏm belonged.

The ideological aspects of the introduction of *taesŏngak* are revealed in their connection with the ancestral shrines. In this context, *taesŏngak* ceased to be about the celebration of the cultural achievements of the Song dynasty and became the celebration of Koryŏ, its ruler, its history and its people. Introducing the prestigious Song ritual music in this environment evidently harnessed Song music for this purpose, instead of the other way round. It may be argued that Koryŏ's attempt at legitimation by seeking recognition from the Chinese Son of Heaven, while at the same constructing a (conceivably even more important) domestic counterpart and relying on indigenous (or indigenized) concepts and beliefs, is mirrored in the way it tried to use *taesŏngak*, indigenous music (*hyangak*) and Koryŏnized Chinese music (*tangak*) in its essential rituals.

The order to compile a Koryŏ version of the *Biannian tongzai* should be seen against this background of enhancing royal power, building Koryŏ prestige and affirming its ontological status, hunger for learning, maintaining unof-

<sup>129</sup>On the *kyŏngshin* day, the king promulgated the following edict: 'As for the basis of the country, the ancestral shrine comes first. For that reason, there has never been an emperor that has not added to the halls, built palaces for the tablets, arranged the tablets with the fathers on the right and the sons on the left and held three-yearly and five-yearly memorial services. It has been several generations since our dynasty responded to its destiny and was founded, but there have not yet been memorial services in the ancestral shrines.' See *KS* 3:24b-25a.

<sup>130</sup>Ch'oe Sun'gwŏn, "Koryŏ chŏn'gi omyoje-ŭi yŏn'gu", pp. 79-111.

<sup>131</sup>*KS* 98: 3a.

<sup>132</sup>Shultz, "Kim Pushik-kwa *Samguk sagi*," pp. 1-20.

<sup>133</sup>Keith L. Pratt, "Music as Factor in Sung-Koryŏ Diplomatic Relations, 1069-1126," *T'oung Pao* 62.4-5 (1976): pp. 199-218; idem, "Sung Hui Tsung's Musical Diplomacy and the Korean Response," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 44.3 (1981): pp. 509-521.

<sup>134</sup>A letter of gratitude to the Song emperor from Kim Pushik's older brother Puil, in recognition of the extraordinarily generous gift of instruments, ritual paraphernalia and music, confirms the enormous ritual significance of *taesŏngak* as follows: "Through the mysterious words of the music, you have illuminated the melodies of the sacrificial ceremony. Through the illustrations on the covers of the books, you have taught us how to play. Embarrassed by these extraordinary gifts, I am aware of the difficulty of responding appropriately. How could [this music] only be used to comfort [the spirits of] our ancestors? It will influence later generations and extend to our grandchildren." See *TMS* 34: 19a-b. By chastising Yi Chagyŏm, then the most powerful man in Koryŏ, with the ritual implications of *taesŏngak*, Kim Pushik showed how ritual significance could be turned into a political weapon.

ficial contacts with the Song and an earnest desire to possess ritual music, the efficacy of which – when properly performed – was in no doubt. Histories of Koryŏ existed during this period, but none that dealt more or less exclusively with the ruling Wang house. The only extant Wang genealogy, the *Chronological Annals*, has been incorporated into the *Standard Koryŏ History*; this work is a product of the late twelfth century though, and is itself probably based upon the Koryŏ *Chronological Annals*, hence the similarity in name. The need for a written genealogy that established and sanctified the descent of the Koryŏ rulers was both a domestic necessity, because of the encroachments on royal power perpetrated by the great lineages, and an internationally necessary symbolic act that reaffirmed the ontological position of the Koryŏ ruler vis-à-vis other rulers. Most important, however, is the fact that the compilation of the genealogy against this background signalled Koryŏ's complicated and ambiguous relationship with Song China. It was both a witness to Song China's cultural achievements and a statement of Koryŏ's equality. There was no reason why Koryŏ should not possess the same kind of genealogy as the Song imperial house. At the same time, however, Song culture set the standards that Koryŏ scholars felt themselves to be equal to.

### EARLY KORYŎ HISTORIOGRAPHY IN PERSPECTIVE

The undertaking of writing history in Koryŏ had various dimensions. Perhaps its most striking characteristic is its emulation of Chinese examples. Koryŏ's history was written in classical Chinese, only rarely contained parts in native methods of transcription such as *idu* 吏讀 or *hyangch'al* 鄉札, and clearly aspired to follow the best examples Chinese historiography had to offer. The education of the literati who wrote the histories was of course largely based on the body of Sinitic cultural resources available to Koryŏ and as such, the influence of Chinese historiography was inevitable. The influences drawn from shared cultural resources were not limited to language and form. The reason for writing (and reading) history was also adopted from continental examples: contents were explicitly moralizing and were expected to have direct relevance to the present of practical engagement. The royal lectures, given by lecturers who were statesmen-cum-state historians, are a case in point. This Sinitic dimension was offset by the distinct peninsular character of the historical writings produced in the Koryŏ

dynasty. The known universe was recentred with Koryŏ at its core. A decidedly peninsular outlook and identity were thus codified in a universally accepted form of expression, by tapping into the body of cultural resources that was shared by the Song, Liao, Jin and Koryŏ. Koryŏ historians in effect tried to prove to the Song, and to a lesser extent to Liao and Jin, that they were as adept at building a civilized state based upon universally accepted principles as the Song (or Liao and Jin) were.

An important, yet often overlooked, characteristic of Koryŏ historiography is that from its inception the historiographical tradition in Koryŏ was Confucian. Even the much-fabled *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* was written according to Confucian standards. The mythical stories and native lore contained in the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms* – and, it should be mentioned, in the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* – were recorded more or less as they were, but within a framework that relied on the example of the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. In the latter case this has been exhaustively noted, while in the former it has been consistently ignored by modern scholarship.

Seen from a peninsular perspective, Koryŏ historiography reveals much with regard to Koryŏ identity. Koryŏ traced its historical legitimacy and descent back to the Three Han. The scrutiny of Koryŏ historical works in this article bears out that idea. The notion of plural descent is conspicuously present in all remaining contemporary writings on Koryŏ history, incorporating but not obliterating other readings of the past. Once the veil of exclusive historical successionism is lifted (be it Shilla, Paekche or Koguryŏ), it is possible to contemplate the significance of the titles of the *Old History of the Three Kingdoms* and the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* and to be guided, when considering their contents, by the contemporary issues that such histories were supposed to deal with. The Three Kingdoms functioned as charter states for Koryŏ; not completely and not all of the time, but according to necessity and as demanded by political expediency.

The peninsular orientation of Koryŏ historiography and the Sinitic format it adopted should also give ample food for thought with regard to the often implicitly assumed idea that peninsular autonomy and adherence to Sinitic cultural resources are somehow opposites. The very existence of historical works such as the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms* should dismantle such an idea. This article not only shows how Koryŏ scholars drew upon the resources of Sinitic culture, but also how they internalized these

achievements and made them fit their own situation. The distinct and strong presence of a pluralist Weltanschauung in the *Histories of the Three Kingdoms*, which allowed three different perceptions of Koryŏ's pasts, was a direct result of the application of Sinitic historiographical ideals to the peninsular situation. Historians such as Kim Pushik acknowledged the complicated historical descent of the peninsula and its contradictions and ambiguities, but codified it in the form of an official state history in the Sinitic vein. History as such (written according to the classical adage 'do not invent facts, write them down' *pulchak isul* 不作而述) took precedence over ideology. The actual pasts of the peninsula were more important than a unified and idealized version of it, but history was simultaneously thought to have a strong moral component, which took ultimate precedence. The moral was distilled from what had happened historically; not from what should have happened. Obviously, ideology played a decisive role in the development of Koryŏ historiography: it was fundamental to it, to its conception, its practical elaboration and the way it was used. Nonetheless, the compilers of histories consciously distanced themselves from the demands of the Sinitic historiographical ideal in order to record the history of the peninsula (when, for example, Kim Pushik incorporated three different basic annals in one history; a clear breach of accepted Sinitic precedent). Ideology, then, only came to bear on history again after the facts had been written and interpretations – for example in the form of a commentary – needed to be made. It certainly returned in full force when the histories were used in the manner in which they had been intended: as guides for behaviour in the present of practical engagement. In this manner, an intricate interplay between history, politics and ideas came into being, in which everything influenced everything else.

Historiographically, the Koryŏ period is distinguished by a strong awareness of the symbiotic relationship between politics and historiography. In other words: between a reality of practical engagement and its past. This is a similarity it shares with traditional Chinese historiography. Koryŏ state historiography occupied a much larger field of historiographical production than is usually acknowledged, as it also was a field where different players and notions interacted, creating a web of variations of and even contradictions of the norm. This phenomenon is directly related to the pluralist orientation of Koryŏ society. Koryŏ state historiography was based

on sound, time-tested and empirically solid methods and anchored in authoritative source materials, but was also surrounded by informal, intuitive, often fluid and highly contextual understandings of Koryŏ realities, which related directly to contemporary issues debated outside the field of historiography. Even more so than in its formal structure that was geared to use the past to instruct the present, it is in this informal layer that Koryŏ historiography utilized present realities to compose meaningful narratives of the past, distilled from a background repository of historical concepts and facts that all Koryŏ literati had access to. The temporal distance to the Koryŏ state and the classical Chinese in which history was written have wrongfully created a stilted image of Koryŏ historiography. However, the notion that all historical writing is also a social practice demonstrates how traditional historiography is qualitatively close to contemporary historiography and merely different in context.

Worthy of note in this regard is the consistent tone of balanced realism that is found in Koryŏ historical writings from Ch'oe Sŭngno to Kim Pushik. The acknowledgement of conflicting realities, their codification even, certainly exercised a formative influence upon the practical view of reality in Koryŏ histories. This view of reality was based on the peninsular realities people had to deal with, which were complicated, ambiguous and imprecise. Despite the inevitable choices the historian must make with regard to what to record and what to omit and with regard to some equally unavoidable alterations, cosmetic interventions and the like, the views on the historical reality expressed in Koryŏ historical works are, perhaps surprisingly, not uniform, often contradictory and strongly focused on historical contingency. As such, Koryŏ historiography exercised a strong influence upon the formation and development of Koryŏ ideologies and the mythomoteurs associated with these, while being exposed to their influence at the same time. To the extent that Koryŏ historiography codified the shared memories of the past, it provided the foundations for the varied ideas that developed with regard to Koryŏ's future.

# Kaibara Ekiken's preface to Chingbirok

A JAPANESE EDITION OF THE BOOK OF CORRECTIONS

As a rule, the Japanese of the Edo Period tended to regard the exploits of Japan's armies in Korea as glorious history. The blurb that the bookshop Izumoji Shōhakudō 出雲寺松柏堂 composed for its four-volume Japanese edition of *Chingbirok* 懲悛錄 (1695) is telling evidence. "The retired *kanpaku* Toyo[tomi Hideyoshi 關白豊臣秀吉]," it says,

*"was an great man and an unparalleled hero. He thought big, and his deeds were grandiose and as resplendent as sun and moon. In this book it is described how he sent the skilled generals under his banner to Korea, how he subjected the numerous commanders of that country, and how it submitted to our court. It gives a true account of these events in Chinese, and is an extraordinary book, famed throughout the world."*

The phrase, here de-italicized, that is used to describe Hideyoshi's matchless character is a literal quote from *History of the Jin Dynasty (Jin Shu 晉書)*, where it describes the founder of the Later Zhao Dynasty 後趙, Shi Le 石勒 (reigned 319-333). Strictly speaking, this negates the point the writer of the blurb was trying to make, but on the whole, Hideyoshi and his commanders enjoyed an excellent repute during the Edo Period (1600-1868). Some people even used his name to voice their opposition to the Tokugawa *bakufu*, and the *bakufu* regularly prohibited the publication of prints of Hideyoshi and his commanders, and of books that were too lavish in their praise of them.

Kaibara Ekiken 貝原益軒, the scholar who was asked

to write the preface of the Japanese edition of *Chingbirok*, was an exception. He was not swayed by easy chauvinist sentiments, nor was he tempted by the possibility to make covert criticism of the *bakufu*. He could have been tempted, for one of the former *daimyō* of the fief he served (the Kuroda 黒田 fief of Fukuoka) had been an important commander at the time of the first invasion, and Ekiken had written extensively about his exploits in *History of the House Kuroda (Kuroda kafu 黒田家譜)* that he had composed. In this preface, however, there is no trace of any lingering sympathy with Japan's invasion of the continent. He condemns it in no uncertain terms.

*"The Commentary states that there are five kinds of war. It distinguishes Righteous War, Reactive War, Covetous War, Arrogant War, and Rancorous War. Of these five, Righteous and Reactive Wars are the kinds of war in which a gentleman will engage himself."*

This is how the Preface begins. The "Commentary" Ekiken quotes is something of a riddle. The text comes closest to the minor Taoist classic *Wenzi* 文子,<sup>1</sup> but is not quite identical. The sense, however, is simple: the only kinds of war with which a gentleman would want to associate himself are wars he has to fight because he is duty-bound to fight them, and wars to defend himself against aggression. Wars fought for such disreputable motives as gain, lust for power, or grudges are out of bounds for decent people.

Ekiken continues:

1 *Wenzi*, Chapter *Jiu shou*, *Daode* 10.

*“The Commentary also states that countries that love war are sure to perish, even though they are large, and that countries that forget about war are sure to be in danger, even though the empire is at peace. How could one fail to be cautioned by the words ‘love’ and ‘forget!’”*

This time, Ekiken quotes the “Commentary” correctly, but his source is a less than obvious military classic, entitled *Sima’s Method* (*Sima fa* 司馬法).<sup>2</sup> The sense of the second part is the same as of the Roman adage “If you want peace, prepare for war.”

The authoritative texts have been quoted; now follows the application:

*“When formerly the Toyotomi campaigned against Korea, they indulged in a war of greed, of arrogance, and of rancour. It cannot possibly be regarded as a righteous war. Neither was it a war that was forced on them. It was a case of loving war. The Way of Heaven hated what they did, and it was only logical that they perished in the end.”*

It is always good to know that the villain got his just desert. The Toyotomi perished in 1615, when Hideyoshi’s son Hideyori 秀頼 was attacked by the Tokugawa 德川 and died in the flames of his castle in Osaka. The Way of Heaven sometimes punished, not the culprit himself, but his descendants, and Ekiken was not the only one to lay a link between the invasion of Korea and the ignominious fall of the House Toyotomi. The Koreans themselves were also to blame, however:

*“The Koreans were fragile and weak; their defeat was quick, like the breaking of tiles or a mountain slide. It had to do with a lack of basic education, and erroneous views on protection and defence. Therefore they could not deploy their soldiers in reaction to the Japanese attack. In the words of the foregoing quotation, theirs was a case of having forgotten about war.”*

It is not quite clear to me what Ekiken is thinking of when he says that the Koreans “lacked basic education.” Does he mean training in the military arts? That would hardly fall within the scope of *kyōyō* 教養. More probably he

means something like knowledge of the world, or the failure to heed the lesson of *Sima’s Method*. On the other hand, “erroneous views on defence” is clear. When the invasions began, the Korean army was spread out evenly over the whole country, and there existed no central, national command. In times of peace, this is the way to keep the military small and compliant to civil rule, but it is not the way to stop an invasion.

*“Alas! This was the cause that the Korean state was in grave danger of losing its vigour and nearly perished.”*

It is strange that Ekiken uses the word “the vigour of the state,” where one would expect a word like “fate” or “future.” The character 勢 is always a problem. Does he here use it to denote the basic drive and energy that make Korea viable as a nation? Or does he mean 國勢 in the modern sense of “the strength of the country, i.e., its people, crafts, industry?”

“It is only right,” Ekiken continues, that

*“Minister Yu 柳成龍 composed Chingbirok. The sense of the title is that later carts are warned by earlier carts that have overturned.”*

The title is an erudite reference to a poem in the *Book of Odes* (*Shijing* 詩經): “I have been chastised, and will guard against future calamities.” The italicized words correspond to the two first characters of the title.<sup>3</sup> The poet has been stung by a wasp through his own fault, and is determined not to let it happen again, but he also envies the birds that can fly away, while he is earth-bound, and unable to cope with the problems of his house. In more sense than one, the poem is applicable to the situation of someone like Yu, who was one of the major dignitaries at the Korean court during the wars, and not only held some measure of responsibility for what had happened, but was also faced with the formidable task of rebuilding Korea after the Japanese withdrawal.

Ekiken does not dwell on this point, however, but proceeds to praise the book itself:

*“The book is an excellent summary of the main facts, and its choice of words is simple and direct. It cannot*

<sup>2</sup> *Sima fa*, Renben 2.

<sup>3</sup> It is ode 289; translation according to B. Karlgren, *Book of Odes*, pp. 249-250.

<sup>4</sup> 翻靡：谓以词藻华丽竞胜。唐韩愈《送陈秀才彤序》：“读书以为学，纘言以为文，非以夸多而翻靡也。”

*be compared to usual writings on the subject, which contain many boasts and empty rhetoric.<sup>4</sup> Those who discuss the war (senbatsu 戦伐) in Korea should take this book as their reliable base (tekkyo = tashika na yoridokoro). Other books, such as Chōsen seibatsu ki 朝鮮征伐記, even though they are written in Japanese script, still may supply some corroborative evidence. These two books can truly be called veritable records."*

*wood, and when it was finished, they asked me to supply a preface. I heartily approved of this book being circulated through the world. Therefore, I took my cue from the intention with which the author had composed these fascicles and discussed it, with this result. My only fear is that I shall be ridiculed by most scholars."*

The book is well written and its author has made an intelligent selection of the main facts. It should become the norm for all future writers on the wars. "Norm," if we go by the characters, means both the target to strive for, and a base to start from. Ekiken allows for only one other book that can compare with *Chingbirok*, and that is *A Record of the Korean Campaigns* (*Chōsen seibatsu ki*).

It is interesting to see how Ekiken introduces this text: "It is written in Japanese, but still reliable." This value judgment echoes the one in the blurb, where it is emphasized that *Chingbirok* was written in Chinese. For the Japanese of the Edo Period, Truth came in Chinese characters. It had to be stressed, therefore, that *A Record of the Korean Campaigns* did supply additional facts, and that it could lay claim to the designation "veritable record." Of course, neither of the two books was a "veritable record" in the strict sense, for in the strict sense the words refer to a record of the *faits et gestes* of an emperor, compiled by officials after his death or abdication. Ekiken's rather loose use of the term is an example of the inveterate East-Asian tendency to look at the individual characters of a binome and deduct from these the meaning of the combination. He emphasizes this by inserting the character *dan*, "sincerely, truly": "Not what conventionally is called Veritable Record, but something that really gives a true account of the facts."

It is surprising that Ekiken had such a high opinion of *A Record of the Korean Campaigns*. Having been printed in 1659, it was one of the few accounts of the invasions that was available in print at the time. Its author, Hori Kyōan 堀杏菴, did his best to verify some of his facts, and he relied, I assume, heavily on the information he received orally when he served the Asano 淺野 in Wakayama 和歌山, but "reliable" is not a word that leaps to mind when one reads the text.

*"Recently I happened to live in the capital as a guest. People of the bookshop had this book cut in catalpa*





Illustration from the 1659 edition from the Chosen seibatsu ki



## THE LEIDEN COPY OF CHINGBIROK: BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

The printer's colophon is dated Genroku 8, which corresponds to 1695, but it is unlikely that a book printed in 1695 had been lying around at least 130 years until it was finally bought. The printer is given as Yamatoya Ihei 大和屋伊兵衛, with the additional remark "copied from a printed book" (?) 写板. The advertisements, however, that are pasted on the inside of the back cover of all four volumes, exclusively carry titles of Izumoji Shōhakudō 出雲寺松柏堂. When one tries to date these titles on the basis of *Kokusho sōmoku roku* and similar bibliographical aids, it can be established that a number of them were first printed in the An'ei, Tenmei, and Kansei periods (1772-1803), while the most recent one is from Ansei 5 (1858), though that may be a special case.

Izumoji was an ancient printing and publishing shop, originally set up in Kyoto. It branched out to Edo in the 1650s, and had become one of the three official purveyors of books to the *bakufu* (*goshomotsushi* 御書物師) by the early eighteenth century.<sup>1</sup> The advertisements in *Chingbirok* all prefix the name with "(Kokugaku) Goshomotsudokoro" (国学) 御書物所, and give an address in Kyoto (Sakai-chō, Sanjō-dōri). Yamatoya Ibei, on the other hand, is mentioned in Kerlen's catalogue of the Leiden collections only once, as the printer of this title, with the annotation "active in the Bunka Era (1804-1817)."<sup>2</sup>

The most likely hypothesis seems, therefore, that Izumoji sponsored a reprint of *Chingbirok* sometime early in the nineteenth century, the actual reprint being made by Yamatoya Ihei.

A handwritten note by Prof. Dr. J.J. Hofmann, (1805-1878) that is placed inside the book and is dated 1866, proves that by that date our copy was part of the Leiden collections, but the same note makes clear that Hoffmann had not used the text when he wrote his contribution to *Nippon* about Japan's relations with the continent, which he finished in 1839. The text does bear no other seals than those of the Leiden University Library, and has no *ex libris*. The book was not part, therefore, of the collections put together by Cock Blomhoff, Von Siebold, and Van Overmeer Fisscher in the 1820s. Neither is the book mentioned in the catalogue Hoffmann prepared of the

books that were bought by Donker Curtius "for the state" on his visit to Edo in 1858.<sup>3</sup> The provenance of the book is thus unclear, but the most likely hypothesis seems to be that the book was acquired by Hoffmann himself, possibly through the Japanese who visited the Netherlands or studied in Leiden between 1862 and 1867, and that it was bought by the University Library with the rest of Hoffmann's personal library after his death in 1878. In that case, however, it is strange that the book does not have an acquisition number inscribed, which one would expect the library to do when it acquired the book.

W.J. BOOT

*For the 1695 Japanese edition of the Chingbirok please follow the following links:*

Chingbirok 1

[www.koreanhistories.org/files/digital\\_sources/Chingbirok1.pdf](http://www.koreanhistories.org/files/digital_sources/Chingbirok1.pdf)

Chingbirok 2

[www.koreanhistories.org/files/digital\\_sources/Chingbirok2.pdf](http://www.koreanhistories.org/files/digital_sources/Chingbirok2.pdf)

Chingbirok 3

[www.koreanhistories.org/files/digital\\_sources/Chingbirok3.pdf](http://www.koreanhistories.org/files/digital_sources/Chingbirok3.pdf)

Chingbirok 4

[www.koreanhistories.org/files/digital\\_sources/Chingbirok4.pdf](http://www.koreanhistories.org/files/digital_sources/Chingbirok4.pdf)

Chingbirok 5

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